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Articles 
LITIGATING WELFARE RIGHTS: MEDICAID, SNAP, 
AND THE LEGACY OF THE NEW PROPERTY 
Andrew Hammond 
ABSTRACT—In 2017, the Republican-controlled Congress was poised to make 
deep cuts to the nation’s two largest anti-poverty programs: Medicaid and the 
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), commonly known as 
“food stamps.” Yet, despite a unified, GOP-led federal government for the first 
time in over a decade, those efforts failed. Meanwhile, the Trump 
Administration and its allies in state government continue to pursue different 
strategies to roll back entitlements to medical and food assistance. As public 
interest lawyers challenge these agency actions in federal court, roughly five 
million Americans’ health insurance and food assistance hang in the balance. 
This Article asks why Medicaid and SNAP have proven so resilient. The 
answer lies in the fiscal federalism that governs them and the federal litigation 
that reinforces them. Food and healthcare programs for poor Americans are 
shaped by several institutions: Congress, federal and state agencies, state 
legislatures, and courts. The federal government pays for 100% of SNAP 
benefits. States pay for up to half of the costs of administering the program, 
but SNAP’s substantive benefits are free to the states. For Medicaid, states 
contribute to the substantive benefits, but the federal government pays the 
lion’s share. As one would expect, when the substance of the benefit is free but 
the procedures surrounding the benefit are not, states are reluctant to impose 
procedural barriers for which the state must pay to prevent its residents from 
accessing benefits which cost the state nothing. As a result, the fiscal rules 
surrounding these programs engender an unholy, but not unstable, alliance 
between public interest lawyers and state administrators—one that prevents the 
gutting of these benefit programs. When states do attempt to restrict access to 
these programs, public interest lawyers can rely on statutory provisions and 
administrative law to contest these cuts in federal court. 
In unearthing this legal infrastructure, this Article offers a new account of 
welfare litigation, one that sharpens and updates Charles Reich’s theory of 
government benefits in The New Property. This Article also challenges the 
conventional wisdom that procedural protections undermine substantive rights. 
Finally, it disputes the widely held belief that litigation is a poor tool for 
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protecting poor people’s rights. Rather, public interest litigation has played a 
key role in Medicaid and SNAP’s durability. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Last October, the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit 
heard oral argument to decide whether the Trump Administration could permit 
Arkansas, Kentucky, and other states to impose work requirements on 
Medicaid recipients. Experts estimated that 195,000 people would have lost 
their health insurance as a result of these two states’ efforts.1 Had Arkansas and 
 
 1 See Amy Goldstein, Appeals Panel Expresses Skepticism About Medicaid Work Requirements, WASH. 
POST (Oct. 11, 2019, 1:11 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/health/appeals-panel-expresses-
skepticism-about-medicaid-work-requirements/2019/10/11/a8357c4e-eb8a-11e9-9c6d-
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Kentucky’s actions succeeded, at least twenty states would have followed suit.2 
Imposing work requirements on such a scale threatens the health insurance of 
two million Americans. 
The same day the D.C. Circuit considered the legality of the proposed 
Medicaid changes, three federal district court judges in California, New York, 
and Washington State granted nationwide injunctions blocking the Trump 
Administration’s final rule on public charge. This public charge regulation 
would have both empowered consular officials to deny entry to and 
immigration judges to order removal of legal immigrants on the grounds that 
they or their family members were likely to access or had accessed anti-poverty 
programs like Medicaid and the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program 
(SNAP), commonly known as “food stamps.” Those injunctions met different 
fates in the Second and Ninth Circuits. The Ninth Circuit stayed the injunctions 
in California and Washington.3 The Second Circuit upheld the district court’s 
injunction,4 only to be overruled by the Supreme Court’s temporary stay.5 Like 
the Medicaid work requirement litigation, the public charge litigation will wind 
its way through the federal courts in the coming months. However, unlike the 
Medicaid work requirement litigation, the Supreme Court has signaled its 
interest in resolving this controversy. If the public charge regulation does go 
into effect, experts estimate millions will disenroll in Medicaid and SNAP, 
including anywhere from 875,000 to 2,000,000 citizen children who would 
lose their health insurance.6 
A few weeks after the D.C. Circuit argument, the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture (USDA) finalized its work requirement rule for SNAP recipients. 
At the time, researchers estimated 755,000 people would lose food assistance.7 
As with the Medicaid work requirements, legal aid attorneys challenged these 
 
436a0df4f31d_story.html [https://perma.cc/9KV7-QENQ] (identifying about 95,000 individuals at risk in 
Kentucky and 100,000 at risk in Arkansas). 
 2 See infra Section I.B. At the time of this writing, the Trump Administration and the State of Arkansas 
have filed petitions for writ of certiorari in the Supreme Court. Gresham v. Azar, 950 F.3d 93 (D.C. Cir. 
2020), petitions for cert. filed, Nos. 20-37 & 20-38 (July 13, 2020). 
 3 City of San Francisco v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., 944 F.3d 773 (9th Cir. 2019). 
 4 New York v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Nos. 19-3591 & 19-3595, 2020 WL 95815 (2d Cir. Jan. 
8, 2020). 
 5 Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. New York, 140 S. Ct. 599 (2020) (order granting stay). 
 6 SAMANTHA ARTIGA, ANTHONY DAMICO & RACHEL GARFIELD, KAISER FAM. FOUND., POTENTIAL 
EFFECTS OF PUBLIC CHARGE CHANGES ON HEALTH COVERAGE FOR CITIZEN CHILDREN (2018), 
http://files.kff.org/attachment/Issue-Brief-Potential-Effects-of-Public-Charge-Changes-on-Health-
Coverage-for-Citizen-Children [https://perma.cc/F6CM-JBUZ]. 
 7 LAURA WHEATON, URB. INST., ESTIMATED EFFECT OF RECENT PROPOSED CHANGES TO SNAP 
REGULATIONS 6 (2019), https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/101368/estimated_effect_of
_recent_proposed_changes_to_snap_regulations_2.pdf [https://perma.cc/EJF7-8DR8]. 
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regulations in federal court and secured a preliminary injunction before the 
final rule could go into effect. While the Trump Administration has filed its 
appeal,8 Congress has scuttled the final regulation by prohibiting the USDA’s 
regulation during the duration of the COVID-19 pandemic.9 Together, these 
three administrative actions, if implemented, would result in millions losing 
health insurance and food assistance in a matter of months. 
Despite the expected blast radius of these proposals, most legal scholars 
have paid them no mind. Understandably, the health law community sees the 
Medicaid changes in the broader context of an effort to undo the Affordable 
Care Act (ACA). Similarly, immigration scholars and practitioners see the 
public charge regulation as one of several anti-immigrant proposals from the 
Trump Administration. Yet, outside of these fields, scholars have failed to see 
these controversies in federal court as worthy of sustained inquiry, let alone 
one that calls into question the nature of the American welfare state. The legal 
academy’s neglect of these controversies stems, in part, from the fact that for 
the last half century, welfare has been ignored as a site of public law. When 
the Supreme Court declined to consider further constitutional welfare 
challenges in the early 1970s, the professoriate followed.10 The broader public 
law community has let this field lie fallow for far too long. 
This Article seeks to explain why the Trump Administration and the 
115th Congress’s efforts to fundamentally reshape the American safety net 
have failed—at least so far. Despite their near-total control of the presidency, 
Congress, and state government, ideological opponents of these programs have 
not easily dismantled food and medical assistance. It shows why the Trump 
Administration has resorted to an interlocking strategy, what I call “devolved, 
disaggregated conditionality,” to undermine Medicaid and SNAP. These 
welfare-cutting efforts from 2016 to 2019 by the Legislative and Executive 
Branches show the process of retrenchment is still subject to the rule of law.11 
 
 8 Notice of Appeal, District of Columbia v. Dep’t of Agric., No. 1:20-cv-119 (D.D.C. May 12, 2020) 
(filed by Sec’y Perdue, U.S. Dep’t of Agric.). 
 9 See Ashraf Khalil, USDA to Appeal Ruling, Seeks Food Stamp Change amid Pandemic, ASSOC. PRESS 
(Mar. 18, 2020), https://apnews.com/e2a2e9be5950a98f4dabcc2649aef332 [https://perma.cc/JA9E-
W3XK]; Lola Fadulu, Trump Backs Off Tougher Food Stamp Work Rules for Now, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 10, 
2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/10/us/politics/trump-food-stamps-delay.html [https://perma.cc/ 
N2QA-SMGF]; see also Families First Coronavirus Response Act of 2020, Pub. L. No. 116-127, § 2301, 
134 Stat. 178, 187–88 (to be codified at 7 U.S.C. § 2011). 
 10 For a discussion of the exceptions, see infra Section I.A.1. 
 11 See Jonah D. Levy, Welfare Retrenchment, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE WELFARE STATE 
552–65 (Francis G. Castles, Stephan Leibfried, Jane Lewis Herbert Obinger & Christopher Pierson eds., 
2010) (discussing scholarly treatment of this term). The classic study of welfare retrenchment is Paul 
Pierson’s comparative analysis of the Reagan Administration and the Thatcher government. PAUL PIERSON, 
DISMANTLING THE WELFARE STATE? REAGAN, THATCHER, AND THE POLITICS OF RETRENCHMENT 131–63 
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The Trump Administration’s efforts have stalled, tied up by several federal 
lawsuits that have secured injunctive relief for SNAP and Medicaid recipients. 
The Medicaid and SNAP cases in federal courts demonstrate both the enduring 
vitality of welfare litigation and the durability of medical and food assistance 
in the United States. 
Why have Medicaid and SNAP proven so tough to cut? The answer to 
this puzzle lies in the combination of the fiscal federalism peculiar to these 
programs and the doctrinal framework laid out by the Supreme Court fifty 
years ago. That framework stems from Professor Charles Reich’s famous 
article, The New Property, which posited that government itself was 
increasingly the source of property that individuals needed to survive.12 
Drawing on Reich’s theory in Goldberg v. Kelly in 1970, the Supreme Court 
held that a state agency can only terminate a recipient’s welfare benefit in a 
manner that comports with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.13 In dissent, Justice Hugo Black worried that the political 
branches would pay for these court-imposed procedural safeguards by 
reducing the substantive benefits themselves, perversely hurting the very 
people the Court sought to protect.14 The Supreme Court echoed Justice 
Black’s reasoning in Mathews v. Eldridge in 1976, which remains the Court’s 
leading procedural due process case.15 
What Justice Black overlooked in his dissent in Goldberg and the 
Supreme Court misidentified in Mathews is that there is not just one institution 
that responds to judicial rulings on welfare administration. These programs are 
governed concurrently by Congress, federal and state agencies, state 
legislatures, and courts. The federal government foots the bill for all SNAP 
benefits. States pay for up to half of the costs of administering the program, 
but SNAP’s substantive benefits are free to the states. For Medicaid, while 
 
(1994); see also R. Shep Melnick, Subterranean Politics Blues, 54 TULSA L. REV. 271, 272 (2019) (defining 
the “distinctive politics of retrenchment” as “taking away benefits and privileges previously granted” (citing 
PIERSON, supra)). Legal scholars occasionally draw on this work and the wider literature, especially to 
discuss the curtailment of civil rights. See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank & Sean Farhang, Rights and 
Retrenchment in the Trump Era, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 37, 43–47 (2018); Stephen B. Burbank & Sean 
Farhang, Litigation Reform: An Institutional Approach, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1543, 1564–67, 1582 (2014) 
(relying on Pierson’s framework); Twinette L. Johnson, Going Back to the Drawing Board: Re-Entrenching 
the Higher Education Act to Restore Its Historical Policy of Access, 45 U. TOL. L. REV. 545, 547–51 (2014) 
(same); Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Americans with Disabilities Act as Welfare Reform, 44 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 921, 1024–26 (2003) (synthesizing efforts to curtail disability benefits); Louis Kaplow & Steven 
Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV. 961, 1101–02 (2001) (discussing retrenchment in tort 
liability). 
 12 Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964). 
 13 397 U.S. 254, 261 (1970). 
 14 Id. at 278–79 (Black, J., dissenting). 
 15 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
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states do contribute to the cost of substantive benefits, the federal government 
pays for the vast majority and can even wholly subsidize the states, as seen in 
the ACA’s most recent expansion of Medicaid that was intended to be free to 
states for several years. As one would expect when the substance of the benefit 
is free but the procedures surrounding the benefit are not, states should be 
reluctant to impose procedural barriers that prevent its residents from accessing 
benefits for which the state does not pay. As a result, the fiscal rules 
surrounding these programs engenders an unholy, but not unstable, alliance 
between public interest lawyers and state administrators. When states do erect 
procedural hurdles in part due to ideological preferences, they must contend 
with fighting back legal challenges in federal court. The procedural protections 
for SNAP and Medicaid stem less from constitutional law and more from 
federal statutes and regulations. Since the federal courts still treat welfare 
benefits as a property interest, public interest lawyers have standing and a 
cause of action to trigger review of agency action that impinges on these 
benefits. 
By revisiting Reich’s theory and the Supreme Court’s reasoning in those 
cases, this Article updates the “New Property” theory for our time, precisely at 
the moment when the two anti-poverty programs that millions of Americans 
receive are under attack. As the New Property has aged, the two largest anti-
poverty programs in America have fed on that theory’s legacy, albeit in 
unexpected ways. The federal government spends $60 billion annually on 
SNAP, nearly as much as spending on K–12 education, the Environmental 
Protection Agency’s budget, and the National Aeronautics Space 
Administration’s budget combined.16 In the 2018 Farm Bill, the omnibus 
legislation that authorizes all federal agriculture and nutrition spending for five 
years, SNAP made up over 80% of the legislation’s expenditures.17 That 
spending reaches a wide swath of the country: nearly forty-three million 
 
 16 See U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., SUPPLEMENTAL NUTRITION ASSISTANCE PROGRAM PARTICIPATION AND 
COSTS (2020), https://fns-prod.azureedge.net/sites/default/files/resource-files/SNAPsummary-6.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5MGJ-S35A]; U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., EDUCATION DEPARTMENT BUDGET BY MAJOR 
PROGRAM (2018), https://www2.ed.gov/about/overview/budget/history/edhistory.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
MS7Y-TWGM]; ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, FY 2019: EPA BUDGET IN BRIEF (2019), 
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2018-02/documents/fy-2019-epa-bib.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
M5D3-G82C]; NASA, FY 2020: EXPLORE BUDGET ESTIMATES BRIEFING BOOK (2020), 
https://www.nasa.gov/sites/default/files/atoms/files/fy2020_summary_budget_brief.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/Q3KP-UBLL]; see also Food Stamp Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-525, 78 Stat. 703 
(codified at 7 U.S.C. §§ 2011–2036(a)). The name was changed to Supplemental Nutrition Assistance 
Program (SNAP) in 2008. See Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-234, § 4001, 
122 Stat. 923, 1092.  
 17 See infra Section II.A.2. 
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Americans receive SNAP.18 SNAP’s ubiquity explains why it is considered a 
vital countercyclical tool in economic downturns.19 
Surpassing SNAP in spending, Medicaid is, after Social Security and 
Medicare, the most expensive domestic program in the federal budget.20 
However, unlike Social Security and Medicare, Medicaid expenditures 
implicate American federalism. Medicaid is the largest contribution the federal 
government makes to state budgets.21 And even though the federal government 
pays for nearly two-thirds of Medicaid’s $600 billion price tag,22 states spend 
more of their own revenue on Medicaid than anything else except public 
schools.23 Intended as a targeted program to serve poor families, Medicaid now 
accounts for one in every six dollars spent on health care.24 
Moreover, both programs loom large in the political life of the country. 
During the most recent government shutdown, state governments, social 
service providers, and retailers agonized over what would happen if forty 
million Americans did not receive their SNAP benefits on time.25 The Supreme 
 
 18 See FOOD & NUTRITION SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., SUPPLEMENTAL NUTRITION ASSISTANCE 
PROGRAM, https://fns-prod.azureedge.net/sites/default/files/resource-files/34SNAPmonthly-7b.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/QZX7-2U2C] (data as of July 10, 2020). 
 19 In the depths of the 2008 financial crisis, White House advisers relied on the macroeconomic 
multiplier effect of SNAP. See Peter Ganong & Jeffrey B. Liebman, The Decline, Rebound, and Further 
Rise in SNAP Enrollment: Disentangling Business Cycle Fluctuations and Policy Changes, 10 AM. ECON. 
J. 153, 154 (2018). See generally KENNETH HANSON, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., ECONOMIC RESEARCH REPORT 
NO. 103, THE FOOD ASSISTANCE NATIONAL INPUT-OUTPUT MULTIPLIER (FANIOM) MODEL AND 
STIMULUS EFFECTS OF SNAP (2010). 
 20 See GRANT A. DRIESSEN, CONG. RSCH. SERV. 7-5700, THE FEDERAL BUDGET: OVERVIEW AND 
ISSUES FOR FY2019 AND BEYOND 7 (2018), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R45202.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/K4GW-7QWX] (“The largest mandatory programs, Social Security, Medicare, and the 
federal share of Medicaid, constituted 48% of all federal spending in FY2017.”); Robin Rudowitz, Kendal 
Orgera & Elizabeth Hinton, Medicaid Financing: The Basics, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Mar. 21, 2019), 
https://www.kff.org/report-section/medicaid-financing-the-basics-issue-brief/ [https://perma.cc/FVU4-
M6GW].  
 21 Rudowitz et al., supra note 20. 
 22 See Federal and State Share of Medicaid Spending, KAISER FAM. FOUND., https://www. 
kff.org/medicaid/state-indicator/federalstate-share-of-spending [https://perma.cc/5ELT-Z4SA]; NHE Fact 
Sheet, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., https://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-
Systems/Statistics-Trends-and-Reports/NationalHealthExpendData/NHE-Fact-Sheet [https://perma.cc/ 
TRR8-2RVB]. 
 23 See NHE Fact Sheet, supra note 22 (noting the health expenditures of various states); Alex Boucher 
& Barb Rosewicz, Medicaid Consumes Growing Slice of States’ Dollars, PEW CHARITABLE TRS. (Apr. 22, 
2015), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/articles/2015/04/medicaid-consumes-growing-
slice-of-states-dollars [https://perma.cc/Q2C3-CNE5]. 
 24 Rudowitz et al., supra note 20. More than 90% of nonelderly beneficiaries had incomes below 200% 
of the federal poverty level (FPL); 54% were below 100% FPL. See JAMILA MICHENER, FRAGMENTED 
DEMOCRACY: MEDICAID, FEDERALISM, AND UNEQUAL POLITICS 9–10 (2018). 
 25 See Helena Bottemiller Evich, States Warn Food Stamp Recipients to Budget Early Benefit Payments 
Due to Shutdown, POLITICO (Jan. 15, 2019, 6:58 PM), https://www.politico.com/story/2019/01/15/state-
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Court’s decision in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius 
has pushed the decision to participate in the ACA’s Medicaid expansion down 
to every governor’s office and state legislature in the nation.26 By rendering the 
ACA’s Medicaid expansion optional, the Court unleashed a series of pitched 
legislative battles and bipartisan compromises in Louisiana, Maine, and 
Michigan,27 as well as high-profile ballot initiatives in Idaho, Nebraska, and 
Utah.28 Across every dimension—the number of people served, the billions of 
dollars spent, cases that wind their way through the federal courts, political 
footballs kicked up Pennsylvania Avenue by the White House, back down by 
Congress, and across the country to every state capitol—SNAP and Medicaid 
controversies persist in the most important arenas of the American 
administrative state. 
The resilience of SNAP and Medicaid defies received wisdom. Historians 
characterize the American welfare state as stunted, especially when compared 
to those in other wealthy democracies.29 Some social scientists and legal 
 
food-stamp-benefits-shutdown-2491182 [https://perma.cc/SB9F-Z2HQ]; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of 
Agric., USDA Announces Plan to Protect SNAP Participants Access to SNAP in February (Jan. 8, 2019), 
https://www.usda.gov/media/press-releases/2019/01/08/usda-announces-plan-protect-snap-participants-
access-snap-february [https://perma.cc/S6TL-DEL5] (explaining the Department’s plans to fund February 
benefits). 
 26 See 567 U.S. 519, 588 (2012) (“Congress may offer the States grants and require the States to comply 
with accompanying conditions, but the States must have a genuine choice whether to accept the offer.”); see 
also Akeiisa Coleman & Rachel Nuzum, Up Close: Legislative Activity on Medicaid Heating Up Across the 
Country, THE COMMONWEALTH FUND (Apr. 9, 2019), https://www.commonwealthfund.org/blog/2019/up-
close-legislative-activity-medicaid-heating-up-across-country [https://perma.cc/3TGC-4PPK] (discussing 
developments on Medicaid activity in six states). 
 27 See, e.g., Joe Lawlor, Maine Gov. Mills Rejects Work Requirements LePage Sought for Medicaid, 
PORTLAND PRESS HERALD (Jan. 22, 2019), https://www.pressherald.com/2019/01/22/mills-rejects-work-
requirements-lepage-sought-for-medicaid-beneficiaries [https://perma.cc/P95J-8N4Y]; Catherine Shaffer, 
New Data Show Benefits of Michigan’s Medicaid Expansion, MICH. PUB. RADIO (Dec. 9, 2018), 
https://www.michiganradio.org/post/new-data-show-benefits-michigans-medicaid-expansion 
[https://perma.cc/FVX6-J77U]; Medicaid Expansion Enrollment Increases to 400,635; Uninsured Rate 
Drops, LA. DEP’T OF HEALTH (Feb. 16, 2017), https://ldh.la.gov/index.cfm/newsroom/detail/4169 
[https://perma.cc/W9M6-P49W]. 
 28 See Lindsay Whitehust, Utah Reduces Voter-Backed Medicaid Expansion in Rare Move, ASSOC. 
PRESS (Feb. 11, 2019), https://apnews.com/49b24e08059e49b3b1685ff0cb450e5e [https://perma.cc/JAT6-
VD8Q]; Audrey Dutton, Idaho Supreme Court Upholds Medicaid Expansion, Rejects Idaho Freedom 
Foundation Suit, IDAHO STATESMAN (Feb. 5, 2019, 4:54 PM), 
https://www.idahostatesman.com/news/politics-government/state-politics/article225578040.html 
[https://perma.cc/EGX8-88YN]; Abby Goodnough, Idaho, Nebraska, and Utah Vote to Expand Medicaid, 
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 7, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/07/health/medicaid-expansion-ballot.html 
[https://perma.cc/68VU-6G3N]; see also Abbe R. Gluck & Thomas Scott-Railton, Affordable Care Act 
Entrenchment, 108 GEO. L.J. 495, 566–68 (2020) (discussing this activity in the states). 
 29 See Monica Prasad, American Exceptionalism and the Welfare State: The Revisionist Literature, 
19 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 187, 188 (2016) (relating that “in recent decades, several scholars have argued that 
the American welfare state is not small after all; it is different”). 
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scholars similarly disparage American welfare programs as an amalgamation 
of race-baiting, misogyny, and anti-tax politics that accompanied the rise of 
right-wing politics.30 Few would predict that two means-tested programs, beset 
by myriad regulations and challenges inherent in federal and state 
coordination, would represent some of the largest federal and state 
expenditures in twenty-first-century America. Yet, we lack an account of how 
and why SNAP and Medicaid have become so durable over the last half 
century. To best understand how SNAP and Medicaid went from minimal 
enterprises to massive endeavors in the space of a few decades, we must allow 
for an important, if imperfect, role for law.31 
In the process, this Article informs two scholarly debates. First, the 
surprising strength of the country’s two largest anti-poverty programs enriches 
our understanding of the relationship between procedure and substantive law. 
This Article challenges the purportedly perverse relationship between 
procedural protections and substantive rights, famously articulated by Justice 
Black in his dissent in Goldberg v. Kelly and the Burger Court in its decision 
in Mathews v. Eldridge.32 Second, the Article adds further evidence that those 
interested in tracing these developments need to look beyond Congress to the 
agencies and courts. By illuminating the more concrete issues of agency action 
and public law litigation, accounting for the staying power of SNAP and 
Medicaid illustrates how law is made in today’s administrative state. 
This Article sets out to account for the continued durability of SNAP and 
Medicaid in today’s administrative state. Part I traces the rise of American anti-
poverty programs, the genesis of Professor Charles Reich’s The New Property, 
and the Supreme Court’s treatment of welfare benefits in Goldberg v. Kelly 
and beyond. This Part also outlines the New Property’s intellectual and 
programmatic legacy and the doctrinal context for public law attorneys 
attempting to litigate welfare rights today. Part II discusses the Trump 
Administration’s current attacks on SNAP and Medicaid through legislative 
and administrative action, paying particularly close attention to the controversy 
over work requirements. Finally, Part III proposes updating the New Property 
by putting forth a structural account recognizing that procedure not only raises 
 
 30 See, e.g., LARRY M. BARTELS, UNEQUAL DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE NEW 
GILDED AGE (2008); MARTIN GILENS, WHY AMERICANS HATE WELFARE: RACE, POVERTY, AND THE 
POLITICS OF ANTIPOVERTY POLICY (1999); Lucy A. Williams, Race, Rat Bites and Unfit Mothers: How 
Media Discourse Informs Welfare Legislation Debate, 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1159, 1163–68 (1995); 
Dorothy E. Roberts, The Value of Black Mothers’ Work, 29 CONN. L. REV. 871, 873 (1994); Sylvia A. Law, 
Women, Work, Welfare, and the Preservation of Patriarchy, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 1249, 1264–66 (1983). 
 31 See generally Ira Katznelson, Rethinking the Silences of Social and Economic Policy, 101 POL. SCI. 
Q. 307, 320, 323 (1986) (identifying “decentralization and federalism . . . a porous central bureaucracy . . . 
[and] the importance of law and the judiciary” as key features of the American state). 
 32 Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 271 (1970); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
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the cost for state administrators to block social welfare program expansion, but 
also raises the costs for participation in those programs. The Article concludes 
by noting the persistent barriers to poor Americans seeking assistance, despite 
the courts’ protection of their interests. 
This Article does not intend to paint a rosy picture of welfare litigation. 
Instead, the Article updates the insights of the New Property in light of the 
maturation of medical and food assistance over the last fifty years. The 
durability of anti-poverty assistance in the United States cannot be fully 
explained without a thorough accounting of the legal infrastructure—the public 
interest bar, state agencies, and federal courts—that buttresses these programs. 
This account challenges shibboleths about public law litigation, procedural 
protections, and substantive rights. By necessity, that project moves the New 
Property away from its original premises that rights must be constitutional, 
lawmaking must occur in Congress, and cases must be litigated up to the 
Supreme Court. This Article seeks to build a theory to fit the world of welfare 
we live in now.33 And in light of the ongoing cases in federal court, we need 
that theory now more than ever. 
I. THE NEW PROPERTY, FIFTY YEARS ON 
Before we can understand the New Property’s legacy, we must attend to 
its creation. This Part synthesizes that origin story with the expansion of food 
and medical assistance and the persistence of welfare litigation over the last 
half century. It traces Supreme Court precedent regarding treating welfare 
entitlements as property rights and concludes by setting up the next Part: a 
comprehensive account of how SNAP and Medicaid have fared in the Trump 
Administration. Indeed, the animating premise of this Article is that the Trump 
Administration’s actions and the attendant litigation illustrate the New 
Property’s enduring vitality. But to get there, we must know how the New 
Property began. 
A. The Beginnings of the New Property 
For the first 150 years of the United States’ history, services to people in 
need were designed, funded, and delivered by state governments, 
municipalities, and charitable organizations, particularly religiously affiliated 
 
 33 See, e.g., Elise Bant & Matthew Harding, Introduction to EXPLORING PRIVATE LAW 3, 3 (Elise Bant 
& Matthew Harding eds., 2010) (describing a legal scholar as someone who “must map what he sees from 
the ground, feeling his way where he must as well as taking the bird’s eye view where he can” thereby “bring 
order to the chaos, but not by turning away from the chaos, and not by refusing to bear the responsibility of 
imposing order”). 
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ones.34 While states and cities began building more systematic responses to the 
newly perceived social problem of poverty at the turn of the twentieth century, 
the federal government was largely absent from social welfare law until the 
New Deal.35 However, beginning with the Social Security Act of 1935, the 
federal government took on a far more active role in financing and overseeing 
these state and local efforts.36 From that point forward, the federal government 
managed an ever-growing social insurance apparatus that dispensed payments 
to the elderly, dependents, and survivors of those beneficiaries, and, later, 
workers with disabilities.37 For needy families, the Social Security Act 
established the Aid to Dependent Children (ADC) program, later renamed Aid 
to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), which increased the federal 
funding of state-administered cash assistance programs on the condition of 
some broad federal requirements.38 While scholars continue to contest the 
purposes and pitfalls of New Deal programs, these programs represent some 
 
 34 For the classic surveys, see MICHAEL B. KATZ, IN THE SHADOW OF THE POORHOUSE: A SOCIAL 
HISTORY OF WELFARE IN AMERICA 3–35 (10th ed. 1996); WALTER I. TRATTNER, FROM POOR LAW TO 
WELFARE STATE: A HISTORY OF SOCIAL WELFARE IN AMERICA 1–46 (6th ed. 1999). There are two new 
histories of governmental responses to poverty in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century America. See KRISTIN 
O’BRASSILL-KULFAN, VAGRANTS AND VAGABONDS: POVERTY AND MOBILITY IN THE EARLY AMERICAN 
REPUBLIC (2019); HIDETAKA HIROTA, EXPELLING THE POOR: ATLANTIC SEABOARD STATES AND THE 
NINETEENTH-CENTURY ORIGINS OF AMERICAN IMMIGRATION POLICY (2017). 
 35 See MICHELE LANDIS DAUBER, THE SYMPATHETIC STATE: DISASTER RELIEF AND THE ORIGINS OF 
THE AMERICAN WELFARE STATE 127–50 (2013) (exploring how federal responses to natural disasters 
informed the New Deal generally and the Social Security Act in particular); JAMES T. PATTERSON, 
AMERICA’S STRUGGLE AGAINST POVERTY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 19–33 (2000) (discussing how the 
Progressive Era built on this understanding); DANIEL T. RODGERS, ATLANTIC CROSSINGS: SOCIAL POLITICS 
IN A PROGRESSIVE AGE 235–66 (1998) (discussing American interest in European social protection schemes 
at the turn of the twentieth century); LINDA GORDON, PITIED BUT NOT ENTITLED: SINGLE MOTHERS AND 
THE HISTORY OF WELFARE 1890–1935, at 253–99 (1994) (describing compromises and concessions made 
by movement leaders to secure the passage of the Social Security Act); THEDA SKOCPOL, PROTECTING 
SOLDIERS AND MOTHERS 525–39 (1992) (arguing that the American welfare state predates the New Deal). 
 36 The Social Security Act of 1935 established and updated several federal and state programs, including 
Aid to Dependent Children, the predecessor program to AFDC and TANF and what most people refer to as 
“welfare” (Title IV). Pub. L. No. 74-271, 49 Stat. 620 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 601–81); see also Goldberg, 
397 U.S. at 271–72 (Black, J., dissenting) (“In the last half century the United States, along with many, 
perhaps most, other nations of the world, has moved far toward becoming a welfare state, that is, a nation 
that for one reason or another taxes its most affluent people to help support, feed, clothe, and shelter its less 
fortunate citizens.”). 
 37 See Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 174–75 (1941) (suggesting that “the theory of the 
Elizabethan poor laws no longer fit the facts” because “[r]ecent years, and particularly the past decade, have 
been marked by a growing recognition that in an industrial society the task of providing assistance to the 
needy has ceased to be local in character”). 
 38 See PATTERSON, supra note 35, at 65–70. Both Medicaid and the food stamp program were conceived 
of as in-kind supplements of medical care and food assistance to AFDC recipients. See GREEN BOOK: 
BACKGROUND MATERIAL AND DATA ON PROGRAMS WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF THE COMMITTEE ON 
WAYS AND MEANS § 2 (2008). 
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of the federal government’s early anti-poverty initiatives and supervision of 
state and local welfare efforts.39 
The growth of federal expenditures and regulations for anti-poverty 
programs accelerated when President Lyndon B. Johnson declared an 
unconditional War on Poverty.40 Johnson’s national program served several 
purposes. Johnson hoped to complete the work of President Franklin Delano 
Roosevelt’s New Deal, extend the gains of the Civil Rights movement from 
political rights to social and economic rights, and broaden federal investment 
and control across urban and rural areas of the country through a domestic 
policy distinct from that of the slain President John F. Kennedy.41 The Johnson 
Administration’s anti-poverty efforts, directed from the White House by the 
newly created Office of Economic Opportunity, drew on and contributed to a 
confidence in the federal government’s capacity to tackle national challenges. 
This activity, spurred by the experiences of the New Deal, World War II, and 
the Marshall Plan, fueled the growth of the federal bureaucracy.42 That 
bureaucracy, in turn, confronted a federal judiciary that had to negotiate the 
growth in administrative activity. In response, lawyers and activists in this 
period drew on flourishing social movements, especially those advocating for 
equal rights and fair treatment of Black Americans and women, to argue that 
poor Americans deserved similar opportunity and justice in the United States. 
 
 39 See generally JEFFERSON COWIE, THE GREAT EXCEPTION: THE NEW DEAL & THE LIMITS OF 
AMERICAN POLITICS (2016); CYBELLE FOX, THREE WORLDS OF RELIEF: RACE, IMMIGRATION, AND THE 
AMERICAN WELFARE STATE FROM THE PROGRESSIVE ERA TO THE NEW DEAL (2012); IRA KATZNELSON, 
FEAR ITSELF: THE NEW DEAL AND THE ORIGINS OF OUR TIME (2013); CASS SUNSTEIN, THE SECOND BILL 
OF RIGHTS: FDR’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION AND WHY WE NEED IT MORE THAN EVER (2004); EDWIN 
AMENTA, BOLD RELIEF: INSTITUTIONAL POLITICS AND THE ORIGINS OF MODERN AMERICAN SOCIAL 
POLICY (1998). 
 40 See Video: Lyndon Johnson’s First State of the Union—January 8, 1964 (UVA Miller 
Center), https://web2.millercenter.org/speeches/video/mp4/1Mb/spe_1964_0108_johnson.mp4 (last visited 
Sept. 28, 2020). Some historians have discussed the role of Michael Harrington’s The Other America, 
published in 1962, and particularly its review in the New Yorker. See Dwight MacDonald, Our Invisible 
Poor, NEW YORKER (Jan. 12, 1963), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/1963/01/19/our-invisible-poor 
[https://perma.cc/C3DX-57DW]; ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER JR., A THOUSAND DAYS: JOHN F. KENNEDY IN 
THE WHITE HOUSE 1010 (rev. ed. 2002) (“The Other America helped crystallize [Kennedy’s] determination 
in 1963 to accompany the tax cut by a poverty program.”). In a provocative challenge to this focus on 
political elites and mass attitudes, Professor Alice O’Connor argues that researchers and philanthropy in the 
1950s and 1960s narrowed the focus of “the poverty problem” by abandoning broader structural inquiries in 
favor of a technocratic, behaviorist approach. ALICE O’CONNOR, POVERTY KNOWLEDGE: SOCIAL SCIENCE, 
SOCIAL POLICY, AND THE POOR IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY U.S. HISTORY 284–95 (2001). 
 41 See JULIAN E. ZELIZER, THE FIERCE URGENCY OF NOW: LYNDON JOHNSON, CONGRESS, AND THE 
BATTLE FOR THE GREAT SOCIETY 132–45 (2015). 
 42 See MICHAEL B. KATZ, THE UNDESERVING POOR: AMERICA’S ENDURING CONFRONTATION WITH 
POVERTY 104 (2d ed. 2013) (suggesting that three interpretations of the early years of the War on Poverty—
“the primacy of ideas and goodwill,” “the outcome of bureaucratic maneuvering,” and “a response to great 
social and political forces”—are at least partially correct). 
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This legalistic, public-spirited approach to addressing poverty manifested, in 
part, through the federal funding of lawyers for poor Americans. Although the 
Johnson Administration initially rejected such a proposal, the efforts of a few 
well-connected advocates and the American Bar Association’s eventual 
acquiescence led to the creation of federally funded legal services.43 These 
lawyers immediately began to challenge state administration of welfare 
programs in federal court.44 Importantly, the legal service lawyers sometimes 
disagreed with the activist leaders in the welfare-rights movement, whose 
leadership and rank-and-file members pushed the lawyers to challenge the 
adequacy of the assistance itself.45 Rather than squarely litigating a 
constitutional right to subsistence, the lawyers, taking a page from the 
NAACP’s Southern strategy, attacked benefit terminations, residency 
requirements, and privacy violations in the former Confederacy.46 
As a result of that strategy, the first welfare case heard in the United States 
Supreme Court was King v. Smith.47 Reuben King, Alabama Governor George 
Wallace’s welfare administrator, oversaw a practice which directed welfare 
caseworkers to terminate any family’s cash assistance if the caseworker 
determined a man was living in the house.48 Known as the “substitute father” 
rule, this practice, common across a swath of states, reflected racist views of 
Black women’s sexuality, family status, and economic activity.49 States like 
Alabama argued that the practice was lawful because federal law gave them 
significant leeway to run their public benefits programs, despite the federal 
government contributing significant portions of funding to states, including 
83% of the funding to Alabama’s AFDC program.50 The Supreme Court 
 
 43 See MARTHA F. DAVIS, BRUTAL NEED: LAWYERS AND THE WELFARE RIGHTS MOVEMENT, 1960–
1973, at 32–35 (1993); FELICIA KORNBLUH, THE BATTLE FOR WELFARE RIGHTS: POVERTY AND POLITICS 
IN MODERN AMERICA 69 (2007) (describing how the “legal resources available to welfare recipients changed 
dramatically in the middle 1960s”). 
 44 See DAVIS, supra note 43, at 35–37. 
 45 See id. at 56–69 (detailing debates over litigation strategy among Welfare Rights organizations and 
attorneys). 
 46 Id. 
 47 392 U.S. 309 (1968); DAVIS, supra note 43, at 4. 
 48 King, 392 U.S. at 313–14. 
 49 Suggestive of the newfound power of a network of anti-poverty lawyers, the legal services lawyer 
who drafted the initial complaint in the King litigation modeled it on a complaint filed by the Center on 
Social Welfare Policy and Law challenging Georgia’s “employable mother” practice. Each harvest season, 
counties in rural Georgia terminated all AFDC recipients who had children over three years old to force 
Black women to work for white farmers. See DAVIS, supra note 43, at 62; see also Ira C. Lupu, Welfare and 
Federalism: AFDC Eligibility Policies and the Scope of State Discretion, 57 B.U. L. REV. 1, 3–11 (1977) 
(discussing the background and implications of King). 
 50 See DAVIS, supra note 43, at 67; King, 392 U.S. at 314 (citing ALABAMA MANUAL FOR 
ADMINISTRATION OF PUBLIC ASSISTANCE, pt. I, ch. 2, § vi); see also id. at 317–18. 
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disagreed, holding that Alabama’s policy violated the Social Security Act 
because it added a condition of eligibility not contemplated by the federal 
statute.51 In doing so, the Court struck down a state’s welfare policy for the first 
time in the nation’s history. The role of federal law—and with it, the role of 
federal courts—in welfare administration would never be the same after King.52 
The following term, the Supreme Court heard arguments in Shapiro v. 
Thompson, which presented three consolidated cases challenging welfare 
residency laws in Connecticut, the District of Columbia, and Pennsylvania. 
Each case involved a statutory provision imposing a one-year waiting period 
before newly arrived residents could receive AFDC. Reargued the following 
term, the case was ultimately decided in favor of the welfare recipients. In an 
opinion authored by Justice William Brennan, the Court reasoned that 
imposing a waiting period on welfare benefits violates a poor American’s 
fundamental right to travel.53 Drawing on emerging equal protection 
jurisprudence, the Court moved closer to suggesting that a state statute that 
infringed on a fundamental right to welfare needed a “compelling interest” to 
survive a Fourteenth Amendment challenge.54 
While King and Shapiro wound their way through the federal courts, legal 
aid lawyers also challenged the state procedures governing benefit 
terminations. However, unlike King, which turned on the interpretation of the 
Social Security Act, and Shapiro, which relied on existing constitutional 
doctrine, this litigation demanded a novel legal theory that brought these 
programs within the ambit of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. At the behest of some welfare experts who knew of his earlier 
writing on invasive searches of welfare recipients’ homes,55 Professor Charles 
Reich agreed to research and reflect on the legal implications of welfare 
administration. The result was The New Property, in which Professor Reich 
argued that government itself was increasingly a source of newfound property 
rights in its provision of entitlements like occupational licenses and welfare 
benefits.56 At common law, land had provided that zone of personal autonomy, 
 
 51 Id. at 333. 
 52 Indeed, Professor Karen Tani has argued that there is a constitutional dimension to King, albeit below 
the surface of the Court’s opinion. See Karen M. Tani, Administrative Equal Protection: Federalism, the 
Fourteenth Amendment, and the Rights of the Poor, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 825, 885–89 (2015). 
 53 Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 630–31 (1969). 
 54 Id. at 638. 
 55 Charles A. Reich, Midnight Welfare Searches and the Social Security Act, 72 YALE L.J. 1347 (1963); 
see also KAREN M. TANI, STATES OF DEPENDENCY: WELFARE, RIGHTS, AND AMERICAN GOVERNANCE, 
1935–1972, at 263–66 (2016); DAVIS, supra note 43, at 81–86. 
 56 See Reich, supra note 12, at 787. Professor Reich’s article The New Property is one of the most well-
known works of legal scholarship. See Fred R. Shapiro & Michelle Pearse, The Most Cited Law Review 
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but the “rootless twentieth century man” of Professor Reich’s time needed 
“sanctuaries or enclaves” to provide protection from government changes in 
policy from one administration to the next.57 Since “property performs the 
function of maintaining independence . . . by creating zones” of independence 
for the rights-holder, Professor Reich wrote that procedural protections could 
provide “a valuable means for restraining arbitrary action” by the 
government.58 
The next term, the Supreme Court struck down New York’s termination 
procedures, lending credence to Reich’s theory of the New Property, in 
Goldberg v. Kelly.59 The Court reasoned that once the Social Security Act 
created a statutory entitlement to assistance, the Fourteenth Amendment 
prohibited a deprivation of that new property interest without due process of 
law. Notably, New York’s Social Services Commissioner had conceded that 
the welfare benefits in question were “property” within the meaning of the Due 
Process Clause.60 As a result, the Court, in another majority opinion by Justice 
Brennan, moved past the threshold question of whether welfare benefits were 
“property” and focused instead on what pretermination process was due.61 The 
Court’s answer was a set of procedural protections, including requiring an in-
person termination hearing to allow the recipient to confront the agency and its 
 
Articles of All Time, 110 MICH. L. REV. 1483, 1489 tbl.1 (2012) (listing Reich’s article as the seventh most 
cited law review article ever); see also Matthew Diller, The Revolution in Welfare Administration: Rules, 
Discretion, and Entrepreneurial Government, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1121, 1144 (2000) (describing how the 
1960s’ “legal-bureaucratic model [of welfare programs] emphasized the notion of entitlement” (citing Reich, 
supra note 12)). 
 57 See Reich, supra note 12, at 787. Professor Reich was not the only legal academic theorizing about 
welfare rights at the time. See, e.g., Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court 1968 Term—Foreword: On 
Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7, 11–13 (1969); Bernard Evans 
Harvith, Federal Equal Protection and Welfare Assistance, 31 ALB. L. REV. 210, 241–45 (1967); Harry W. 
Jones, The Rule of Law and the Welfare State, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 143, 154–55 (1958). And Professor 
Jacobus tenBroek had been writing about these issues for decades until he passed away in 1968. See 
JACOBUS TENBROEK, FAMILY LAW AND THE POOR: ESSAYS BY JACOBUS TENBROEK (Joel F. Handler ed., 
1971); see also Reich, supra note 12, at 786 n.233 (citing works by Professors tenBroek and Jones). 
 58 Reich, supra note 12, at 771, 783. While Professor Reich thought welfare benefits was one example 
of this new property, another impetus for his analysis came from his apprehension about McCarthyism—in 
particular, a case involving a New York doctor who refused to respond to a subpoena from the House Un-
American Activities Committee (HUAC) and who eventually lost his medical license as a result. See Karen 
M. Tani, Flemming v. Nestor: Anticommunism, the Welfare State, and the Making of “New Property,” 
26 LAW & HIST. REV. 379, 403–04 (2008). 
 59 See 397 U.S. 254, 271 (1970). 
 60 The litigants could have used 28 U.S.C. § 1343 or 42 U.S.C. § 1983 instead of claiming an implied 
cause of action in the Constitution itself. Unlike the Justices who currently sit on the Supreme Court, the 
Goldberg majority was apparently unconcerned from whence the cause of action arose. 
 61 Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 262 n.8 (1970) (“It may be realistic today to regard welfare entitlements as 
more like ‘property’ than a ‘gratuity.’”). 
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witnesses before an “impartial decision maker” who would “state the reasons 
for his determination and indicate the evidence he relied on.”62 
Justice Black dissented in Goldberg on several grounds. Most relevant for 
this Article, Justice Black predicted that the additional procedures the Court 
imposed on New York and other states would undermine the very recipients 
the Court sought to protect.63 Justice Black’s reasoning foreshadowed the 
perversity argument that has dogged the due process revolution64: he predicted 
that the cost of increased procedural protections would discourage the political 
branches from extending welfare benefits.65 Justice Black’s intuition about 
subsequent decisions across the branches of government was intriguing, but 
ultimately wrong, as this Article will explore. 
Although Goldberg v. Kelly appeared to invite a revolution in the 
substantive law of welfare programs and constitutional due process more 
generally, such predictions proved premature.66 Within a week of handing 
down Goldberg, the Court rejected a challenge to Maryland’s welfare grant 
amount on equal protection grounds in Dandridge v. Williams.67 The lawyers 
who brought Dandridge argued that by setting a maximum grant, regardless of 
family size, Maryland denied equal treatment to families on the arbitrary basis 
of household size.68 Courts and scholars have subsequently interpreted 
 
 62 Id. at 271. 
 63 Id. at 278–79 (Black, J., dissenting). 
 64 By “due process revolution,” I refer to federal court decisions in both the civil and criminal law 
contexts in the 1960s and 1970s. Compare, e.g., Jason Parkin, Dialogic Due Process, 167 U. PA. L. REV. 
1115, 1116–17 (2019) (arguing that “[a] series of Court decisions culminating in Goldberg v. Kelly greatly 
expanded the scope of the Due Process Clause’s coverage, triggering an ‘explosion’ in due process litigation 
that came to be known as the ‘due process revolution’”), with Sarah A. Seo, Democratic Policing Before the 
Due Process Revolution, 128 YALE L.J. 1246, 1249 (2019) (describing the due process revolution’s 
dominant narrative as concerning how “the Court broke new ground by extending federal procedural rights 
to state criminal defendants in an effort to protect individuals, especially minorities and the poor, from the 
police”). Professor Charles Reich is credited for inspiring the due process revolution. See Fred O. Smith, Jr., 
Due Process, Republicanism, and Direct Democracy, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 582, 599–600 (2014) (associating 
the civil context of the due process revolution with Professor Reich); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Due Process 
Counterrevolution of the 1990s?, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1973, 1974 (1996) (“Charles Reich can be credited 
with intellectual paternity for the due process revolution.”). 
 65 Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 278–79 (Black, J., dissenting). 
 66 See Judith Resnik, The Story of Goldberg: Why This Case Is Our Shorthand, in CIVIL PROCEDURE 
STORIES 473, 498 (Kevin M. Clermont ed., 2d ed. 2008) (“In one respect, Goldberg v. Kelly lived a very 
short life.”); SUNSTEIN, supra note 39, at 161 (describing Goldberg as “an especially dramatic ruling” 
because it “abandoned the right-privilege distinction and ruled that welfare was indeed a form of 
constitutional ‘property’”). 
 67 397 U.S. 471, 485–87 (1970). 
 68 Id. at 466–77. 
115:361 (2020) Litigating Welfare Rights 
377 
Dandridge as the Supreme Court rejecting a right to basic assistance.69 While 
some persuasively dispute that characterization,70 none challenge that 
Dandridge represents the current limit of constitutional welfare litigation. 
Six years later, the Court in Mathews v. Eldridge abandoned the Goldberg 
Court’s quest for trial-like procedures in administrative adjudication. Instead, 
the Court in Mathews adopted a more flexible, multifactor test that balanced 
the interest of the impacted individual, the expected value of additional 
procedural safeguards, and the costs and burdens to the government to provide 
those procedures.71 Importantly, the Court in Mathews tracked the reasoning of 
Justice Black’s dissent in Goldberg, agonizing over how the political branches 
would respond to court-ordered procedural protections for benefit recipients.72 
While Dandridge and Mathews represent the confines of the Supreme Court’s 
activity in this area of law, assistance to meet the needs of poor Americans has 
become more firmly rooted than this limited doctrine might suggest. 
B. The New Property Grows Up, 1964–2016 
From the inception of the New Property to the election of the current 
Administration, several scholars have questioned and built on the New 
Property. First, by looking at the intellectual legacy of the New Property, this 
Section discerns three principal camps of scholars, each offering insights about 
the past and future of the New Property. Second, by looking at the origins and 
growth of SNAP and Medicaid, one detects a vitality to these programs, despite 
repeated efforts to dismantle them. This Section concludes by noting the 
particular political barriers to SNAP and Medicaid’s growth and the programs’ 
dogged persistence in the face of proposed cuts, suggesting their importance 
not only to those who use them, but also to state governments who cannot 
afford to stand in their way. 
 
 69 See C.K. v. N.J. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., 92 F.3d 171, 191 (3d Cir. 1996); Baker v. City of 
Concord, 916 F.2d 744, 755 (1st Cir. 1990); Susannah Camic Tahk, The New Welfare Rights, 83 BROOK. L. 
REV. 875, 884 (2018) (describing “[t]he Court’s skepticism surrounding a ‘right to live’” as “what eventually 
led to the demise of the welfare rights litigation movement”); Samuel Krislov, The OEO Lawyers Fail to 
Constitutionalize a Right to Welfare: A Study in the Uses and Limits of the Judicial Process, 58 MINN. L. 
REV. 211, 228–29 (1973) (describing the issue in Dandridge as “the bridge to a constitutional right to 
welfare,” but that “[t]he outcome of the case . . . came as a cruel and unexpected blow to the ‘right to life’ 
hopefuls”). 
 70 See Julie A. Nice, A Sweeping Refusal of Equal Protection: Dandridge v. Williams (1970), in THE 
POVERTY LAW CANON 129, 129–52 (Ezra Rosser & Marie Failinger eds., 2016). 
 71 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 339–49 (1976). 
 72 Id. at 348–49. 
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1. The New Property’s Intellectual Legacy 
While the Supreme Court backed away from Goldberg’s groundwork for 
both a full-blown procedural revolution and a substantive right to welfare, The 
New Property’s ideas live on. Although some have taken New Property into 
fields outside of government services and benefits,73 of those who have 
engaged with Professor Reich’s analysis in his original area of focus, most fall 
into one of three camps. The first diagnoses the failure to constitutionalize a 
right to welfare benefits. The second pragmatically focuses on pursuing the 
same principles in new arenas, such as tax and employment law. Finally, some 
see the steady, reliable growth of welfare benefits as a sign that the New 
Property did take root, but in an unpredicted form. 
The first and largest camp is made up of those who emphasize the 
unfulfilled promise of the potentially transformative idea of constitutional 
rights to social welfare benefits. Typically retrospective, this scholarship is 
unsurprisingly the bailiwick of legal historians. However, these laments do not 
always agree as to the cause of the New Property’s failure. In her book Brutal 
Need, the still-definitive account of the beginnings of welfare rights, Professor 
Martha Davis characterizes the efforts of lawyers and activists to build a 
doctrine of constitutional welfare rights as incomplete, if not misguided.74 
Lawyers enjoyed initial success in the Supreme Court striking down some state 
practices, as explained above.75 Yet disagreements among the lawyers 
themselves, as well as tensions between the attorneys and activists, including 
the National Welfare Rights Organization, undermined what was ultimately an 
unsuccessful court-centric effort as opposed to one that could nurture the social 
movements crucial to fundamental change.76 Professor Cass Sunstein and 
others have suggested that it was not a result of strategy or tactics on the part 
of lawyers or their movement allies that the United States failed to 
constitutionalize welfare rights; rather, the failure stemmed from a change in 
the Supreme Court’s composition.77 According to this account, Richard 
 
 73 See, e.g., Jim Chen, Embryonic Thoughts on Racial Identity as New Property, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 
1123, 1146 (1997); Michael Herz, Parallel Universes: NEPA Lessons for the New Property, 93 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1668 (1993) (exploring how the concept could inform environmental impact statements). 
 74 See DAVIS, supra note 43, at 143–45 (1993) (concluding that the welfare-rights litigation strategy 
was an “ultimate failure”); see also FELICIA KORNBLUH, THE BATTLE FOR WELFARE RIGHTS: POLITICS AND 
POVERTY IN MODERN AMERICA 185 (2007) (“The welfare rights era [has] ended . . . .”). But see Ed Sparer, 
Fundamental Human Rights, Legal Entitlements, and the Social Struggle: A Friendly Critique of the Critical 
Legal Studies Movement, 36 STAN. L. REV. 509, 561–63 (1984) (highlighting the energizing effect of 
litigation on the welfare social movement). 
 75 See, e.g., King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 311–13 (1968). 
 76 See DAVIS, supra note 43, at 133–41. 
 77 See SUNSTEIN, supra note 39, at 153 (identifying the 1968 election as “[t]he crucial historical 
development” because of Nixon’s “four Supreme Court appointments, which created a critical mass of 
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Nixon’s election to the presidency and his success at putting four Justices on 
the Supreme Court in his first term effectively shut the door to further 
constitutional protections for poor people.78 Nevertheless, even though he 
offers a different explanation from Davis’s, Sunstein concurs in the verdict that 
it was a “revolution that wasn’t.”79 Professor Karen Tani has offered both a 
more expansive and a more nuanced history of these developments, putting the 
New Property in the context of a heterodox set of ideas and arguments swirling 
around and inside the American welfare state.80 Notably, Professor Tani shows 
how administrators (many of whom were not lawyers) were grappling with 
forming a national welfare law long before Reich alighted on the topic.81 While 
her history begins earlier and sweeps broader than the other accounts, Professor 
Tani, too, sides with Davis, Sunstein, and the other members of this camp, 
concluding that the New Property project failed to find anything more than a 
foothold within the federal administrative apparatus and state bureaucracies.82 
Professor Tani agrees that by the early 1970s, federal and state governments 
were both considered “valid centers and hence valid administrators—allowing, 
in effect, for unequal, nonuniform citizen experiences with authority” and 
“capable of tolerating extraordinary levels of poverty and inequality.”83 
The second camp includes scholars who, like the first, recognize the 
failure of the New Property to lead to a transformation in public law, but look 
for alternative avenues to expand legal protections for poor Americans. Their 
projects are, at bottom, prospective and, as a result, are in conversation with 
the lawyers litigating these cases. Some of these alternativists have argued that 
new poverty law must revolve not around public benefits like cash assistance, 
Medicaid, or SNAP, but rather low-wage work. As Professor Juliet Brodie has 
written, after the failed constitutional project of the 1960s and 1970s and the 
welfare-reform legislation of the 1990s, “The end of welfare entitlement meant 
that many former welfare recipients must now rely on wage employment for a 
 
justices willing to reject the claim that social and economic rights were part of the Constitution”); see also 
id. at 162–63 (describing how the Court then “limited the reach of [decisions like Shapiro and Goldberg] . . . 
and eventually made it clear that for the most part, social and economic rights have no constitutional status”). 
But see R. SHEP MELNICK, BETWEEN THE LINES: INTERPRETING WELFARE RIGHTS 39 (1994) (pointing out 
that despite naming no Justices to the U.S. Supreme Court, President Carter successfully nominated 264 
Article III judges—“more than any President until Reagan”).  
 78 See SUNSTEIN, supra note 39, at 153. 
 79 Id. 
 80 TANI, supra note 55, at 212–14. 
 81 Id. 
 82 Id. at 280 (concluding that “the rule books have gotten thicker, but citizens are still dying, slowly and 
unequally from, economic need”). 
 83 Id. at 279. 
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larger percentage of their families’ income than in the AFDC era.”84 As a result, 
the workplace, especially at the bottom of the labor market, “presents unique 
and important legal issues” that demand “a new poverty law agenda.”85 Others 
like Professors Susannah Tahk and Sara Greene have pointed to the prodigious 
growth in anti-poverty tax expenditures and their concomitant procedural 
protections to demonstrate newer federal anti-poverty efforts.86 This camp 
insists that welfare rights should move on to more promising arenas, whether 
in civil justice, employment law, tax law, or some other area.87 
A small camp, perhaps best characterized as the contrarians, do not see 
the New Property as a failure, but as still holding some promise. To paraphrase 
Mark Twain, these contrarians would caution that reports of the New 
Property’s death have been exaggerated.88 The contrarians maintain the focus 
should not be on the expressive commitments of politicians or landmark 
Supreme Court cases, but rather on the functional constraints placed on the 
bureaucrats who administer these programs. These scholars see the steady 
growth and routinization of public benefits, such as SNAP and Medicaid, as a 
 
 84 Juliet M. Brodie, Post-Welfare Lawyering: Clinical Legal Education and a New Poverty Law 
Agenda, 20 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 201, 225 (2006); see id. (contrasting “an earlier era . . . dominated by 
welfare policy, entitlements and constitutional protections” with a new era demanding that “lawyers 
concerned about justice for the poor must contend with the post-welfare employment setting” (citing, inter 
alia, Goldberg v. Kelly and Dandrige v. Williams as part of the earlier era)); Karen M. Tani, Welfare and 
Rights Before the Movement: Rights as a Language of the State, 122 YALE L.J. 314, 381 (2012) (describing 
PRWORA as “eliminating rights claims”); Noah Zatz, Welfare to What?, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 1131, 1138–40 
(2006) (discussing the emphasis PRWORA placed on promoting work); cf. Noah D. Zatz, What Welfare 
Requires from Work, 54 UCLA L. REV. 373, 380–88 (2006) (describing the need for a purposive account of 
what qualifies as “work” under welfare work requirements); Alan W. Houseman, The Vitality of Goldberg 
v. Kelly to Welfare Advocacy in the 1990s, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 831, 859 (1990) (arguing a few years before 
the enactment of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA) 
that “Goldberg is even more vital today than it was when issued in 1970”).  
 85 See Brodie, supra note 84, at 225. 
 86 See Susannah Camic Tahk, The New Welfare Rights, 83 BROOK. L. REV. 875, 898–916 (2018) 
(characterizing tax law as replete with protections for low-income taxpayers in contrast with the decline in 
welfare rights); Susannah Camic Tahk, The Tax War on Poverty, 56 ARIZ. L. REV. 791, 796–817 (2014) 
(enumerating the anti-poverty programs administered through the tax code); Sara Sternberg Greene, The 
Broken Safety Net: A Study of Earned Income Tax Credit Recipients and a Proposal for Repair, 88 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 515, 560 (2013) (suggesting that “[i]n many regards, the [earned income tax credit (EITC)] is an 
ideal federal antipoverty program” but that families who receive the EITC are still vulnerable to “financial 
shocks”). But see Francine J. Lipman, Access to Tax InJustice, 40 PEPP. L. REV. 1173, 1186–87 (2013) 
(discussing challenges low-income families face in accessing EITC); Anne L. Alstott, Why the EITC Doesn’t 
Make Work Pay, 73 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 285, 287–89 (2010) (questioning the EITC’s effectiveness 
at reducing poverty). 
 87 See, e.g., Martha F. Davis, Participation, Equality, and the Civil Right to Counsel: Lessons from 
Domestic and International Law, 122 YALE L.J. 2260 (2013). 
 88 Mark Twain said, “[T]he report of my death was an exaggeration.” Louis J. Budd, Mark Twain as an 
American Icon, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO MARK TWAIN 1, 7 (Forrest G. Robinson ed., 1995). 
115:361 (2020) Litigating Welfare Rights 
381 
sign of the New Property’s staying power.89 These scholars are not apologists 
for the current regime. Indeed, they often are its most vociferous critics.90 But 
their criticisms do not suggest that the New Property project is 
misapprehended, just misapplied.91 What these scholars share is a skepticism 
that the standard by which the New Property should be judged is not whether 
it has adherents on the Supreme Court or in Congress, but whether poor people 
can use the New Property to make claims through agencies and courts.92 
There are worthy insights in each of these approaches. First, not only do 
the historical accounts serve to ground doctrinal developments in the social 
movements of the last century, but they also chasten those who may expect 
courts to lead in this area of law. The alternativist approach warns lawyers from 
becoming too enamored with a golden age, which, whether it was as bright as 
hindsight suggests, is undeniably past.93 The alternativist mode challenges 
lawyers to go where poor people and organizations are, rather than where they 
might have once been. The contrarians, like the alternativists, pull attorneys 
away from the past to confront contemporary challenges, without abandoning 
welfare programs—the traditional site of the New Property—altogether. The 
 
 89 See, e.g., David A. Super, The Quiet “Welfare” Revolution: Resurrecting the Food Stamp Program 
in the Wake of the 1996 Welfare Law, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1271, 1285–86 (2004) (explaining that anti-hunger 
advocates “saved what in many respects is the best-designed means-tested program in the United States” 
with its “uniform benefit structure” and entitlement financing); Diller, supra note 56, at 1163–64 (2000) 
(describing the impact of discretion-based welfare administration on the changing relationship between 
caseworkers and program recipients); MELNICK, supra note 77, at 17.  
 90 See Wendy A. Bach, The Hyperregulatory State: Women, Race, Poverty, and Support, 25 YALE J.L. 
& FEMINISM 317, 357–66 (2014) (arguing that social welfare policy can impose punitive consequences); see 
also Diller, supra note 56, at 1128 (asserting that the “lack of accountability and potential for unfairness in 
the new administrative regime are causes for concern”). 
 91 See Super, supra note 89, at 1282 (cautioning that “the common practice of studying cash-assistance 
policy almost exclusively is likely to yield a severely distorted picture of public-benefits law”). 
 92 This legal scholarship dovetails with similar lines of inquiry in the social sciences. See JOE SOSS, 
RICHARD C. FORDING & SANFORD F. SCHRAM, DISCIPLINING THE POOR: NEOLIBERAL PATERNALISM AND 
THE PERSISTENT POWER OF RACE 293–308 (2011); Michael Lipsky, Bureaucratic Disentitlement in Social 
Welfare Programs, 58 SOC. SERV. REV. 3, 12 (1984) (arguing that managerial reforms to the Aid to Families 
with Dependent Children program have reduced workers’ discretion and their ability to respond to recipients 
in need); cf. Diller, supra note 56, at 1137 (discussing the move from the “social work” model of the 1930s 
to the legal–bureaucratic model that emerged by the 1970s). Importantly, Professor Karen Tani has 
synthesized these insights by highlighting bureaucratic disentitlement and the problems of administration 
without losing sight of the federal courts. See TANI, supra note 55, at 279–82. 
 93 The experience of material deprivation in the United States looks different than it did more than half 
a century ago. The experience of poverty in America is dissimilar from that of the country during the War 
on Poverty. See AEI/BROOKINGS WORKING GRP. ON POVERTY & OPPORTUNITY, OPPORTUNITY, 
RESPONSIBILITY, AND SECURITY: A CONSENSUS PLAN FOR REDUCING POVERTY AND RESTORING THE 
AMERICAN DREAM 16–29 (2015) (discussing how poverty and economic opportunity in America have 
changed since the 1960s); see also Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights 
on His Mission to the United States of America, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/38/33/Add.1, at 8–9 (2018). 
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contrarians teach us that simply because the American constitutional system 
currently fails to guarantee minimal entitlements does not mean that American 
public law does not. And as a functional matter, the source of the right may not 
matter to the person receiving assistance. Together, scholars from these three 
camps delineate the New Property’s legacy and potential in light of anti-
poverty programs’ current challenges. 
2. New Property’s Programmatic Legacy: Medicaid and SNAP 
More Americans receive medical and food assistance from government 
sources than ever before. Yet, the omnipresence of these two government 
programs was neither predicted nor preordained. When Congress passed the 
Social Security Amendments of 1965—commonly known as the Medicare 
Act—it tacked on a caboose to that contributory program’s train and called it 
Medicaid.94 Congress did not envision that the program would pay for nearly 
half the births in the country,95 nor become a potential vehicle for universal 
health coverage.96 Similarly, the year before creating Medicaid, Congress made 
the funding of the food stamp program permanent, and a decade later Congress 
extended that program nationwide.97 When Congress nationalized the food 
stamp program, few politicians on Capitol Hill, federal or state bureaucrats, or 
activists and lawyers working in and through the welfare-rights movement 
thought that Congress had created a statutory right to food assistance. And yet, 
over the last half century, fuzzy but firm rights to food and medical assistance 
have taken root in the United States.98 
 
 94 See DAVID G. SMITH & JUDITH D. MOORE, MEDICAID POLITICS AND POLICY 19–40 (2d ed. 2015) 
(discussing Medicaid’s origins as both an “afterthought” for the Johnson Administration and members of 
Congress, but also as a “sleeping giant” championed by then-House Ways and Means Chairman Wilbur 
Mills). 
 95 See Anne Rossier Markus, Ellie Andres, Kristina D. West, Nicole Garro & Cynthia Pellegrini, 
Medicaid Covered Births, 2008 Through 2010, in the Context of the Implementation of Health Reform, 
23 WOMEN’S HEALTH ISSUES e273, e276 tbl.2 (2013). 
 96 State Public Option Act, S. 489, 116th Cong. § 2 (2019) (permitting individuals not eligible for 
Medicaid to buy into a state Medicaid plan); State Public Option Act, H.R. 1277, 116th Cong. § 2 (2019) 
(same); see also, e.g., FRANK J. THOMPSON, MEDICAID POLITICS: FEDERALISM, POLICY DURABILITY, AND 
HEALTH REFORM 2 (2012) (describing Medicaid as “initially seen by many as a poor second cousin to 
Medicare” but noting that the program now “covers more people than Medicare” and “has become a pivotal 
component of the epic health reform law of 2010”); Nicole Huberfeld, Federalism in Health Care Reform, 
in HOLES IN THE SAFETY NET 197, 211 (Ezra Rosser ed., 2019) (describing Medicaid as having “achieved a 
hidden, near universality”); Lindsay F. Wiley, Medicaid for All? State-Level Single-Payer Health Care, 
79 OHIO ST. L.J. 843, 896 (2018) (describing the Affordable Care Act’s reliance on Medicaid to get to 
universal coverage). 
 97 See Amendments to the Food Stamp Act of 1964, Pub. L. 91-671, 84 Stat. 2048 (1971). 
 98 This is not the first article to assess the half-century legacy of public interest litigation on behalf of 
poor Americans. Two accounts have had particular influence on this project. See Jason Parkin, Aging 
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Medicaid has seen significant expansion in the last fifty-five years. 
Medicaid is a program jointly administered by the federal and state 
governments to assist states in furnishing medical assistance to needy 
individuals and families.99 Anyone who qualifies under program rules can 
receive Medicaid.100 Although states administer Medicaid, the federal 
government determines the financial eligibility criteria for participants, and 
state statutes and regulations must comply with certain broad federal 
requirements.101 As for financing Medicaid benefits, there is a fairly technical 
formula, called the Federal Medical Assistance Percentage (FMAP), that is 
calculated for each state and varies by population and covered services.102 A 
state’s FMAP ranges from 50% to 83%, with poorer states receiving more in 
federal funding.103 Notably, for the ACA’s expansion of Medicaid, the statute 
set the federal contribution at 100% and decreased it only to 90% in 2020 and 
subsequent years.104 In addition to contributing less than half the benefit costs 
of Medicaid, states also contribute roughly half of the costs to administer the 
program.105 Despite Medicaid expenditures making up both the largest source 
of federal funding to states and one of the largest budget items of state 
spending, federal courts have repeatedly held that states cannot claim that their 
own budgetary needs prevent them from complying with Medicaid’s 
requirements.106 To administer Medicaid, states must cover “mandatory” 
populations of people whose income falls below a means test tied to the federal 
 
Injunctions and the Legacy of Institutional Reform Litigation, 70 VAND. L. REV. 167, 189–92 (2017); 
Deborah L. Rhode, Public Interest Law: The Movement at Midlife, 60 STAN. L. REV. 2027, 2056 (2008). 
 99 See 42 U.S.C. § 1396-1; see also, e.g., Frew v. Hawkins, 540 U.S. 431, 433 (2004) (“State 
participation [in Medicaid] is voluntary; but once a State elects to join the program, it must administer a 
state plan that meets federal requirements.”); Cal. Pharmacists Ass’n v. Maxwell-Jolly, 596 F.3d 1098, 1102 
(9th Cir. 2010); Miller v. Gorski Wladyslaw Est., 547 F.3d 273, 277 (5th Cir. 2008). According to the 2016 
Actuarial Report on the Financial Outlook for Medicaid, overall Medicaid spending for FY2016 was $575.9 
billion, with federal expenditures of $363.4 billion and state expenditures of $212.5 billion. CHRISTOPHER 
J. TRUFFER, CHRISTIAN J. WOLFE & KATHRYN E. RENNIE, OFFICE OF THE ACTUARY, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE 
& MEDICAID SERVS., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., 2016 ACTUARIAL REPORT ON THE FINANCIAL 
OUTLOOK FOR MEDICAID, at iv (2016). 
 100 Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 453 U.S. 34, 36–37 (1981) (interpreting the Medicaid Act such that 
“[a]n individual is entitled to Medicaid if he fulfills the criteria established by the State in which he lives”). 
 101 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a). 
 102 ALISON MITCHELL, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R43847, MEDICAID’S FEDERAL MEDICAL ASSISTANCE 
PERCENTAGE (FMAP) 1–2 (2018). 
 103 See 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(b); see also Federal Financial Participation in State Assistance Expenditures, 
83 Fed. Reg. 61,157, 61,159 tbl.1 (Nov. 28, 2018) (listing effective quarterly FMAP rates); MITCHELL, supra 
note 102, at 12–13 tbl.A-1 (listing FMAP rates from the last five fiscal years for the fifty states and D.C.). 
 104 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i)(VIII), 1396d(y)(1); MITCHELL, supra note 102, at 8 tbl.1. 
 105 42 U.S.C. § 1396b(a)(7). 
 106 See, e.g., Rite Aid of Pa., Inc. v. Houstoun, 171 F.3d 842, 856 (3d Cir. 1999); Tallahassee Mem’l 
Reg’l Med. Ctr. v. Cook, 109 F.3d 693, 704 (11th Cir. 1997). 
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poverty guidelines, including children, parents, pregnant women, people with 
disabilities, and senior citizens.107 For these populations, a state’s Medicaid 
program must provide certain mandatory services.108 States may also receive 
federal matching funds to extend coverage to optional populations, including 
those listed above whose incomes fall slightly above the means test and those 
who are considered “medically needy” people, as well as additional federal 
funding for optional services.109 
 
FIGURE 1: PERCENT OF U.S. POPULATION ENROLLED IN SNAP, 1969–2019110 
 
 
 107 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(k)–(m). So far, thirty-seven states and the District of Columbia have, under the 
Affordable Care Act, expanded Medicaid to parents and childless adults up to 138% FPL. Status of State 
Medicaid Expansion Decisions: Interactive Map, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (July 1, 2020), 
https://www.kff.org/medicaid/issue-brief/status-of-state-medicaid-expansion-decisions-interactive-map/ 
[https://perma.cc/KL6T-ZVFC]. The Supreme Court held in National Federation of Independent Business 
v. Sebelius that the federal government could not require states to expand Medicaid, rendering the provision 
optional. 567 U.S. 519, 588 (2012). 
 108 These services include everything from hospital services to vaccines for children to pregnancy-
related services to rural health-clinic services. For a full list, see BARBARA S. KLEES, CHRISTIAN J. WOLFE 
& CATHERINE A. CURTIS, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., BRIEF SUMMARIES OF MEDICARE & 
MEDICAID 28 (2016), https://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Statistics-Trends-and-
Reports/MedicareProgramRatesStats/Downloads/MedicareMedicaidSummaries2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
T76F-RZ9D]. 
 109 See 42 C.F.R. § 435.831(d) (2019); KLEES ET AL., supra note 108, at 28–29. 
 110 Data were compiled from the U.S. Department of Agriculture and the U.S. Census Bureau. See U.S. 
DEP’T OF AGRIC., SUPPLEMENTAL NUTRITION ASSISTANCE PROGRAM PARTICIPATION AND COSTS (2020), 
https://fns-prod.azureedge.net/sites/default/files/resource-files/SNAPsummary-7.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
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FIGURE 2: PERCENT OF U.S. POPULATION ENROLLED IN MEDICAID, 1966–2017111 
SNAP has likewise grown dramatically since its inception. While federal 
nutrition assistance dates back to the New Deal, the modern SNAP program 
originated in 1964 and, through a flurry of congressional activity and federal 
litigation, expanded repeatedly.112 Through a series of revisions to the Food 
Stamp Act from 1970 to 1996, Congress expanded and standardized federal 
food assistance. The 1970 amendments required that the Secretary of Health, 
Education, and Welfare create national standards for eligibility and increase 
federal spending.113 The 1977 amendments made far more Americans eligible, 
in part by no longer requiring households to pay for food stamps. At the same 
time, Congress grew concerned with the ways in which federal courts were 
interpreting the statute.114 
Today, SNAP provides food-purchasing assistance to low-income 
individuals and families.115 Like Medicaid, SNAP benefits are considered an 
entitlement—meaning that a state needs to cover every eligible household that 
applies for the benefit. Similar to Medicaid, federal law lays out SNAP 
eligibility rules and benefit amounts. To qualify for benefits, a SNAP 
household’s income must be at or below 130% of the federal poverty level 
 
 111 Data were compiled from the Medicaid and CHIP Payment and Access Commission. See MEDICAID 
& CHIP PAYMENT & ACCESS COMM’N, MACSTATS: MEDICAID AND CHIP DATA BOOK 25 (2018), 
https://www.macpac.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/December-2018-MACStats-Data-Book.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9LUK-ENPL]. 
 112 MELNICK, supra note 77, at 183–84 (charting the “precipitous rise in spending” from fiscal years 
1965 to 1992). 
 113 Amendments to the Food Stamp Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 91-671, § 4, 84 Stat. 2048, 2049 (1971). 
 114 See MELNICK, supra note 77, at 207–30. 
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(FPL),116 the household’s net monthly income (after deductions for expenses 
like housing and child care) must be less than or equal to 100% FPL, and its 
assets must fall below limits identified in the federal regulations.117 Households 
with no net income receive the maximum amount per month ($509 for a family 
of three), but the average monthly benefit is far lower ($378 for a family of 
three).118 The average monthly benefit per person is $134 a month or $1.49 per 
meal.119 SNAP benefits are provided on a “household” basis.120 In federal law, 
a SNAP “household” means “an individual who lives alone or who, while 
living with others, customarily purchases food and prepares meals for home 
consumption separate and apart from the others; or a group of individuals who 
live together and customarily purchase food and prepare meals together for 
home consumption.”121 SNAP households may use the benefit to purchase food 
at one of the quarter-million retailers authorized by the Food and Nutrition 
Service (FNS) to participate in the program.122 However, SNAP households 
cannot use their benefits to purchase other necessary household items, like 
sanitary products, or to purchase hot foods prepared at the retailer.123 
Congress spared SNAP and Medicaid from the block grant changes of the 
1996 Welfare Reform Act, and consequently, federal law continues to require 
that states enroll any household that meets the eligibility criteria laid out in 
statute. As a result, during economic downturns, especially in ones as severe 
as the 2008 recession or the COVID-19 pandemic, SNAP rolls will expand. 
States also have fiscal incentives to increase SNAP enrollment, as benefits are 
100% federally funded. While administrative costs are split between the 
federal and state governments, every dollar of SNAP benefits spent goes to 
grocery stores and retailers in that state or region. As we will see in the next 
Section, the fact that public-benefits administration is bound up in federal–state 
 
 116 This requirement does not apply to households with an elderly or disabled member. Id. § 2014(c)(2) 
 117  CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES, A QUICK GUIDE TO SNAP ELIGIBILITY AND BENEFITS 1–4 
(2019), https://www.cbpp.org/research/a-quick-guide-to-snap-eligibility-and-benefits [https://perma.cc/ 
QU2K-JKWM]. In fiscal year 2020, the resource limits are $2,250 for households without an elderly or 
disabled member and $3,500 for those with an elderly or disabled member. Id. at 1. 
 118 Id. at 3 & tbl.1. 
 119 Id. The average meal figure was calculated by dividing $134 by ninety meals, or three meals per 
day. 
 120 7 U.S.C § 2014(a). 
 121 Id. § 2012(n)(1)(A)–(B). 
 122 U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., SNAP RETAILER DATA, FISCAL YEAR 2016 AT A GLANCE 1 (2016), 
https://fns-prod.azureedge.net/sites/default/files/snap/2016-SNAP-Retailer-Management-Year-End-
Summary.pdf [https://perma.cc/4V4R-9VZD] (“As of September 30, 2016, 260,115 firms were authorized 
to participate in SNAP.”). 
 123 See 7 U.S.C. § 2012(k); see also id. § 2013(a) (“The benefits so received by such households shall 
be used only to purchase food from retail food stores which have been approved for participation in the 
supplemental nutrition assistance program.”). 
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relations in the United States, in turn, helps to explain the judicial flavor of this 
area of public law. 
C. Litigating the New Property 
As we can see from Supreme Court precedent and current efforts by 
public interest attorneys, public law litigation serves a particularly important 
role in the enforcement of welfare as a property right against federal and state 
cuts. Therefore, it is similarly important to understand the procedural hurdles 
over which public law attorneys must vault to bring these lawsuits. In many 
areas of American law, litigation plays a larger role in lawmaking relative to 
the development of public law in other wealthy democracies. Public-benefits 
administration is a leading example of this distinctive characteristic of the 
American administrative state. Because states operate Medicaid and SNAP 
within the confines of federal law, federal courts offer a national forum in 
which individual recipients can enforce their rights under federal law against 
the states.124 
As discussed above, the Supreme Court in Mathews v. Eldridge was 
skeptical of the federal judiciary’s ability to require procedural protections in 
welfare administration.125 The Mathews Court assumed that government faces 
an inevitable procedure–substance trade-off in welfare benefits.126 Writing for 
the Court in Mathews, Justice Lewis Powell suggested that procedural 
protections and the substance of the benefit would necessarily come from the 
same funding source. The Court reasoned that if the judiciary mandated more 
procedure for welfare recipients, the political branches would fund those 
procedures at the expense of the benefits themselves.127 In fact, the federal 
government has not cut substantive benefits to provide procedural protections. 
 
 124 See, e.g., Wos v. E.M.A. ex rel. Johnson, 133 S. Ct. 1391, 1398 (2013) (concluding state law violated 
the Medicaid Act and was therefore preempted); Townsend v. Swank, 404 U.S. 282, 283–85 (1971) 
(interpreting the Social Security Act to allow beneficiaries to bring preemption actions to enjoin state laws 
that conflict with federal law). 
 125 See supra Section I.A. 
 126 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 348 (1976) (reasoning that “the cost of protecting those whom 
the preliminary administrative process has identified as likely to be found undeserving may in the end come 
out of the pockets of the deserving since resources available for any particular program of social welfare are 
not unlimited”). 
 127 See id. (“[T]he Government’s interest, and hence that of the public, in conserving scarce fiscal and 
administrative resources is a factor that must be weighed.”). Justice Black had a slightly different prediction 
in Goldberg: that government would be disinclined to enroll individuals in public benefit programs if they 
knew that procedural rights would attach upon enrollment. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 279 (1970) 
(Black, J., dissenting) (warning that “[w]hile this Court will perhaps have insured that no needy person will 
be taken off the rolls without a full ‘due process’ proceeding, it will also have insured that many will never 
get on the rolls, or at least that they will remain destitute during the lengthy proceedings followed to 
determine initial eligibility”).  
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Instead, it is the ideological state actors who attempt to limit or restrict access 
to welfare by imposing procedural requirements, even though they must 
swallow that cost themselves and even though it reduces the flow of federal 
funding to their citizens and state. Public interest lawyers then must challenge 
these requirements in federal court for violation of the federal statutory 
requirements. In those cases, private litigants can rely on federal courts to 
enforce national standards against the states. 
For SNAP, the federal government pays for 100% of the substantive 
benefit. States have to pay for up to half the administrative costs of the SNAP 
program.128 That means that while states have to contribute to the 
administration (including the procedures of the program), SNAP’s substantive 
benefits are free to the states.129 While states do contribute to the cost of 
Medicaid benefits, the federal government pays the lion’s share, and in the 
Affordable Care Act, the most recent expansion of Medicaid was intended to 
be free to states. As one might expect when the substance of the benefit is free, 
but the procedures surrounding the benefit are not, states have historically been 
reluctant to impose procedural barriers for which the state must pay to prevent 
its residents from accessing benefits for which the state does not pay. As a 
result, there is an improbable alliance between welfare recipients and their 
advocates, on the one hand, who threaten to challenge procedural barriers, and 
state bureaucrats, on the other, who are willing to undo procedural barriers or 
refrain from erecting new ones. Both advocates and administrators’ interests 
converge on keeping the benefits flowing to the recipients and the state. This 
political economy story has more explanatory power because SNAP and 
Medicaid are benefits that rely on third parties. SNAP benefits must be 
accessed through SNAP-participating retailers, and Medicaid is an insurance 
program that contributes to many hospitals’ and health care providers’ bottom 
lines.130 
By permitting claimants to bring a cause of action under the Due Process 
Clause and federal statutes against state welfare administrators, the Supreme 
Court in King, Shapiro, and Goldberg invited federal and state courts to 
entertain the claims of individuals accessing SNAP and Medicaid. And perhaps 
because of the incomplete nature of Supreme Court doctrine in this area, lower 
courts knew that these welfare cases were unlikely to be taken up by the highest 
court.131 This “new judicial terrain” was not lost on the attorneys challenging 
 
 128 7 U.S.C. § 2025(a). 
 129 See id. §§ 2013(a), 2019, 2025(a); 7 C.F.R. §§ 277.1(b), 277.4(b) (2019). 
 130 See, e.g., 7 C.F.R. § 278.2; 42 C.F.R. § 482.1(a)(3) (2019). 
 131 The Supreme Court did not review the D.C. Circuit’s decision that the Food Stamp Act created a 
right to an adequate diet, but the Court might have reviewed the decision had the D.C. Circuit interpreted 
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state welfare practices who began “stressing statutory rather than constitutional 
arguments” and focused on “winning a string of cases in the lower courts 
[rather] than one big case in the Supreme Court.”132 
To this day, federal and state courts regularly invoke Goldberg for the 
proposition that welfare recipients have a statutorily created property interest 
significant enough to warrant the Constitution’s due process protections.133 
Medicaid and SNAP recipients have procedural rights under the Constitution 
and federal statutes to administrative hearings and meaningful notice when 
their claims for assistance are denied or unreasonably delayed.134 As a result, 
welfare recipients can use the Goldberg legacy to challenge various state 
practices, albeit often relying on federal statutes rather than the Constitution 
itself. For instance, SNAP recipients have sued for timely processing of their 
applications for monthly benefits, expedited SNAP, and Disaster SNAP.135 
Medicaid recipients have successfully challenged fair hearing procedures.136 
 
the Constitution as creating the same. See MELNICK, supra note 77, at 205–11 (discussing Rodway v. U.S. 
Dep’t of Agric., 514 F.2d 809 (D.C. Cir. 1975)). 
 132 See id. at 40. This is not to say that SNAP and Medicaid recipients always win in federal court. See, 
e.g., Toney-Dick v. Doar, No. 12 Civ. 9162(KBF), 2013 WL 6057949, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 2013) 
(granting the federal government’s motion to dismiss claims of discrimination brought by Disaster SNAP 
recipients after Hurricane Sandy); McGee v. Mont. Dep’t of Pub. Health & Hum. Servs., 398 P.3d 245, 247 
(Mont. 2017) (accepting state agency’s position); Ennis v. N.D. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 820 N.W.2d 714, 718 
(N.D. 2012) (same). 
 133 See, e.g., Reynolds v. Giuliani, 35 F. Supp. 2d 331, 341 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (concluding that 
“[p]laintiffs also have an overarching property interest in their continued receipt of food stamps, Medicaid 
and cash assistance” (citing Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 261–66 (1970))), modified in part 43 F. Supp. 
2d 492 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); Perdue v. Gargano, 964 N.E.2d 825, 832 (Ind. 2012) (“There is no question that 
these entitlement benefits [Medicaid, SNAP, and TANF] are ‘property’ entitled to the full panoply of due 
process protections.” (citing Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 261–62)). 
 134 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(3) (requiring states to “provide for granting 
an opportunity for a fair hearing before the State agency to any individual whose claim for medical assistance 
under the plan is denied or is not acted upon with reasonable promptness”); 42 C.F.R. §§ 431.200–250 
(2019); see also Hamby v. Neel, 368 F.3d 549, 560–62 (6th Cir. 2004) (concluding that Medicaid applicants 
received inadequate notice and were denied meaningful hearings in violation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause); Catanzano v. Dowling, 60 F.3d 113, 117 (2d Cir. 1995) (concluding 
that the Fourteenth Amendment requires a fair hearing before the state terminates Medicaid assistance); 
Holman v. Block, 823 F.2d 56, 57 (4th Cir. 1987) (“[A] household currently receiving benefits has the right 
to an administrative hearing before an action may be taken that adversely affects its participation in the Food 
Stamp Program.”); Salazar v. District of Columbia, 954 F. Supp. 278, 292–93, 326 (D.D.C. 1996) 
(interruptions in Medicaid benefits without notice violated the Due Process Clause, federal statutes, and 
Health and Human Services (HHS) regulations). 
 135 Class Action Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief at 2, Miami Workers Ctr. v. Carroll, 
No. 17-cv-24047 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 2, 2017) (suing on behalf of Hurricane Irma survivors with disabilities who 
had been or would be excluded from participation in Florida’s D-SNAP program). 
 136 Shakhnes v. Berlin, 689 F.3d 244, 263 (2d Cir. 2012) (holding that the Medicaid Act “creates a 
right—enforceable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983—to have Medicaid fair hearings held, and fair hearing decisions 
issued, within the regulation’s specified time frame”). 
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SNAP recipients have challenged the implementation of the statutory time 
limit for Able-Bodied Adults Without Dependents (ABAWDs).137 Recipients 
have challenged the privatization of welfare administration.138 They have 
attacked state statutes penalizing recipients who have criminal records, secured 
relief for HIV-positive welfare recipients, and challenged states’ failures to 
accommodate recipients who have disabilities.139 Indeed, these lawsuits duck 
many of the procedural and doctrinal obstacles that have made federal 
litigation so challenging for other marginalized groups.140 As discussed below, 
lawyers litigating to defend SNAP and Medicaid still can rely on private 
enforcement of federal statutes, obtain class certification, and secure injunctive 
relief. 
1. Private Enforcement of Federal Law 
Even though 42 U.S.C. § 1983 authorizes lawsuits to enforce federal 
statutes against state officials,141 simply because a federal statute creates a right 
does not mean individuals can enforce those rights in court. The Supreme 
Court has instructed that § 1983 “does not provide an avenue for relief every 
time a state actor violates a federal law.”142 Rather, a plaintiff must demonstrate 
 
 137 See Brooks v. Roberts, 251 F. Supp. 3d 401, 436–37 (N.D.N.Y. 2017); Order Setting Objections 
Deadline & Hearing, Hatten-Gonzales v. Earnest, No. 88-0385 KG/CG (D.N.M. Feb. 5, 2018), ECF No. 
811 (appointing a special master to help the state comply with the court’s orders); Order & Reasons, Romain 
v. Sonnier, No. 15-06942 (E.D. La. July 18, 2016), ECF No. 23. 
 138 See VIRGINIA EUBANKS, AUTOMATING INEQUALITY: HOW HIGH-TECH TOOLS PROFILE, POLICE, 
AND PUNISH THE POOR 39–83 (2017) (detailing the bureaucratic mess and political fallout from Indiana’s 
efforts to privatize its welfare benefits system by contracting with IBM); see also Class Action Complaint 
at 1, Gemmell v. Affigne, No. 16-cv-00650 (D.R.I. Dec. 8, 2016) (challenging Rhode Island’s widespread 
failure to process SNAP applications in a timely manner, in part due to the implementation of a faulty new 
computer system). After filing the lawsuit, the plaintiff class settled with the Rhode Island Department of 
Human Services. See Stipulation & Order of Settlement at 2, Gemmell v. Affigne, No. 16-cv-00650 (D.R.I. 
Feb. 24, 2017). 
 139 Henrietta D. v. Giuliani, 119 F. Supp. 2d 181, 210 (E.D.N.Y. 2000), aff’d sub nom., Henrietta D. v. 
Bloomberg, 331 F.3d 261 (2d Cir. 2003) (regarding HIV-positive welfare recipients); see also Complaint at 
1, R.H. v. Rawlings, No. 17-cv-01434 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 24, 2017) (federal lawsuit on behalf of three low-
income residents with disabilities alleging that the Georgia SNAP and Medicaid agencies systematically 
failed to accommodate the disabilities of vulnerable applicants and recipients); Raymond v. Rowland, 
220 F.R.D. 173, 181 (D. Conn. 2004) (certifying class of welfare recipients with disabilities). This is not to 
suggest that all SNAP litigation involves recipients. There is a gaggle of federal cases brought by grocers 
and convenience stores seeking review of the Food and Nutrition Service’s decisions to disqualify them as 
SNAP-approved retailers—almost always unsuccessfully. See, e.g., Irobe v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 890 F.3d 
371, 382 (1st Cir. 2018); SS Grocery, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 340 F. Supp. 3d 172, 186 (E.D.N.Y. 
2018); Alhalemi, Inc. v. United States, 224 F. Supp. 3d 587, 594 (E.D. Mich. 2016). 
 140 For a sustained critique of these trends, see ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CLOSING THE COURTHOUSE 
DOOR: HOW YOUR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS BECAME UNENFORCEABLE (2017). 
 141 See Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 4 (1980). 
 142 City of Rancho Palos Verdes v. Abrams, 544 U.S. 113, 119 (2005). 
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that the underlying statute creates enforceable “rights” and “not the broader or 
vaguer ‘benefits’ or ‘interests,’ that may be enforced under” the statute.143 
Many have bemoaned the increasingly restrictive approach federal courts have 
taken to finding a federal statute enforceable in federal court, absent an explicit 
grant.144 Neither SNAP nor Medicaid has an explicit statutory provision 
authorizing private enforcement, leaving § 1983 as the chief vehicle for 
vindicating these claims in federal court. But should federal courts consider 
SNAP and Medicaid as creating rights enforceable through § 1983? 
To answer that question, federal courts must navigate among various 
Supreme Court precedents, including Blessing v. Freestone and Gonzaga v. 
Doe. In Blessing, the Supreme Court laid out the test to make such a 
determination: (1) “Congress must have intended that the provision in question 
benefit the plaintiff”; (2) the right “is not so ‘vague and amorphous’ that its 
enforcement would strain judicial competence”; and (3) “the statute must 
unambiguously impose a binding obligation on the States.”145 If satisfied, this 
three-part inquiry creates a rebuttable presumption that the statute is privately 
enforceable under § 1983.146 This presumption can be overcome if Congress 
precluded private enforcement either “expressly” or “impliedly, by creating a 
comprehensive enforcement scheme that is incompatible with individual 
enforcement under § 1983.”147 
Yet, finding an implied cause of action has not been fatal to welfare 
recipients’ efforts to enforce federal requirements in either program, with the 
notable exception of Medicaid’s equal access provision.148 In Briggs v. Bremby, 
the Second Circuit held that “[u]nlike the [FERPA] funding provision involved 
in Gonzaga,” the Food Stamp Act’s timely processing provisions “conferred 
individual rights upon food stamp applicants in clear and unambiguous terms” 
because the statute “contain[s] language that is focused on the interests of the 
applicant households and calibrated to their economic needs” and thereby 
satisfies Blessing’s first prong.149 As for the other two components of the 
Blessing test, the Food Stamp Act, the Second Circuit pointed out, “create[s] a 
specific requirement that must be followed for every food stamp applicant, 
rather than a generalized ‘policy or practice,’” or one that “merely direct[s] the 
 
 143 Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 276, 283 (2002) (holding that a provision of Family 
Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) did not create an enforceable right under § 1983). 
 144 See, e.g., CHEMERINSKY, supra note 140, at 101–03. 
 145 Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 340–41 (1997). 
 146 Id. at 341. 
 147 Id. 
 148 Harris v. Olszewksi, 442 F.3d 456, 459–65 (6th Cir. 2006) (holding that Medicaid’s “freedom-of-
choice provision” creates a privately enforceable right). 
 149 Briggs v. Bremby, 792 F.3d 239, 244–45 (2d Cir. 2015). 
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distribution of funds.”150 Once the Second Circuit accepted the presumption 
that the Food Stamp Act is enforceable under § 1983, the court further rejected 
Connecticut’s attempt to rebut the presumption. Connecticut argued that since 
the Food Stamp Act “empowers the Secretary of Agriculture to investigate 
State noncompliance, withhold federal funds, and refer a noncompliant State 
to the Attorney General to seek an injunction” that the statute bars “parallel 
enforcement by individuals in federal and state courts.”151 The Second Circuit 
rejected the State’s argument, reasoning that “[i]n stark contrast with FERPA 
[the statute at issue in Gonzaga], however, the Food Stamp Act contains no 
similar agency adjudication process or enforcement structure that could take 
the place of private lawsuits.”152 
On the other hand, the Supreme Court recently took a restrictive approach 
to finding a private cause of action in a Medicaid case that could portend a 
forbidding future for welfare litigation. In Armstrong v. Exceptional Child 
Center, Inc., health care providers sued Idaho on the grounds that the State’s 
reimbursement rates were so low that they violated the Medicaid statute’s 
provision guaranteeing that a state’s rates “are consistent with efficiency, 
economy, and quality of care.”153 The Supreme Court rejected that challenge, 
holding that the Medicaid Act’s requirement for adequate reimbursement rates 
does not create a private cause of action, via the Supremacy Clause, to 
invalidate state-provider payment policies.154 Writing for the Court, Justice 
Antonin Scalia reasoned that “[t]he sheer complexity associated with enforcing 
§ 30(A), coupled with the express provision of an administrative remedy, 
§ 1396c, shows that the Medicaid Act precludes private enforcement of 
§ 30(A) in the courts.”155 The circuits are split as to whether Armstrong is 
limited to federal statutory provisions that foreclose private enforcement in a 
cause of action in equity or if Armstrong extends to a case brought under 
§ 1983.156 
 
 150 Id. 
 151 Id. at 245 (citing 7 U.S.C. § 2020(g)). 
 152 Id. The Eighth Circuit has suggested that “[i]t is now settled that nothing ‘short of an unambiguously 
conferred right’ will support a cause of action under § 1983.” Does v. Gillespie, 867 F.3d 1034, 1040 (8th 
Cir. 2017) (quoting Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 283 (2002)). 
 153 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(30)(A). 
 154 Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1378, 1385 (2015). 
 155 Id. (referencing 42 U.S.C. § 1396c). 
 156 Compare, e.g., Does, 867 F.3d at 1040 (concluding that § 30(A) of the Medicaid Act can no longer 
proceed under § 1983, because the Court’s later decision in Armstrong “plainly repudiate[s] the ready 
implication of a § 1983 action that Wilder exemplified” (quoting Armstrong, 135 S. Ct. at 1386 n.*)), with 
Legacy Cmty. Health Servs., Inc. v. Smith, 881 F.3d 358, 372 (5th Cir. 2018) (rejecting that reading of 
Armstrong precisely because it “would likely overrule cases such as Wilder in which the Court found other 
provisions of the Medicaid Act to be enforceable by health care providers through § 1983” (citation 
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Along with the question of whether any individual can enforce a statutory 
right for welfare benefits, there is the related question of whether individuals 
have standing to enforce that right. Derived from Article III’s case-or-
controversy requirement, standing demands that a “plaintiff must have suffered 
or be imminently threatened with a concrete and particularized ‘injury in fact’ 
that is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant and likely to 
be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.”157 A plaintiff must demonstrate 
standing for each claim and each form of relief sought.158 Federal courts have 
found that welfare recipients do have standing to challenge wrongful 
terminations and denials of benefits.159 Indeed, perhaps because of the 
pecuniary nature of benefits, the injury is quintessentially concrete and 
redressable.160 Put together, these questions, one resolved and the other unclear, 
pose obstacles for public law attorneys litigating these issues that must remain 
top of mind for the success of any suit. 
 
omitted)), revised (Feb. 1, 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 211 (2018), and BT Bourbonnais Care, LLC v. 
Norwood, 866 F.3d 815, 820–21 (7th Cir. 2017) (applying Blessing’s three-factor test and noting that 
“nothing in Armstrong, Gonzaga, or any other case we have found supports the idea that plaintiffs are now 
flatly forbidden in section 1983 actions to rely on a statute passed pursuant to Congress’s Spending Clause 
powers”). The Second Circuit has distinguished Armstrong from a case involving federal law intended to 
benefit foster parents. N.Y. State Citizens’ Coal. for Child. v. Poole, 922 F.3d 69, 85 (2d Cir. 2019). 
 157 Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1386 (2014) (citing Lujan 
v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)). But see James E. Pfander, Standing, Litigable Interests, and 
Article III’s Case-or-Controversy Requirement, 65 UCLA L. REV. 170, 182–88 (2018) (suggesting that such 
an interpretation of Article III conflicts with historical practice in the early years of the federal courts). 
 158 See DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 352 (2006); Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Env’t 
Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 185 (2000). And the Supreme Court has interpreted Article III as 
“demand[ing] that an ‘actual controversy’ persist throughout all stages of litigation.” Hollingsworth v. Perry, 
133 S. Ct. 2652, 2661 (2013). 
 159 See, e.g., Gresham v. Azar, 363 F. Supp. 3d 165, 174 (D.D.C. 2019) (discussing how standing is 
“easily established for their claim challenging the [Arkansas Medicaid waiver] as a whole”); N.B. ex rel. 
Peacock v. District of Columbia, 682 F.3d 77, 81, 86 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (concluding that plaintiffs had 
standing to enforce procedural rights to adequate notices where the alleged violations threatened their ability 
to obtain prescription medications under Medicaid). 
 160 See, e.g., Peña Martínez v. Azar, 376 F. Supp. 3d. 191, 200 (D.P.R. 2019) (“Plaintiffs have standing 
to raise their claims because they have adequately alleged that they would be entitled to receive greater 
benefits under SNAP than they currently do under NAP [Puerto Rico’s food assistance program].” (citing 
Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–61)); Stewart v. Azar, 313 F. Supp. 3d 237, 252 (D.D.C. 2018) (holding that 
Medicaid recipients have standing because they would be required to pay increased premiums); see also 
Rumsfeld v. F. for Acad. & Institutional Rts., 547 U.S. 47, 52 n.2 (2006) (“[T]he presence of one party with 
standing is sufficient to satisfy Article III’s case-or-controversy requirement.”). 
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2. Class Actions and Injunctive Relief 
Federal courts have become increasingly hostile to class actions, one of 
the primary vehicles for welfare-rights litigation.161 However, even in this 
climate for aggregate litigation, classes of welfare recipients are often immune 
or, at least, resistant. To be certified in federal court, a class of plaintiffs must 
convince the federal district court that first, “the class is so numerous that 
joinder of all members is impracticable”; second, “there are questions of law 
or fact common to the class”; third, the “claims or defenses of the 
representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class”; and 
fourth, “the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the 
interests of the class.”162 The first requirement, numerosity, is easily met in 
welfare litigation, as the relevant fraction of a Medicaid SNAP caseload will 
include thousands of recipients at least.163 As for commonality, if class 
members’ benefits are delayed, unfairly terminated, or reduced, class counsel 
can often tie that injury to a single statutory provision.164 And such a statutory 
provision makes it easier for named plaintiffs to show that their situation is not 
only typical of the recipients they seek to represent, but also that the 
representative parties, being so similarly situated to the unnamed class 
members, will fairly and adequately protect the class’s interests.165 
A class of public benefits recipients is also in a strong position to request 
injunctive relief pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2), since it is often seeking to enforce 
a federal statutory provision with which the state agency must comply.166 
Driving the federal courts’ fairly rigid approach to enforcing the Food Stamp 
Act and the Medicaid Act against state agencies is the fact that these courts 
repeatedly insist on absolute, rather than substantial, compliance.167 Given the 
 
 161 See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 342, 367 (2011) (reversing a certification of a 
nationwide class of female employees); AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 336, 352 (2011) 
(allowing corporations to insulate themselves from consumer class actions via arbitration clauses). 
 162 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a). 
 163 See, e.g., Garnett v. Zeilinger, 301 F. Supp. 3d 199, 206 (D.D.C. 2018) (pointing out that “even 
taking just the applications processed after the statutory time limit in one quarter of one fiscal year, 
[p]laintiffs provide a reason to estimate the proposed class number to be in the hundreds, if not thousands,” 
which “presumptively satisfies numerosity”). 
 164 Id. at 207 (concluding there is commonality because the Food Stamp Act “speaks in terms of 
absolute deadlines without any caveats or limitations when it comes to meeting them”). 
 165 Id. at 210 (determining the plaintiffs met the typicality requirement because they “present a single 
legal injury, a single legal theory, and a single means of injury: the District has systemically failed to process 
applications or issue recertification notices on time and consequently violated Plaintiffs’ statutory rights 
under the SNAP Act”). 
 166 See id. at 211 (finding that “that injury can be remedied by a single injunction ordering the District 
to comply with the statutory timelines”). 
 167 See, e.g., Withrow v. Concannon, 942 F.2d 1385, 1387–88 (9th Cir. 1991); Haskins v. Stanton, 
794 F.2d 1273, 1277 (7th Cir. 1986); Alexander v. Hill, 707 F.2d 780, 784 (4th Cir. 1983) (“The defendants’ 
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cooperative federalism inherent in both programs, one could imagine that 
states would be given some leeway in their administration of welfare programs. 
Yet, apart from the notable exception of Armstrong discussed above, federal 
courts have insisted on absolute compliance with federal statutes, which 
smooths the way for class certification and injunctive relief. 
The availability of the class action device in welfare litigation dovetails 
with the availability of injunctive relief.168 For instance, a party seeking a 
preliminary injunction must show: “(1) a likelihood of irreparable harm; (2) 
either a likelihood of success on the merits or sufficiently serious questions as 
to the merits . . . ; (3) that the balance of hardships tips in their favor regardless 
of the likelihood of success; and (4) that an injunction is in the public 
interest.”169 As for the second factor, the likelihood of success on the merits 
falls back on questions discussed above—whether there is a federal claim and 
whether the plaintiffs have made a showing of state noncompliance.170 The 
remaining three factors often weigh in favor of the welfare recipients. 
In assessing the propriety of a preliminary injunction, federal courts have 
repeatedly concluded that the harm stemming from improper denial or 
termination of welfare benefits is quintessentially irreparable.171 As a result, the 
first factor is met for any case that pleads the loss of welfare benefits.172 Courts 
have rejected welfare administrators’ claims that the harm is not irreparable 
 
objection to the 100% applicability of the relief ordered, based on a claim that it is too Draconian, need not 
long detain us . . . . The law itself compels 100% compliance.”); Henrietta D. v. Giuliani, 119 F. Supp. 2d 
181, 210 (E.D.N.Y. 2000), aff’d sub nom., Henrietta D. v. Bloomberg, 331 F.3d 261, 262 (2d Cir. 2003). 
For litigation around the timely processing of SNAP, see Briggs v. Bremby, No. 3:12-cv-324 (VLB), 
2012 WL 6026167, at *17–18 (D. Conn. Dec. 4, 2012), aff’d, 792 F.3d 239, 240 (2d Cir. 2015); Robidoux 
v. Kitchel, 876 F. Supp. 575, 579 (D. Vt. 1995); Robertson v. Jackson, 766 F. Supp. 470, 475–76 (E.D. Va. 
1991), aff’d, 972 F.2d 529 (4th Cir. 1992). 
 168 See Benisek v. Lamone, 138 S. Ct. 1942, 1943–44 (2018) (per curiam). 
 169 See Brooks v. Roberts, 251 F. Supp. 3d 401, 422 (N.D.N.Y. 2017) (quoting Gen. Mills, Inc. v. 
Chobani, LLC, 158 F. Supp. 3d 106, 114 (N.D.N.Y. 2016)) (applying this test to a class action brought by 
all ABAWD SNAP recipients in New York). 
 170 See David Marcus, The Public Interest Class Action, 104 GEO. L.J. 777, 797–98 (2016) (arguing 
that class certification often becomes a preview of the merits of the case and the requested remedy). 
 171 Morel v. Giuliani, 927 F. Supp. 622, 635 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (“To indigent persons, the loss of even a 
portion of subsistence benefits constitutes irreparable injury.”); Brown v. Giuliani, 158 F.R.D. 251, 264 
(E.D.N.Y. 1994) (reasoning that a “loss of even a small portion of welfare benefits can constitute irreparable 
injury”). But see Brooks, 251 F. Supp. 3d at 433 (concluding irreparable harm factor weighs against SNAP 
recipient class because for “the alleged harm flowing from the lack of due process and statutory protections, 
any harm to recipients whose benefits are discontinued based on being a non-compliant ABAWD is cut by 
the fact that they can immediately reestablish eligibility by reapplying for benefits and complying with work 
rules”). 
 172 Where some courts hesitate to grant preliminary injunctions in welfare cases is when the plaintiffs 
cannot show that their benefits have, in fact, been terminated or that an adverse decision is imminent. Id. at 
432. 
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because the administrator will compensate the plaintiffs with restored benefits, 
including benefits dating back to the erroneous agency action, should the 
plaintiffs prevail.173 Furthermore, due to the grave risk of harm to welfare 
recipients of lost benefits—the concept of “brutal need” from Goldberg v. 
Kelly—the balance of hardships and the public interest often weigh in the 
welfare recipient’s favor.174 
3. Financing Welfare Litigation 
This is not to say that welfare applicants and recipients seeking relief in 
federal court do not encounter skepticism or even hostility from the bench. No 
doubt many Americans, judges included, share beliefs and biases that 
recipients are scroungers.175 Furthermore, regardless of what they think about 
welfare, federal judges are often reluctant to wade into the morass of any 
government bureaucracy. But the cases discussed above suggest that arguably 
the greatest impediments to litigation on behalf of welfare applicants and 
recipients are not driven by a lack of doctrine. Instead, the real threat is a lack 
of funding. When the Supreme Court heard the canonical cases of King v. 
Smith, Shapiro v. Thompson, Goldberg v. Kelly, and Dandridge v. Williams, 
the federal government had just begun to fund legal services for poor 
Americans. Although that funding increased significantly for a time, over the 
last fifty years the federal government has made deep cuts to that funding and 
attached a variety of strings to whatever funding was left.176 Since 1974, legal 
 
 173 See supra note 167. 
 174 See, e.g., Banks v. Trainor, 525 F.2d 837, 842 (7th Cir. 1975) (affirming a district court judge’s 
conclusion that “the hardship to plaintiffs and their class . . . outweigh[ed] the administrative inconvenience 
and cost”); Willis v. Lascaris, 499 F. Supp. 749, 759 (N.D.N.Y. 1980) (“Even a slight change in food stamp 
allotments effects a public assistance household’s ability to procure the necessities of life.” (citing Goldberg 
v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970))); Hudson v. Bowling, 752 S.E.2d 313, 322–23 (W. Va. 2013) (concluding 
notices from state SNAP agency did not comport with constitutional due process); Baker v. Alaska Dep’t of 
Health & Soc. Servs., 191 P.3d 1005, 1009–10 (Alaska 2008) (reading Goldberg to mean that Medicaid 
recipients “should be afforded a degree of protection from agency error and arbitrariness in the 
administration of those benefits” and concluding notices from state agency did not meet the constitutional 
standard of procedural due process); Hardges v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 442 N.W.2d 752, 755 (Mich. Ct. App. 
1989) (same, but with regards to SNAP); see also Blum v. Caldwell, 446 U.S. 1311, 1314 (1980) (Marshall, 
J., in chambers) (order denying stay of mandate to continue to provide Medicaid) (reasoning that “the very 
survival of these individuals and those class members . . . is threatened by a denial of medical assistance 
benefits”). 
 175 David Lauter, How Do Americans View Poverty? Many Blue-Collar Whites, Key to Trump, Criticize 
Poor People as Lazy and Content to Stay on Welfare, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 14, 2016), https://www.latimes.com/ 
projects/la-na-pol-poverty-poll/ [https://perma.cc/LCU8-KFGM] (describing a public opinion survey). 
 176 See Andrew Hammond, Poverty Lawyering in the States, in HOLES IN THE SAFETY NET: 
FEDERALISM AND POVERTY, supra note 96, at 215, 222–23; Catherine Albiston, Su Li & Laura Beth Nielson, 
Public Interest Law Organizations and the Two-Tier System of Access to Justice in the United States, 
42 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 990, 1017 (2017) (concluding that “political attacks and legislative constraints 
have limited the scope of [these legal organizations’] activities, and developed a striking, empirically 
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aid organizations funded by the federal Legal Services Corporation (LSC) have 
not been able to engage in political activities, including voter registration and 
labor-organizing activities, or litigate in various areas of public concern, 
including abortion and the desegregation of schools.177 Congress cut legal aid 
funding in 1982 and 1996 and imposed further restrictions.178 Since 1996, LSC-
funded attorneys have been barred from bringing class actions, representing 
prisoners, and representing noncitizens (with a couple limited exceptions).179 
They cannot lobby in Congress or in state legislatures.180 These restrictions 
have fractured the public interest bar that represents welfare recipients.181 With 
fewer lawyers to represent Americans who have claims against welfare 
bureaucrats, it is not surprising that many legal aid attorneys have spurned 
federal funding. And regardless of LSC restrictions, all legal aid lawyers focus 
on the regulations and guidance coming out of the relevant federal and state 
agencies. Due to the fact that states have some flexibility under SNAP and 
Medicaid to extend certification periods and add additional services, legal aid 
lawyers have ample opportunities to push for expanding and streamlining both 
programs in ways that are consistent with federal law, but often have to do so 
with limited and restricted funding.182 
 
documented divide between local and regional organizations that provide direct services and national 
organizations that seek law reform”); David Luban, Taking Out the Adversary: The Assault on Progressive 
Public-Interest Lawyers, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 209, 224 (2003) (arguing that Legal Services Corporation 
restrictions were designed to remove any form of advocacy for “entire subgroups” of low-income people); 
BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., RESTRICTING LEGAL SERVICES: HOW CONGRESS LEFT THE POOR WITH ONLY 
HALF A LAWYER 9–13 (2000) (discussing the prohibition on Legal Services Corporation-funded lawyers 
from filing class actions). 
 177 Hammond, supra note 176, at 222. 
 178 Id. 
 179 See Luban, supra 176, at 221; Geoffrey Heeren, Illegal Aid: Legal Assistance to Immigrants in the 
United States, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 619, 652–55 (2011) (providing a comprehensive overview of the 
restrictions on representing noncitizens). 
 180 45 C.F.R. § 1612.1 (1998); see also LSC Restrictions and Other Funding Sources, LEGAL SERVS. 
CORP., https://lsc.gov/lsc-restrictions-and-funding-sources [https://perma.cc/5AKQ-PC35]. 
 181 See Hammond, supra note 176, at 222; see also Sameer M. Ashar, Deep Critique and Democratic 
Lawyering in Clinical Practice, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 201, 228 (2016) (explaining how many clinics focus on 
direct, and often limited, representation over other types of lawyering); ABA STANDING COMM. ON PRO 
BONO & PUB. SERV. & THE CTR. FOR PRO BONO, SUPPORTING JUSTICE: A REPORT ON THE PRO BONO WORK 
OF AMERICA’S LAWYERS 3, 6, 45 (2018), 
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/probono_public_service/ls_pb_supporting_j
ustice_iv_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/SX6H-NX8S] (surveying 47,242 attorneys in twenty-four states and 
estimating that in 2016, American attorneys provided an average of 36.9 hours of pro bono); Rebecca L. 
Sandefur, Lawyers’ Pro Bono Service and American-Style Civil Legal Assistance, 41 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 
79, 97 (2007) (estimating that it would take fifty-nine pro bono attorneys to make up for a single, year-round 
legal aid attorney). 
 182 For instance, the Food and Nutrition Service publishes an annual report detailing how states use this 
flexibility. See U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., FOOD & NUTRITION SERV., STATE OPTIONS REPORT: SUPPLEMENTAL 
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The combination of a lack of substantive constitutional rights to 
assistance and the prodigious growth of Medicaid and SNAP made these 
programs tempting targets for retrenchment once the Republican Party 
regained control of the presidency and both houses of Congress in 2017. The 
next Part explains how these retrenchment efforts have fared. 
II. THE NEW PROPERTY UNDER ATTACK: SNAP AND MEDICAID IN THE 
TRUMP ERA 
The surprising strength of Medicaid and SNAP is explained, in part, by 
how the courts and public interest lawyers make it difficult for legislators and 
agencies to cut existing benefits. Yet, this account of poverty law’s durability 
runs counter to the current political climate, in which detractors of both 
programs control much of federal and state lawmaking.183 This stress test for 
SNAP and Medicaid is what makes this analysis so timely. From 2017 to 2019, 
committed welfare retrenchers—those dedicated to reducing spending on 
SNAP and Medicaid—controlled much of national and state government, 
precisely at a time when spending on means-tested programs has continued to 
increase over the last half century. The 115th Congress teemed with legislators 
interested in reducing the size of welfare expenditures. The most prominent 
was then-Speaker of the House Paul Ryan who, as a former chair of both the 
Ways and Means Committee and the Budget Committee, repeatedly advocated 
for transformative proposals to Medicaid and SNAP.184 Similarly, in the Trump 
Administration, there are also many officials with experience and interest in 
dismantling the welfare state.185 
 
NUTRITION ASSISTANCE PROGRAM 1 (14th ed. 2018) [hereinafter STATE OPTIONS REPORT], https://fns-
prod.azureedge.net/sites/default/files/snap/14-State-Options.pdf [https://perma.cc/PY9M-UFXA]. 
 183 See Video: National Review Institute Ideas Summit, Speaker Paul Ryan (C-SPAN 2017), 
https://www.c-span.org/video/?425555-6/national-review-institute-ideas-summit-speaker-paul-ryan (last 
visited Oct. 10, 2020) (“Medicaid—sending it back to the states, capping its growth rates. We have been 
dreaming of this since I’ve been around, since you and I were drinking at a keg.”). 
 184 See TASK FORCE ON POVERTY, OPPORTUNITY, & UPWARD MOBILITY, A BETTER WAY: OUR VISION 
FOR A CONFIDENT AMERICA 11–12 (2016), https://www.heartland.org/_template-
assets/documents/publications/abetterway-poverty-policypaper.pdf [https://perma.cc/C8JP-4S6F]. Then-
Speaker Paul Ryan created the task force in 2016. John Bresnahan & David Rogers, New House Republican 
‘Anti-Poverty Plan’ Repackages GOP Proposals, POLITICO (June 7, 2017, 12:03 AM), 
https://www.politico.com/story/2016/06/house-gop-poverty-223969 [https://perma.cc/3BHR-UAJ7]; 
HOUSE BUDGET COMM., 114TH CONG., FY2016 BUDGET RESOLUTION: A BALANCED BUDGET FOR A 
STRONGER AMERICA 20, 29 (2015) (proposing to repeal Obamacare’s Medicaid expansion to allow states 
to manage their Medicaid programs and to convert SNAP to a “State Flexibility Fund”). 
 185 For example, Vice President Mike Pence’s former State Medicaid Director Seema Verma now runs 
the federal Center for Medicaid and Medicare Services. See Rachana Pradhan & Alice Miranda Ollstein, 
How Mike Pence’s ‘Indiana Mafia’ Took Over Health Care Policy, POLITICO (May 20, 2019, 5:04 AM), 
https://www.politico.com/story/2019/05/20/mike-pence-health-care-1331705 [https://perma.cc/C8G7-
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Importantly, this unified government in Washington mirrored the GOP’s 
near-total control of state government. Starting in the 2010 midterm election, 
the Republican Party made consistent, nationwide gains in state elections.186 
Following the 2016 election, Republicans controlled both chambers of the state 
legislature in thirty-two states.187 In contrast to the federal government, which 
has been synonymous with divided government since 1981,188 state 
governments exhibit increasingly unified, partisan control.189 The ubiquity of 
unified state government streamlined policy change in several areas, including 
welfare. While Congress sets parameters for funding and eligibility of 
Medicaid and SNAP, states make important decisions about how those benefits 
are administered, such as whether to cover optional populations and whether 
to provide optional services. Furthermore, states can request waivers from the 
federal government to further change how their agencies run welfare programs. 
This Part analyzes how the Trump Administration, the 115th Congress, 
and their political allies in state government have tried to dismantle SNAP and 
Medicaid. It describes how opponents of safety net programs failed to enact 
 
NCMQ] (discussing Verma’s record in Indiana and HHS Secretary Azar’s previous work for Indiana-based 
drug company Eli Lilly); see also Jake Harper, Trump Picks Seema Verma to Run Medicare and Medicaid, 
NPR (Nov. 29, 2016, 5:18 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2016/11/29/503762324/trump-
picks-seema-verma-to-run-medicare-and-medicaid [https://perma.cc/P4NE-C4CU] (describing Verma’s 
involvement in Indiana’s Medicaid expansion and the expansion’s intent “to appeal to conservatives”). 
 186 During President Obama’s two terms, Democrats lost—on net—816 seats, the largest of a two-term 
presidency since Dwight D. Eisenhower. NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES, ANALYSIS ON THE 
ELECTION FROM THE STATE PERSPECTIVE (2016), 
https://www.ncsl.org/Portals/1/Statevote/StateVote_Combined%20Presentation.pdf [https://perma.cc/CBP
9-WUYW]. 
 187 Id. 
 188 Since 1981, there were only three periods where either party has controlled both houses of Congress 
and the presidency: 2003 to 2007 for the Republicans and 2009 to 2011 for the Democrats. The election of 
President Trump and the GOP-controlled 115th Congress, the period that is the focus of this Article, is the 
third. See Party Divisions of the House of Representatives, 1789 to Present, OFF. OF THE HISTORIAN, U.S. 
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, https://history.house.gov/Institution/Party-Divisions/Party-Divisions/ 
[https://perma.cc/M75A-5LGB]; Party Division, U.S. SENATE, https://www.senate.gov/history/ 
partydiv.htm [https://perma.cc/PSF6-4YZ5]. For discussions of how divided government in Washington 
functions differently from unified government or not, compare DAVID R. MAYHEW, DIVIDED WE GOVERN: 
PARTY CONTROL, LAWMAKING, AND INVESTIGATIONS, 1946–2002, at 2–4 (2d ed. 2005), suggesting 
Congress is productive even when different parties control each chamber or the presidency, with MORRIS 
FIORINA, DIVIDED GOVERNMENT 110 (Sean Wakely & Stephen Hull eds., 2d ed. 1996), documenting how 
divided government can frustrate national lawmaking. 
 189 Following the 2018 midterm elections, many journalists and political analysts pointed out that not 
since 1914 has only one state had a divided legislature. See, e.g., Adam Nagourney & Sydney Ember, 
Election Consolidates One-Party Control over State Legislatures, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 7, 2018), 
https://nytimes.com/2018/11/07/us/politics/state-house-elections.html [https://perma.cc/EUR6-JR7M] 
(noting that, following the 2018 midterms, one party controls both chambers in every state legislature except 
Minnesota’s). 
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Medicaid and SNAP cuts, despite their control of both the Executive and 
Legislative Branches of the federal government.190 By adopting the 
categorization of previous scholarship on welfare state retrenchment, this Part 
suggests that direct, traditional attacks on both programs, so-called 
“programmatic retrenchment,” failed spectacularly. Despite unified 
government, President Trump and congressional leaders were unable to repeal 
the Affordable Care Act, defund Medicaid or SNAP through block grants, or 
achieve structural cuts and increased conditionality to SNAP in the Farm Bill. 
The White House and their congressional allies were more successful in their 
efforts at “systemic retrenchment,” which consists of depriving state and 
federal government of resources and revenue in order to undermine past 
expansions. To that end, the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 and less visible 
budgetary maneuvers put discretionary spending on a collision course with 
historically low tax rates—a wreck that will be foisted on future lawmakers.191 
The government shutdown in 2019 may also be best understood as an example 
of systemic retrenchment, as the federal government’s closure jeopardized 
SNAP benefits.192 That said, the heart of this Part posits that the lawmaking 
worth tracing is no longer in Congress, but in federal and state agencies. The 
Trump Administration and certain states are pursuing an interconnected 
strategy to cut SNAP and Medicaid not through legislation, but through 
regulation and devolution—a kind of lawmaking in the shadow of Congress. 
Therefore, tracking these state-focused efforts better explains the real threat 
facing anti-poverty programs today and the lasting influence of the New 
Property’s procedural protections. 
 
 190 See Agriculture Improvement Act of 2018, H.R. 2, 115th Cong. (2018) (enacted). The Senate 
companion bill was S. 3042, but it did not pass the Senate. S. 3042, 115th Cong. (2018); see also American 
Health Care Act of 2017, H.R. 1628, 115th Cong. (2017). The Better Care Reconciliation Act of 2017 was 
a Senate amendment in the nature of a substitute to H.R. 1628. Better Care Reconciliation Act of 2017, 
Amendment H.R. 1628, LYN17343, 115th Cong. (June 26, 2017) (amendment in the nature of a substitute). 
 191 The tax cuts represent arguably the best example of systemic retrenchment by the Trump 
Administration. See, e.g., Erica Werner, White House Budget Director Effectively Admits Tax Bill Doesn’t 
Pay for Itself, WASH. POST (Feb. 14, 2018, 5:18 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/business/wp/ 
2018/02/14/white-house-budget-director-effectively-admits-tax-bill-doesnt-pay-for-itself/ [https:// 
perma.cc/892N-4KCU]; Sam Fleming, US Budget Deficit Hits $779bn in Trump’s First Full Fiscal Year, 
FIN. TIMES (Oct. 15, 2018), https://ft.com/content/c8a990d8-d0a5-11e8-a9f2-7574db66bcd5 
[https://perma.cc/M6H2-VY75]. Indeed, this effort by President Trump parallels Presidents Ronald Reagan 
and George W. Bush’s earlier systemic retrenchment in reducing tax revenues. PIERSON, supra note 11, at 
149–55 (discussing Reagan’s “impairment of the federal government’s ability to generate tax revenues”); 
Larry M. Bartels, Homer Gets a Tax Cut: Inequality and Public Policy in the American Mind, 3 PERSPS. ON 
POL. 15, 23 (2005) (casting Bush tax cuts in a similar light). 
 192 See, e.g., Helena Bottemiller Evich, Food Stamps for Millions of Americans Become Pawn in 
Shutdown Fight, POLITICO (Jan. 7, 2019, 10:25 AM), http://politico.com/story/2019/01/07/food-stamps-
government-shutdown-1062090 [https://perma.cc/JJM2-F5BA]. 
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A. Legislative Action 
With control of both houses of Congress and the White House for the first 
time in over a decade, the Republican Party appeared poised in 2017 to make 
significant cuts to Medicaid and SNAP. The Republican Party’s stated 
priorities were to repeal the Affordable Care Act, cut taxes, and shrink the 
federal government’s size, and the GOP insisted that those goals were served 
by paring back both growing assistance programs.193 These kinds of legislative 
actions that are designed to reduce benefit levels and decrease the number of 
benefit recipients are typically considered examples of programmatic 
retrenchment. However, as seen in the failed efforts to roll back Medicaid and 
slash SNAP, all of these efforts in Congress proved futile. 
1. The Failed Efforts to Roll Back Medicaid 
The Trump Administration’s legislative efforts to cut Medicaid are bound 
up with its broader policy of undoing the Affordable Care Act. Just as President 
Obama’s first session of Congress was consumed by trying to enact the 
Affordable Care Act, President Trump’s was dominated by attempts to repeal 
it. However, despite significant coordination between the Trump 
Administration and Republican congressional leadership, the repeal of the 
ACA failed repeatedly.194 For the purposes of this Article, there is neither room 
nor reason to recount the play-by-play of Congress’s unsuccessful efforts to 
repeal the ACA beyond a single footnote.195 Suffice it to say, had the Trump 
 
 193 PLATFORM COMM., REPUBLICAN PLATFORM 2016, at 1–2 (2016), https://prod-cdn-
static.gop.com/media/documents/DRAFT_12_FINAL%5B1%5D-ben_1468872234.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/YLM2-UEGU] (promising to cut taxes); id. at 23 (promising to shrink the size of the 
federal government); id. at 36 (promising to repeal the Affordable Care Act). 
 194 See Tessa Berenson, Reminder: The House Voted to Repeal Obamacare More Than 50 Times, TIME 
(Mar. 24, 2017), https://time.com/4712725/ahca-house-repeal-votes-obamacare/ [https://perma.cc/8VEE-
P6DW]. 
 195 American Health Care Act of 2017, H.R. 1628, 115th Cong.; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Health & 
Hum. Servs., The American Health Care Act Is Critical First Step Toward Protecting Patients (Mar. 7, 2017), 
https://www.hhs.gov/about/news/2017/03/07/american-health-care-act-critical-first-step-toward-
protecting-patients.html [https://perma.cc/D2FT-CUDR] (supporting first repeal-and-replace bill, entitled 
the American Health Care Act, upon its introduction in the House); Final Vote Results for Roll Call 256, 
OFF. OF THE CLERK: U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (May 4, 2017), 
http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2017/roll256.xml [https://perma.cc/96U8-3MUN] (passing the American Health 
Care Act). The Senate then released the Better Care Reconciliation Act (BCRA), which would have capped 
Medicaid spending, repealed tax provisions paying for ACA benefits, and allowed states to waive consumer 
protections in health law. See Robert Pear & Thomas Kaplan, Senate Health Care Bill Includes Deep Cuts 
to Medicaid, N.Y. TIMES (June 22, 2017), https://nyti.ms/2tSE2IN [https://perma.cc/64NC-ZQNZ]. Senate 
sponsors then released a revised version of the BCRA. See Better Care Reconciliation Act, H.R. 1628, 
ERN17490, 115th Cong. (July 13, 2017) (amendment in the nature of a substitute). While the Senate initially 
voted to begin debate on a revised BCRA, the Senate then rejected the legislation. See, e.g., Thomas Kaplan 
& Robert Pear, Senate Votes Down Broad Obamacare Repeal, N.Y. TIMES (July 25, 2017), 
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Administration and the Republican Congress repealed the Affordable Care 
Act, millions of Medicaid recipients would have lost their health insurance,196 
and Medicaid’s trajectory would have changed dramatically.197 Important for 
our purposes, although not all ACA-repeal efforts included a Medicaid block 
grant, all versions eliminated the ACA’s Medicaid expansion and reduced 
Medicaid spending further.198 The fact that the 115th Congress only considered 
ACA-repeal legislation that would have cut Medicaid betrays the role 
Medicaid now plays in our public health insurance system.199 Once the 
Democrats took control of the House in January 2019, the Trump 
Administration indicated their intention to bypass Congress and block grant 
Medicaid using regulations and waivers.200 
2. The Failed Efforts to Slash SNAP 
Despite consistent promises and proposals by the Trump Administration 
and Republicans in Congress to achieve structural cuts to SNAP by turning it 
into a block grant to states, those efforts, like the efforts to cut Medicaid, have 
foundered. Following President Trump’s inauguration, Republicans in the 
House proposed $150 billion in cuts to SNAP.201 Those proposals came to 
 
https://nyti.ms/2tWG2cz [https://perma.cc/2QYW-6EW8] (analyzing first failed floor vote); Sean Sullivan, 
Juliet Eilperin & Kelsey Snell, Senate GOP Effort to Unwind the ACA Collapses Monday, WASH. POST 
(Sept. 25, 2017, 8:20 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/powerpost/new-version-of-health-care-bill-
will-help-alaska-and-maine--home-of-two-holdout-senators/2017/09/25/24697f62-a188-11e7-b14f-
f41773cd5a14_story.html [https://perma.cc/K2D4-9RKB] (detailing recognition among Senate leaders that 
there were not enough votes to repeal and replace the ACA). 
 196 See CONG. BUDGET OFF., COST ESTIMATE: H.R. 1628, AMERICAN HEALTH CARE ACT OF 2017 tbl.4 
(2017); Letter from Keith Hall, Dir., Cong. Budget Off., to Hon. Mike Enzi, Chairman, Comm. on the 
Budget (July 20, 2017) (regarding H.R. 1628, the Better Care Reconciliation Act of 2017: An Amendment 
in the Nature of a Substitute) (on file with journal). 
 197 See Letter from Keith Hall, supra note 196 (estimating that in the BCRA “[t]he largest savings would 
come from a reduction in total federal spending for Medicaid resulting both from provisions affecting health 
insurance coverage and from other provisions,” and that “[b]y 2026, spending for that program would be 
reduced by 26 percent”). 
 198 See Aaron E. Carroll, How Would Republican Plans for Medicaid Block Grants Actually Work?, 
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 6, 2017), https://nyti.ms/2kEw1Qu [https://perma.cc/Z3WE-4DKA]. 
 199 See Nicole Huberfeld, Federalism in Health Care Reform, in HOLES IN THE SAFETY NET: 
FEDERALISM AND POVERTY, supra note 96, at 197, 211 (“Despite targeting only the deserving poor for its 
first five decades, Medicaid covers half of all births, more than a third of all children, and is the primary 
payor for long-term care—anyone who lives long enough is highly likely to become a Medicaid 
Beneficiary.”). 
 200 Rachana Pradhan & Dan Diamond, Trump Wants to Bypass Congress on Medicaid Plan, POLITICO 
(Jan. 11, 2019, 5:14 PM), https://politico.com/story/2019/01/11/trump-bypass-congress-medicaid-plan-
1078885 [https://perma.cc/9RAL-LAE7]. 
 201 Greg Trotter, Food Stamp Program Faces Uncertain Future as Power Shifts in Washington, CHI. 
TRIB. (Jan. 6, 2017), https://chicagotribune.com/business/ct-food-stamps-block-grants-0108-biz-20170105-
story.html [https://perma.cc/3DLZ-H6E2]. Although the 2018 budget proposal did not mention the phrase, 
most think tanks and analysts interpreted the House budget proposal to mean something akin to block grants. 
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naught. Despite being unable to make deep cuts to SNAP through the budget 
process, the 115th Congress and the Trump Administration had another 
significant opportunity to codify SNAP cuts: namely, the Farm Bill. The Farm 
Bill is the omnibus legislation that reauthorizes federal agriculture and 
nutrition spending for a five-year period.202 The Nutrition Title, which 
authorizes SNAP funding, has become the largest expenditure in that 
legislation—and increasingly so over the last twenty years.203 Since 2014, the 
Republican House leadership made it clear that they saw the Farm Bill as a 
vehicle for their vision of welfare reform.204 In the House version of the 2018 
Farm Bill (an $860 billion legislation that passed by only two votes), the House 
made changes to the SNAP program that would have cut SNAP benefits for 
millions of Americans.205 The House bill sought to reduce SNAP benefits in 
three ways, one of which is worth detailing because it has since resurfaced in 
regulatory efforts.206 The House version tightened the time limit for able-
bodied adults without dependents who did not meet a work requirement, which 
would have ultimately removed 1.2 million recipients from the program. 
Analysts connected the work requirements proposal in the House bill as part 
of a coordinated campaign by the Trump Administration and the GOP-led 
Congress to make similar changes to Medicaid.207 
 
ISAAC SHAPIRO, RICHARD KOGAN & CHLOE CHO, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES, HOUSE GOP 
BUDGET CUTS PROGRAMS AIDING LOW- AND MODERATE-INCOME PEOPLE BY $2.9 TRILLION OVER DECADE 
4 (2017). 
 202 RENÉE JOHNSON & JIM MONKE, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RS22131, WHAT IS THE FARM BILL? 1 & n.1 
(2018) (identifying the “17 farm bills since the 1930s” and concluding that “[f]arm bills have become 
increasingly omnibus in nature since 1973, when the nutrition title was included”). 
 203 Id. at 7 (“[W]hen the 2008 farm bill was enacted, the nutrition title was 67% of the five-year total. 
When the 2014 farm bill was enacted, the nutrition share had risen to 80%.”). Lawmakers have tried 
repeatedly to separate the Nutrition Title from the rest of the Farm Bill, most recently in 2013. Jonathan 
Weisman & Ron Nixon, House Republicans Push Through Farm Bill, Without Food Stamps, N.Y. TIMES 
(July 11, 2013), https://nyti.ms/14L66pW [https://perma.cc/6KCK-Q838]. 
 204 See STAFF OF HOUSE BUDGET COMM., 113TH CONG., THE WAR ON POVERTY: 50 YEARS LATER 81, 
92, 96 (2014). 
 205 Jeff Stein, Congress Just Passed an $867 Billion Farm Bill. Here’s What’s in It, WASH. POST (Dec. 
12, 2018, 4:03 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2018/12/11/congresss-billion-farm-bill-is-
out-heres-whats-it/ [https://perma.cc/4P8W-US77]. 
 206 The 2018 Farm Bill was officially entitled the Agriculture Improvement Act of 2018 and enacted as 
Public Law 115-334. See H.R. 2, 115th Cong. (2018) (enacted). 
 207 Diana R.H. Winters, Everything You Need to Know About the Upcoming Farm Bill Debate, HEALTH 
AFFS. BLOG (Feb. 21, 2018), https://healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20180215.383921/full/ 
[https://perma.cc/V5DU-S8GA] (describing the Department of Agriculture’s position as “consistent with 
the administration’s broader efforts to connect public benefits to work requirements, as in the Medicaid 
program”). Under the House version, states could have continued to exempt a portion of the caseload and 
request geographic waivers based on labor-market measures, but with some amendments. The Congressional 
Budget Office (CBO) estimated that the House-passed work-related changes would reduce spending on 
SNAP benefits by approximately $14.1 billion over ten years and would have increased spending on program 
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However, when the Senate passed its version of the Farm Bill only a week 
later, the legislation contained none of these proposed cuts to SNAP. By a vote 
of 86–11, the Senate passed its version of the Farm Bill, which essentially 
maintained the status quo for SNAP.208 Both the Chairman and the Ranking 
Member of the Senate Agriculture Committee stated that the House cuts to 
SNAP and the work requirements could not pass the sixty-vote threshold for 
legislation in the Senate, and the Senate voted down an amendment to the bill 
that would have added work requirements.209 Thus, despite having both House 
and Senate versions of the Farm Bill by the end of June 2018, Congress failed 
to pass the Farm Bill before authorization expired at the end of September 
2018.210 The failure to pass the Farm Bill before the expiration date became a 
key issue in many congressional races during the 2018 cycle.211 After the 2018 
midterm election confirmed that the Democrats would control the House in the 
next Congress, the House and Senate agreed, during the lame-duck session of 
the 115th Congress, to a Farm Bill that left out all three of these cuts to SNAP 
benefits. 
Yet, there was one feature of the final bill that aligned with the Trump 
Administration and Republican Congress’s goal of defunding SNAP. 
Although the Senate included a provision blocking the Trump Administration 
from cracking down on state ABAWD waivers, that provision was dropped in 
the final version of the Farm Bill, which the President signed.212 The same day 
President Trump signed the 2018 Farm Bill, the President’s Secretary of 
Agriculture, Sonny Perdue, announced a proposed rule that would tighten work 
requirements for ABAWDs, characterizing the requirements as “common-
 
administration by approximately $7.3 billion—a net reduction of $6.8 billion. Letter from Keith Hall, Dir., 
Cong. Budget Off., to Hon. Michael Conaway, Chairman, Comm. on Agric. (Apr. 13, 2018) (on file with 
journal). 
 208 Catherine Boudreau & Liz Crampton, Senate Passes Farm Bill, Setting Up Food Stamp Battle with 
the House, POLITICO (June 28, 2019, 8:09 PM), https://politico.com/story/2018/06/28/senate-passes-farm-
bill-683232 [https://perma.cc/X4ZP-B3VM]. 
 209 Id. 
 210 See Humeyra Pamuk, U.S. Lawmakers, at Impasse on New Farm Bill, Mull Extension of Old One, 
REUTERS (Oct. 2, 2018, 1:34 PM), https://reuters.com/article/us-usa-farmbill/u-s-lawmakers-at-impasse-on-
new-farm-bill-mull-extension-of-old-one-idUSKCN1MC2EU [https://perma.cc/A93L-MYZ6]. 
 211 See Jeff Daniels, Stalled Farm Bill Grabs Attention During Midterms, Expected on Front Burner 
When Congress Returns, CNBC (Nov. 1, 2018, 2:56 PM), https://cnbc.com/2018/10/31/stalled-farm-bill-
expected-on-front-burner-when-congress-returns-.html [https://perma.cc/RAF6-B8JX]. 
 212 See Helena Bottemiller Evich & Catherine Boudreau, Farm Bill Headed to Trump After Landslide 
House Approval, POLITICO (Dec. 13, 2018, 11:34 AM), https://politico.com/story/2018/12/12/house-passes-
farm-bill-1060916 [https://perma.cc/AE5N-P3SL] (“Well, we lost the House of Representatives in 
November . . . That was the final nail on the coffin in terms of leverage that I got.” (quoting House 
Agriculture Chairman Mike Conaway)). Conservatives proclaimed the ABAWD omission “a win because 
it allows USDA to tighten the process without congressional approval.” Id. 
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sense policy, particularly at a time when the unemployment rate is at a 
generational low.”213 As the next Section explores, the Department of 
Agriculture’s proposed work requirement regulation was the first of several 
efforts to cut SNAP through agency action—many of which run parallel to 
similar efforts by the Trump Administration to undo Medicaid. 
B. Administrative Action 
Both during and after these efforts in Congress, the Trump Administration 
pursued agency actions that sought to achieve the same policy they had 
attempted via legislation, namely, reducing access to and generosity of SNAP 
and Medicaid benefits. To do so, the Trump Administration combined three 
major strategies: devolution to states, disaggregation of the recipient 
population, and increased conditionality of benefit receipt.214 This framework 
for administrative action suggests an understanding among opponents of these 
programs on how to undo the protections envisioned by the New Property. 
However, the federal courts’ rulings on work requirements in Medicaid, 
SNAP, and public charge litigation demonstrate that there are potent checks on 
the Trump Administration’s efforts to achieve through regulation what it has 
failed to enact through legislation. 
1. The Trump Administration’s Strategy 
Following the successive defeats in Congress to legislate cuts in food and 
medical assistance, the Trump Administration looked to achieve similar ends 
through an interlocking strategy, what I call “devolved, disaggregated 
conditionality,” for both the SNAP and Medicaid programs.215 By and large, 
the Trump Administration has sought to reduce food and medical assistance 
 
 213 Press Release, USDA, USDA to Restore Original Intent of SNAP: A Second Chance, Not a Way of 
Life (Dec. 20, 2018), https://www.fns.usda.gov/news-item/usda-restore-original-intent-snap-second-
chance-not-way-life [https://perma.cc/NGA9-6MXR] (quoting Department of Agriculture Secretary Sonny 
Perdue); see also Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program: Requirements for Able-Bodied Adults 
Without Dependents, 84 Fed. Reg. 22 (Feb. 1, 2019) (to be codified at 7 C.F.R pt. 273). 
 214 See Reducing Poverty in America by Promoting Opportunity and Economic Mobility, Exec. Order 
No. 13,828, 83 Fed. Reg. 15,941, 15,943 (Apr. 10, 2018) (requiring eight Cabinet-level secretaries to each 
submit a report to the President with “a list of recommended regulatory and policy changes and other actions 
to accomplish the principles outlined in this order,” and within 90 days of submitting those reports, to “take 
steps to implement the recommended administrative actions”); see also Ezra Rosser, Pulling from a Dated 
Playbook: President Trump’s Executive Order on Poverty, HARV. L. REV. BLOG (Apr. 18, 2018), 
https://www.blog.harvardlawreview.org/pulling-from-a-dated-playbook-president-trumps-executive-order-
on-poverty/ [https://perma.cc/2846-RXYQ] (analyzing and criticizing the order). 
 215 This account cuts against those proposed by some who have found that the Trump Administration’s 
efforts in this area are fundamentally incoherent or held together only by animus. See, e.g., David A. Super, 
Opinion, The Cruelty of Trump’s Poverty Policy, N.Y. TIMES (July 24, 2019), https://nyti.ms/2y6tUtZ 
[https://perma.cc/MDE3-37W5]. 
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not by regulating both programs nationwide, but by directing federal agencies 
to cut SNAP and Medicaid through partnerships with like-minded elected 
officials and bureaucrats in state government.216 Using the discourse of 
federalism, the Trump Administration has characterized many of these 
proposals as optional for the states. Yet, none of the devolutionary proposals 
permit states to expand either program. The only choice states have under these 
policies is to reduce benefits and services. This “insincere devolution” is 
similar to earlier cooperative-federalism efforts in Temporary Assistance for 
Needy Families (TANF), the cash assistance program, in the wake of welfare 
reform.217 
Not only has the Trump Administration pursued a state-specific strategy; 
it is group-specific within any particular state. The Administration has not 
attempted any changes to the entire SNAP or Medicaid caseload in a given 
state. Instead, federal agencies have exploited fractured definitions of 
American citizenship. Long before President Trump took office, American 
public law constructed tiers of social citizenship.218 And for the last fifty years, 
there have always been restrictions on which needy Americans could access 
SNAP and Medicaid. For instance, Americans who reside on tribal lands, in 
overseas territories, or who live in mixed-status families experience a distinct, 
often deteriorating safety net.219 Similarly, Americans who do not have 
children, or at least are not raising children in the home, also cannot equally 
access SNAP and Medicaid. Notably, the Affordable Care Act eliminated most 
of these distinctions across citizenship with its Medicaid expansion, but the 
Supreme Court deemed that expansion unconstitutionally coercive for states.220 
It is no accident that these groups are considered to be less politically powerful. 
 
 216 Somewhat surprisingly, the Trump Administration has not made similar efforts to devolve control 
of SNAP and Medicaid to private actors. See generally JON D. MICHAELS, CONSTITUTIONAL COUP: 
PRIVATIZATION’S THREAT TO THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 119–42 (2017) (characterizing privatization efforts 
over the last forty years as an existential threat to the American public law system). 
 217 See Andrew Hammond, Welfare and Federalism’s Peril, 92 WASH. L. REV. 1721, 1741–44 (2017) 
(describing how TANF devolution is, in effect, “statutized deterioration”). For a discussion of how the 
implementation of devolved standards of the TANF program and PRWORA did not live up to the policy 
promises from Washington, respectively, see Zatz, supra note 84, at 1134, 1155, and Jon Michaels, 
Deforming Welfare: How the Dominant Narratives of Devolution and Privatization Subverted Federal 
Welfare Reform, 34 SETON HALL L. REV. 573, 604–06 (2004). 
 218 See generally FOX, supra note 39, at 291–94 (discussing the exclusion of Blacks and Mexicans from 
New Deal programs and its implication today). 
 219 See Andrew Hammond, The Immigration-Welfare Nexus in a New Era?, 22 LEWIS & CLARK L. 
REV. 501, 505–17 (2018) (detailing the doctrinal, statutory, and regulatory framework for immigrant 
families applying for Medicaid, SNAP, SSI, and TANF); The Study of the Food Distribution Program on 
Indian Reservations, NORC AT THE UNIV. OF CHI., https://www.norc.org/Research/Projects/Pages/the-
study-of-the-food-distribution-program-on-indian-reservations.aspx [https://perma.cc/Z24H-2J2C]. 
 220 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 588 (2012). 
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Even going after the least politically popular or sympathetic populations, 
the Trump Administration could not simply cut Medicaid or SNAP benefits for 
those groups. While the Supreme Court in Dandridge rejected a constitutional 
challenge that would have increased the substantive benefits,221 federal law still 
prevents agencies from singling out certain populations for direct cuts. Federal 
law requires that states cover certain mandatory populations in both programs. 
For Medicaid, federal law also requires that states provide certain services to 
every Medicaid recipient.222 A state cannot decline to insure a mandatory 
population nor can a state choose to cover a certain population, but deny them 
certain mandatory services.223 Similarly, SNAP requires that benefit levels are 
uniform across the continental United States.224 Of course, as a near-cash 
benefit, SNAP’s generosity rises and falls with a household’s net income, and 
administrators can sanction recipients individually.225 But a state cannot create, 
via statute or regulation, a new category of recipients that receive reduced 
SNAP benefits.226 
As a result, benefit levels of Medicaid and SNAP are not immediately 
susceptible to regulatory change. Absent amending the federal statute, states 
have to come up with some other way to cut both programs, either by 
preventing people from signing up or by kicking off current recipients. One of 
the challenges with creating these additional conditions is that they impose 
costs on the recipient and the administrator. And because both programs 
operate under a cooperative-federalism scheme, state administrators could face 
a federal lawsuit relying on precedent that has grown up around welfare 
programs since Professor Reich penned The New Property in 1964. 
2. Work Requirements 
The most prominent illustration of the Trump Administration’s 
administrative strategy—a mix of devolution, disaggregation, and 
conditionality—is the work requirement. Welfare programs have always been 
bound up in the myths and realities of low-wage work.227 Work requirements 
 
 221 See supra notes 64–68 and accompanying text. 
 222 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(k)–(m). 
 223 KLEES ET AL., supra note 108, at 28. 
 224 See Memorandum from U.S. Dep’t of Agric. to All Reg’l Dirs., SNAP—Fiscal Year 2019 Cost-of-
Living Adjustments (July 27, 2018), https://fns-prod.azureedge.net/sites/default/files/snap/ 
COLAMemoFY19.pdf [https://perma.cc/CM4R-87RE].  
 225 See A Quick Guide to SNAP Eligibility and Benefits, supra note 117, at 1–4; see also, e.g., OHIO 
ADMIN. CODE 5101:4-3-11.2 (2020). 
 226 See U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 540 (1973). 
 227 Mass. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare v. Yeutter, 947 F.2d 537, 540 (1st Cir. 1991) (holding that USDA could 
sanction a state for failure to comply with federal plan for mandatory employment and training (E&T) 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
408 
abound in public benefits programs. The most obvious example is TANF,228 
but housing programs also include work requirements.229 Similarly, the Trump 
Administration has pursued work requirements in SNAP and Medicaid to 
make stealth cuts to both programs.230 Here, the federal government invites 
states to opt in to applying an additional condition of receiving a public benefit, 
namely, that they have to prove a certain number of hours in formal 
employment or sometimes activities that could lead to employment, for a 
certain segment of the welfare caseload. By looking at these requirements, we 
can see the shape of welfare litigation today: namely, the federal government 
must rely on state actors, often with varying levels of success. 
a. Medicaid work requirements 
Since the failure to repeal the Affordable Care Act, the Trump 
Administration’s efforts to cut Medicaid have centered on granting waivers to 
individual states. Nearly fifty years before the Affordable Care Act, federal law 
authorized states to depart from certain requirements of the Social Security Act 
to pursue a demonstration project if they received a waiver from the federal 
government.231 The Social Security Act empowers the Health and Human 
Services (HHS) Secretary to allow states to run an “experimental, pilot, or 
 
program); see also Zatz, supra note 84, at 380–88 (discussing the challenges of defining “work” for the 
purposes of a welfare program). 
 228 See Hammond, supra note 217, at 1722–24; see also Policy Basics: Temporary Assistance for Needy 
Families, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES (Feb. 6, 2020), https://www.cbpp.org/research/family-
income-support/temporary-assistance-for-needy-families [https://perma.cc/PCU4-MKA9].  
 229 Michele Gilman, The Difference in Being Poor in Red States Versus Blue States, in HOLES IN THE 
SAFETY NET, supra note 96, at 68, 70–74 (discussing this feature of welfare governance with respect to work 
requirements); see also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., MEDICAID DEMONSTRATIONS: APPROVALS OF 
MAJOR CHANGES NEED INCREASED TRANSPARENCY (2019) (discussing Medicaid work requirements); 
DAVID SUPER, PUBLIC WELFARE LAW 956 (2017) (“Although the Supreme Court in the 1960s and 70s 
struck down most states’ attempts to impose behavioral norms on welfare recipients without explicit federal 
approval, it ignored these holdings when the norms being imposed related to work.”); Kali Grant, Funke 
Aderonmu, Sophie Khan, Kastubh Chahande, Casey Goldvale, Indivar Dutta-Gupta, Aileen Carr & Doug 
Steiger, Unworkable & Unwise: Conditioning Access to Programs That Ensure a Basic Foundation for 
Families on Work Requirements (Geo. Ctr. on Poverty & Inequality, Working Paper, 2019). 
 230 See COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, EXPANDING WORK REQUIREMENTS IN NON-CASH WELFARE 
PROGRAMS 7 (2018), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/Expanding-Work-
Requirements-in-Non-Cash-Welfare-Programs.pdf [https://perma.cc/V8SP-7QTG] (detailing “the current 
state of work requirements in Medicaid, SNAP and housing assistance programs” and noting that they “are 
much weaker and less expansive than those in TANF”). 
 231 Public Welfare Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. 87-543, 76 Stat. 172 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1315) 
(commonly referred to as § 1115 of the Social Security Act); S. REP. No. 87-1589, at 31 (1962); see also 
Anthony Albanese, The Past, Present, and Future of Section 1115, 128 YALE L.J.F. 827, 828 (2019) 
(detailing HHS’s history as a “lenient gatekeeper” in granting waivers); Jonathan R. Bolton, The Case of the 
Disappearing Statute: A Legal and Policy Critique of the Use of Section 1115 Waivers to Restructure the 
Medicaid Program, 37 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 91, 92–94 (2003). 
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demonstration project” in its Medicaid program that would otherwise run afoul 
of federal requirements if the Secretary determines that that project “is likely 
to assist in promoting the objectives” of the Act.232 To apply for the waiver, the 
state must follow some basic procedures,233 as must the Secretary in 
considering the waiver.234 
To date, twenty states have submitted waivers that, if implemented, would 
allow them to impose work requirements on Medicaid recipients.235 The 
question of whether these waivers violate federal law is best understood 
through the litigation involving Kentucky—the first state to receive such a 
waiver—and Arkansas. On January 1, 2014, Kentucky opted into the 
Affordable Care Act’s Medicaid expansion. As a result, more than 400,000 
Kentuckians received medical assistance through the Medicaid expansion.236 
However, in December 2015, Matt Bevin, who had campaigned against the 
Medicaid expansion, began his first term as Kentucky Governor. To honor that 
campaign promise, in 2016 Governor Bevin submitted a waiver application to 
the Secretary of HHS to “comprehensively transform Medicaid.”237 On July 3, 
2017, the Bevin administration submitted a modified waiver.238 Kentucky’s 
new Medicaid plan required the expansion-eligible recipients and others to 
participate in “community engagement” activities.239 Those activities include 
at least eighty hours each month of such activities as a condition of receiving 
health coverage. The project also calls for, among other things, increased 
premiums and more stringent reporting requirements.240 Kentucky projected 
that the state would reduce Medicaid enrollment over a five-year period by 
over 95,000 recipients and reduce payments by $2.4 billion.241 However, the 
Obama Administration let Kentucky’s application languish. 
 
 232 42 U.S.C. § 1315(a). Section 1115 of the Social Security Act requires that the Secretary consider 
two criteria before granting the waiver: (1) whether the project is an “experimental, pilot or demonstration 
project,” and (2) whether the project is “likely to assist in promoting the objectives” of the Act. Id. 
 233 See 42 C.F.R. § 431.408(a) (2019). 
 234 Id. § 431.416(b), (e)(1). 
 235 Medicaid Waiver Tracker: Approved and Pending Section 1115 Waivers by State, KAISER FAM. 
FOUND. (June 11, 2020), https://www.kff.org/medicaid/issue-brief/medicaid-waiver-tracker-approved-and-
pending-section-1115-waivers-by-state/ [https://perma.cc/MXA2-4KQV]. 
 236 Stewart v. Azar, 313 F. Supp. 3d 237, 243 (D.D.C. 2018). 
 237 Letter from Matthew G. Bevin, Governor of Ky., to Hon. Sylvia Burwell, Sec’y, Dep’t of Health & 
Hum. Servs. (Aug. 24, 2016) (discussing HEALTH § 1115 Demonstration) (on file with journal). 
 238 Letter from Adam Meier, Deputy Chief of Staff, Off. of Governor Matthew G. Bevin, to Brian Neale, 
Dir., Ctr. for Medicaid & CHIP Servs. (July 3, 2017) (discussing Kentucky HEALTH § 1115 Demonstration 
Modification Request) (on file with journal). 
 239 Id. 
 240 Id. 
 241 Id. 
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In contrast, the Trump Administration, before and after its efforts to repeal 
the ACA, made concerted efforts to encourage such waiver applications. On 
March 14, 2017, HHS Secretary Price and the new Administrator of the 
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) Seema Verma published 
a letter to all governors encouraging them to apply for Medicaid waivers. The 
“Dear Governor” letter singled out the ACA expansion group, describing it as 
“a clear departure from the core, historical mission of the program” and 
offering to “fast-track” approval of waivers that dealt with this population.242 
Despite the promise to fast track, no work requirement waivers were approved 
for several months. Presumably, the Trump Administration held off giving 
states further guidance because they were after bigger game: the repeal of the 
ACA. Once the repeal-and-replace bill was defeated in the Senate, however, 
the Administration ramped up its efforts, publicly and privately. In November 
2017, Verma declared that the ACA’s decision to “move[] millions of 
working-age, non-disabled adults into” Medicaid “does not make sense,” and 
announced that CMS would resist that change by approving state waivers that 
contain work requirements.243 To that end, on January 11, 2018, CMS 
published a letter “announcing a new policy designed to assist states in their 
efforts to improve Medicaid enrollee health and well-being through 
incentivizing work and community engagement among nonelderly, 
nonpregnant adult Medicaid beneficiaries who are eligible for Medicaid on a 
basis other than disability.”244 This letter was aimed squarely at people who 
 
 242 Letter from Thomas E. Price, Sec’y, Health & Hum. Servs. & Seema Verma, Adm’r, CMS, to All 
Governors (Mar. 14, 2017), https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/sec-price-admin-verma-ltr.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/4CTZ-RXY9]. A few months later, Verma authored an op-ed describing how the United 
States had “a rare opportunity, through a combination of congressional and administrative actions, to 
fundamentally transform Medicaid.” Seema Verma, Opinion, Lawmakers Have a Rare Chance to Transform 




 243 Seema Verma, Adm’r, CMS, Remarks at the National Association of Medicaid Directors (NAMD) 
2017 Fall Conference (Nov. 7, 2017), https://www.cms.gov/newsroom/fact-sheets/speech-remarks-
administrator-seema-verma-national-association-medicaid-directors-namd-2017-fall 
[https://perma.cc/NN2A-JCBB]. A few days later, Verma said in an interview that one of the “major, 
fundamental flaws in the Affordable Care Act was putting in able-bodied adults” since Medicaid was “not 
designed for an able-bodied person.” The Future of: Health Care, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 10, 2017, 4:10 PM) 
https://www.wsj.com/video/the-future-of-health-care/D5B767E4-B2F2-4394-90BB-37935CCD410C.html 
(last visited Oct. 10, 2020). In the interview, Verma also said that CMS was “trying [to] restructure the 
Medicaid program.” Id. 
 244 Letter from Brian Neale, Dir., Ctr. for Medicaid & CHIP Servs., to State Medicaid Dirs. (Jan. 11, 
2018), https://www.medicaid.gov/federal-policy-guidance/downloads/smd18002.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
AZ2Q-LELM] (regarding “Opportunities to Promote Work and Community Engagement Among Medicaid 
Beneficiaries”). 
115:361 (2020) Litigating Welfare Rights 
411 
received Medicaid under the ACA expansion.245 The next day, HHS approved 
Kentucky’s Medicaid waiver.246 
Shortly after, sixteen named plaintiffs, on behalf of all Kentucky 
Medicaid recipients, filed a class action in federal court arguing that HHS’s 
approval of the Kentucky waiver violated the Social Security Act and the 
Administrative Procedure Act (APA).247 In their complaint, the class 
representatives pointed out that, by the end of 2014, over 375,000 Kentuckians 
had enrolled in Medicaid.248 In addition to detailing the medical services 
received by these ACA-expansion Medicaid recipients, the plaintiffs 
emphasized the reduction in Kentucky hospitals’ uncompensated care costs 
and the 12,000 new jobs attributed to the Medicaid expansion.249 In addition to 
requesting certification as a class under Rule 23(b)(2), the plaintiffs requested, 
inter alia, that the district court issue a declaratory judgment that Administrator 
Verma’s letter to State Medicaid Directors (SMDL) and the decision to 
approve Kentucky’s waiver violated federal law as well as preliminarily and 
permanently enjoin the SMDL.250 
The district court granted plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment, in 
part, and vacated the HHS Secretary’s grant of Kentucky’s Medicaid waiver.251 
Reviewing the agency record, Judge James E. Boasberg held that the HHS 
Secretary “never adequately considered whether Kentucky HEALTH would in 
fact help the state furnish medical assistance to its citizens, a central objective 
of Medicaid.”252 Judge Boasberg concluded that that “signal omission” 
rendered the Secretary’s determination arbitrary and capricious and in 
violation of the APA.253 Judge Boasberg noted that while TANF and SNAP 
“condition benefits on working, there is no equivalent for the Medicaid 
program.”254 Looking at past agency practice, Judge Boasberg pointed out that 
“during the 50-plus years of Medicaid, CMS has not previously approved a 
 
 245 See David A. Super, A Hiatus in Soft-Power Administrative Law: The Case of Medicaid Eligibility 
Waivers, 65 UCLA L. REV. 1590, 1594–95 (2018). 
 246 Letter from Brian Neale, Deputy Adm’r, Ctr. for Medicaid & CHIP Servs., to Adam Meier, Deputy 
Chief of Staff, Off. of Governor Matthew Bevin (Jan. 12, 2018), https://affordablecareactlitigation.files. 
wordpress.com/2018/11/5745524-0-18348.pdf [https://perma.cc/B7XW-9VXG].  
 247 Class Action Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief at 4, Stewart v. Hargan, No. 18-cv-152 
(D.D.C. Jan. 24, 2018). Alex Azar later replaced Acting HHS Secretary Eric Hargan as a named defendant. 
 248 Id. at 17. 
 249 Id. at 17–18. 
 250 Id. at 76. 
 251 Stewart v. Azar, 313 F. Supp. 3d 237, 243 (D.D.C. 2018). 
 252 Id.; see also id. at 262 (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm, 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)). 
 253 Id. at 243. 
 254 Id. at 245 (first citing 42 U.S.C. § 607; and then citing 7 U.S.C. § 2029(a)(1)). 
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community-engagement or work requirement as a condition of Medicaid 
eligibility.”255 Because the Secretary “glossed over ‘the impact of the state’s 
project’ on the individuals whom Medicaid ‘was enacted to protect,’” the 
district court vacated HHS’s approval of Kentucky’s and remanded it to the 
agency.256 On remand, Governor Bevin submitted, and the Trump 
Administration approved, after a notice-and-comment period, a second, nearly 
identical waiver request.257 But the district court stopped the Trump 
Administration again by vacating the new waiver.258 
The same day the district court vacated the reapproved Kentucky waiver, 
it handed down another decision regarding the Trump Administration’s 
approval of Arkansas’s Medicaid waiver. Like Kentucky, Arkansas submitted 
a Medicaid waiver during the Obama Administration.259 The Obama 
Administration initially denied Arkansas’s waiver proposal in part because it 
included a work requirement.260 Following the 2016 election and before 
President Trump’s inauguration, the Obama Administration approved a 
modified waiver from Arkansas, even while it let Kentucky’s languish.261 Some 
 
 255 Id. 
 256 Id. at 265 (quoting Beno v. Shalala, 30 F.3d 1057, 1070 (9th Cir. 1994)); see also id. at 274. In 
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 258 Stewart v. Azar, 366 F. Supp. 3d 125 (D.D.C. 2019). 
 259 See Letter from Asa Hutchinson, Governor of Ark., to Hon. Sylvia Mathews Burwell, Sec’y, U.S. 
Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs. (June 28, 2016), https://www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CHIP-Program-
Information/By-Topics/Waivers/1115/downloads/ar/Health-Care-Independence-Program-Private-
Option/ar-works-application-07072016.pdf [https://perma.cc/EF79-E2FJ] (requesting permission from 
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Works”). 
 260 See Letter from Sylvia Burwell, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., to Asa Hutchinson, 
Governor of Ark. (Apr. 5, 2016) (denying Arkansas’s request because it is not “consistent with the purposes 
of the Medicaid program”) (on file with journal); see also Letter from Andrew M. Slavitt, Acting Adm’r, 
Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., to Thomas Betlach, Dir., Az. Health Care Cost Containment Sys. 
(Sept. 30, 2016) (approving the waiver but denying a work requirement and other provisions from Arizona 
and, in the process, concluding that work requirements do “not support the objectives” of Medicaid) (on file 
with journal). 
 261 See Letter from Andrew M. Slavitt, Acting Adm’r, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., to Cindy 
Gillespie, Dir., Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs. (Dec. 8, 2016), https://www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CHIP-
Program-Information/By-Topics/Waivers/1115/downloads/ar/Health-Care-Independence-Program-
Private-Option/ar-works-amndmnt-appvl-12292017.pdf [https://perma.cc/4KJG-PJ9W] (extending the 
§1115 project through the end of 2021). 
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viewed these actions as evidence that the Obama Administration sought to get 
as many states as possible to opt in to the ACA expansion, even though 
Arkansas’s was a proposal the federal government would have never designed 
themselves.262 Once President Trump took office, Arkansas Governor Asa 
Hutchinson submitted a request to HHS to amend its Medicaid waiver.263 
Specifically, Arkansas requested to implement a work requirement, eliminate 
three-month retroactive coverage, and phase out Medicaid coverage of 
individuals with household incomes above 100% FPL.264 After a public 
comment period, the Secretary of HHS approved the Arkansas Works 
Amendment, with qualifications.265 The federal government allowed Arkansas 
to implement the work requirement and to reduce the retroactive coverage to 
not less than one month.266 The federal government denied the state’s request 
to reduce the income eligibility for Medicaid. 
Similar to Kentucky, Arkansas residents impacted by the Medicaid 
changes challenged the waiver in federal court, which the district court 
designated as related to Stewart v. Azar and thus assigned to Judge Boasberg.267 
As Kentucky had in Stewart, Arkansas intervened as a defendant, and both 
sides filed for summary judgment. In his decision in the Arkansas litigation, 
Gresham v. Azar, Judge Boasberg found that, like in Stewart, the Secretary 
“neither offered his own estimates of coverage loss nor grappled with 
comments in the administrative record projecting that the Amendments would 
lead a substantial number of Arkansas residents to be disenrolled from 
Medicaid,” making the decision to grant Arkansas’s waiver “arbitrary and 
capricious.”268 
 
 262 See Abbe R. Gluck & Nicole Huberfeld, What Is Federalism in Healthcare For?, 70 STAN. L. REV. 
1689, 1737–39 (2018); BETHANY MAYLONE & BENJAMIN D. SOMMERS, THE COMMONWEALTH FUND, 
EVIDENCE FROM THE PRIVATE OPTION: THE ARKANSAS EXPERIENCE (2017), 
https://www.commonwealthfund.org/sites/default/files/documents/___media_files_publications_issue_brie
f_2017_feb_1932_maylone_private_option_arkansas_ib_v2.pdf [https://perma.cc/YT6V-8R7L]; Rebecca 
Adams, Federal Officials Give Arkansas Medicaid Waiver, THE COMMONWEALTH FUND (Sept. 27, 2013), 
https://www.commonwealthfund.org/publications/newsletter-article/federal-officials-give-arkansas-
medicaid-waiver [https://perma.cc/M9N4-UNQL]. 
 263 See Letter from Asa Hutchinson, Governor of Ark., to Hon. Thomas E. Price, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of 
Health & Hum. Servs. (June 30, 2017) (on file with journal). 
 264 See id. 
 265 Letter from Seema Verma, Adm’r, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., to Cindy Gillespie, Dir., 
Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs. (Mar. 5, 2018) (on file with journal). 
 266 Id. 
 267 While HHS objected to this related-case designation, the district court determined the cases shared 
legal and factual issues that weighed in favor of retaining the case. See Minute Order, Gresham v. Azar, 
363 F. Supp. 3d 165 (D.D.C. 2019) (No. 18-cv-1900), ECF No. 22. 
 268 Gresham, 363 F. Supp. 3d at 175 (“As Opening Day arrives, the Court finds its guiding principle in 
Yogi Berra’s aphorism, ‘It’s déjà vu all over again.’”) 
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While the district court’s decision to vacate and set aside Arkansas’s 
Medicaid waiver tracked its decision to do the same with Kentucky’s, 
Arkansas’s waiver presented an additional wrinkle. Whereas Kentucky’s 
changes had yet to take effect, Arkansas’s changes were an amendment to an 
existing waiver.269 For this reason, Arkansas and the federal government in 
Gresham were in a slightly stronger position than Kentucky in Stewart to ask 
the court not to vacate the waiver because of the disruption it would cause to 
Arkansas’s Medicaid program.270 The decision to decline to vacate turned on 
the “seriousness of the order’s deficiencies (and thus the extent of doubt 
whether the agency chose correctly) and the disruptive consequences of an 
interim change.”271 The district court said that for Arkansas, like Kentucky in 
Stewart, “the road to cure the deficiency in this case is, at best, a rocky one,” 
but that the second factor of disruptive consequences was a “closer call.”272 The 
court balanced the disruption for the state administrators against “the harms 
that Plaintiffs and persons like them will experience if the program remains in 
effect.”273 The court also took into consideration that “Arkansas’s own numbers 
confirm[ed] that in 2018, more than 16,000 persons have lost their Medicaid” 
and that “[HHS and the State] offer[ed] no reason to think the numbers w[ould] 
be different in 2019” and “indeed, once the requirements apply to persons aged 
 
 269 Id. at 169, 182. 
 270 The district court acknowledged that even though vacatur is “the normal remedy,” courts “sometimes 
decline to vacate an agency’s action.” Id. at 182 (quoting Allina Health Servs. v. Sebelius, 746 F.3d 1102, 
1110 (D.C. Cir. 2014)). 
 271 Id. (quoting Allied-Signal, Inc. v. Nuclear Reg. Comm’n, 988 F.2d 146, 150–51 (D.C. Cir. 1993)). 
 272 Id. at 183. The district court considered concerns that vacatur would undermine data collection and 
their ability to educate Arkansas Medicaid recipients on the work requirements, which began for some 
recipients in June 2018 and others in January 2019. Id. The district court pointed out that even though HHS 
was concerned about data collection, the federal government approved the project despite it lacking any 
evaluation component and Arkansas did not mention this concern in its summary judgment motion. Id. 
Moreover, the district court suggested, Arkansas and HHS could always extend the demonstration project 
to facilitate more data collection. Id. at 183–84. As for outreach efforts, the district court acknowledged that 
“vacatur of work requirements that have already been implemented may send mixed messages,” but that the 
disruption would be minimized since the court was handing down its decision before Arkansas began 
disenrolling noncompliant recipients. Id. at 184. 
 273 Id. 
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19–29” would be “likely to rise.”274 The court concluded that the Arkansas 
Works Amendments could not stand.275 
Judge Boasberg’s opinions could have taken a different tack and stood 
against sloppy agency action that intended to cut anti-poverty programs 
without following their own procedures. There were other details in the 
Stewart record that suggested the illegality of the Trump Administration’s 
actions. For instance, CMS published its letter to state Medicaid directors and 
approved the Kentucky waiver the following day.276 However, the waiver 
approval had the date filled in for a prior day.277 If ever there was a smoking 
gun in an administrative record showing that an agency decision was 
unreasoned, this was it. CMS had drafted the waiver request to fit Kentucky’s 
waiver—a backwards process which betrayed its arbitrary action.278 Instead, 
Stewart v. Azar reads as broader defense of legality in administrative action, 
or, at the very least, meaningful judicial oversight of an agency action that 
could undo a longstanding statutory regime. 
Recently, the D.C. Circuit considered appeals by the federal government, 
Kentucky, and Arkansas challenging Judge Boasberg’s decisions. At oral 
argument, the panel voiced concern that the federal government and the two 
states were attempting through agency action to add an additional condition to 
Medicaid without any authority from Congress to do so.279 These concerns 
 
 274 Id. at 184–85. In light of this litigation, GOP lawmakers in Michigan continue to push their proposal 
to exempt white rural areas from its Medicaid work requirement. Alice Ollstein, Trump Admin Poised to 
Give Rural Whites a Carve-Out on Medicaid Work Rules, TALKING POINTS MEMO (May 14, 2018, 6:00 
AM), https://talkingpointsmemo.com/dc/trump-admin-poised-to-give-rural-hites-a-carve-out-on-medicaid-
work-rules [https://perma.cc/VU4D-NSBV] (discussing proposals in Michigan and Ohio). The question of 
whether states can apply these work requirements to federally recognized tribes adds yet another layer of 
complexity. Id. 
 275 Gresham, 363 F. Supp. 3d at 185. 
 276 Stewart v. Azar, 313 F. Supp. 3d 237, 246 (D.D.C. 2018). 
 277 See Plaintiffs’ Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment at 46, Stewart, 313 F. 
Supp. 3d 237 (No. 18-cv-152). 
 278 This may be another instance of “regulatory slop” by the Trump Administration. See, e.g., Robert 
L. Glicksman & Emily Hammond, The Administrative Law of Regulatory Slop and Strategy, 68 DUKE L.J. 
1651, 1653–54 (2019) (describing how “the Trump Administration has doggedly ignored some settled 
administrative-law expectations for agency decisionmaking”); Super, supra note 245, at 1593 (arguing that 
“[t]he Trump administration, in word and deed, has rejected the broad structural consensus about the means 
and limits of administrative law that have existed since the New Deal”). 
 279 See Oral Argument at 28:18, Gresham v. Azar, 950 F.3d 93 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (No. 19-5094), petitions 
for cert. filed, Nos. 20-37 & 20-38 (July 13, 2020), 
https://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/recordings/recordings2019.nsf/836067B4CDCC615785258490005718B0/
$file/19-5094.mp3 [https://perma.cc/T8GX-NUXN]. For more information about and description of the oral 
arguments, see Amy Goldstein, Appeals Panel Expresses Skepticism About Medicaid Work Requirements, 
WASH. POST (Oct. 11, 2019, 1:11 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/health/appeals-panel-expresses-
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became moot for Kentucky as, following Governor Bevin’s defeat in the 2019 
election, Kentucky rescinded its waiver request and withdrew its appeal.280 But 
the Arkansas waiver remained, and the D.C. Circuit held that the Secretary’s 
grant of that waiver was arbitrary and capricious and affirmed Judge 
Boasberg’s vacatur.281 
In an opinion penned by Judge David Sentelle, the D.C. Circuit rejected 
the Trump Administration’s contention that the Secretary’s waiver authority 
was unreviewable because the Medicaid Act itself says the Secretary is to grant 
waivers “likely to assist in promoting the objectives” of Medicaid.282 The D.C. 
Circuit went on to point out that “[t]he district court is indisputably correct that 
the principal objective of Medicaid is providing health care coverage.”283 The 
Court of Appeals relied on the text of the statute and judicial interpretation by 
other circuits.284 The D.C. Circuit also rejected the Secretary’s arguments that 
it was a reasoned decision on the grounds that the Secretary’s approval of the 
waiver cited alternative objectives like transitioning recipients to commercial 
coverage and promoting financial independence, since the Secretary could not 
point to anywhere in the Medicaid Act that suggests those objectives were part 
of the statutory scheme.285 Judge Sentelle rightly pointed out that Congress has 
added language in the purposes of the statutes governing TANF and SNAP as 
well as work requirements in both those programs, but that Congress declined 
to do either for Medicaid, at precisely the same time they amended the statutes 




 280 See Gresham, 950 F.3d at 98 (noting that “[o]n December 16, 2019, Kentucky moved to dismiss its 
appeal as moot because it ‘terminated the section [1315] demonstration project’” and that “[n]either the 
[federal] government nor the appellees opposed the motion” (citation omitted)); see also Alex Ebert, First 
Approved Medicaid Work Rule on Chopping Block in Kentucky, BLOOMBERG L. HEALTH & BUS. NEWS 
(Nov. 14, 2019, 5:17 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/health-law-and-business/first-approved-
medicaid-work-rule-on-chopping-block-in-kentucky [https://perma.cc/F9AZ-TJ4W] (quoting Kentucky 
Governor-elect Andy Beshear’s victory speech: “In my first week in office I am going to rescind this 
governor’s Medicaid waiver”). 
 281 See Gresham, 950 F.3d at 96. 
 282 See id. at 96, 98 (reasoning that judicial review is barred “only in those ‘rare instances’ where ‘there 
is no law to apply’” (quoting Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971))). 
 283 See id. at 99. 
 284 See id. at 99–101. 
 285 See id. at 101–02 (“When Congress wants to pursue additional objectives within a social welfare 
program, it says so in the text.”). 
 286 See id. (pointing out that Congress did not add a work requirement to Medicaid or any language 
about promoting work). Judge Sentelle made this point at oral argument. See Goldstein, supra note 279 
(quoting Judge Sentelle that the Medicaid, Food Stamp, and TANF statutes “‘are not comparable at all’ 
because Congress specifically wrote that financial self-sufficiency is a goal of the other two programs 
[TANF and SNAP] but has never included that in Medicaid law”); see also Nicole Huberfeld, Can Work Be 
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the Secretary failed to consider whether the Arkansas waiver would result in 
Medicaid recipients losing coverage, the decision to approve the State’s waiver 
was arbitrary and capricious.287 
Meanwhile, other states’ efforts to impose work requirements ground to 
a halt, even before the COVID-19 pandemic hit. Judge Boasberg blocked 
another waiver granted by HHS that would have allowed New Hampshire to 
impose work requirements on Medicaid recipients.288 And shortly before the 
D.C. Circuit heard argument on Kentucky and Arkansas’s actions, Judge 
Boasberg was assigned two other lawsuits involving Michigan and Indiana’s 
waivers.289 After the D.C. Circuit sitting, Arizona and Indiana announced 
delaying the implementation of work requirements, referencing the 
controversies in court.290 Depending on the length of the pandemic, the 
Arkansas and New Hampshire litigation will continue, and the cases will test 
Governor Bevin’s prediction: “‘We’ll win at the U.S. Supreme Court, but it 
takes time’ . . . . ‘And this will be the first entitlement reform of any 
significance in America since the mid-‘90s.’”291 Despite Governor Bevin’s 
electoral defeat, and although he was proven wrong about Kentucky, he may 
 
Required in the Medicaid Program?, 378 NEW ENG. J. MED. 788, 788–91 (2018) (providing the background 
for this omission). 
 287 See Gresham, 950 F.3d at 104 (“While we have held that it is not arbitrary or capricious to prioritize 
one statutorily identified objective over another, it is an entirely different matter to prioritize non-statutory 
objectives to the exclusion of the statutory purpose.”). 
 288 Philbrick v. Azar, 397 F. Supp. 3d 11, 15 (D.D.C. 2019) (“The issues presented in this case are all 
too familiar. In the past year or so, this Court has resolved challenges to similar programs in Kentucky and 
Arkansas, each time finding the Secretary’s approval deficient.”). 
 289 See Class Action Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief, Young v. Azar, No. 19-cv-3526 
(D.D.C. Nov. 22, 2019) (challenging the legality of Michigan’s Medicaid waiver in a manner similar to the 
Kentucky, Arkansas, and New Hampshire lawsuits); Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief, Rose 
v. Azar, No. 19-cv-2848 (D.D.C. Sept. 23, 2019) (challenging Indiana’s Medicaid waiver on similar 
grounds). While Indiana has represented that its waiver will not reduce its Medicaid rolls, it was likely that 
this waiver would meet a similar fate. 
 290 See Jonathan J. Cooper, Arizona Quietly Suspends Medicaid Work Requirement, ASSOC. PRESS (Oct. 
22, 2019), https://apnews.com/1fad03f5d68d4797a24f7f942d0aa430 [https://perma.cc/5PTE-DXSD]; Shari 
Rudavsky, State Temporarily Suspends Controversial Work Requirement for Healthy Indiana Plan, INDY 
STAR (Oct. 31, 2019, 3:29 PM), https://www.indystar.com/story/news/health/2019/10/31/medicaid-work-
requirement-suspended-while-indiana-faces-lawsuit/4110646002/ [https://perma.cc/GG92-YECM]. But see 
Corin Cates-Carney, Health Department: Medicaid Expansion Work Requirements Won’t Take Effect in 
January, MONT. PUB. RADIO (Nov. 7, 2019), https://www.mtpr.org/post/health-department-medicaid-
expansion-work-requirements-wont-take-effect-january [https://perma.cc/2LET-WXQN] (pressing ahead 
with the work requirements policy due to state law). 
 291 Paige Winfield Cunningham, The Health 202: Medicaid Work Requirements Were Defeated at the 
Ballot Box Last Night, WASH. POST (Nov. 6, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/ 
paloma/the-health-202/2019/11/06/the-health-202-mediciaid-work-requirements-were-defeated-at-the-
ballot-box-last-night/5dc1bd3888e0fa10ffd20b7b/ [https://perma.cc/28X7-FUGA]. 
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yet be proven right about Medicaid as a whole. The Trump Administration and 
the State of Arkansas have filed certiorari petitions in the Supreme Court.292 
b. SNAP work requirements 
The Trump Administration has pursued a similar strategy of reducing 
access to SNAP and has been similarly stymied in federal court. The same day 
President Trump signed the 2018 Farm Bill, which lacked any structural cuts 
to SNAP or increased work requirements for its recipients, Secretary of 
Agriculture Sonny Perdue proposed a rule to achieve these changes by other 
means.293 In the proposed rule, the Department claimed that it “consistently 
approved waivers based on qualification for extended unemployment benefits 
because it has been a clear indicator of lack of sufficient jobs and an especially 
responsive indicator of sudden economic downturns,” but that states’ 
“widespread use of ABAWD waivers during a period of historically low 
unemployment” suggests that “regulatory standards should be reevaluated.”294 
True to form, the Trump Administration’s rule disaggregates the SNAP 
caseload rather than cutting benefits directly. It impacts only SNAP recipients 
who are considered to be ABAWDs within the meaning of the Food Stamp Act 
and implementing regulations. ABAWDs include recipients ages eighteen to 
forty-nine who do not have a disability and are not caring for children or other 
dependents in their own home.295 The USDA’s rule would limit the extent to 
which states can waive a statutory provision that places a time limit on 
ABAWDs’ receipt of SNAP benefits. ABAWDs currently can only receive 
three months of SNAP benefits in a three-year period unless they meet a work 
requirement or are exempted from that work requirement.296 States, however, 
can apply to the federal government for a waiver if the state’s unemployment 
 
 292 Gresham, 950 F.3d 93. 
 293 See Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program: Requirements for Able-Bodied Adults Without 
Dependents, 84 Fed. Reg. 980 (proposed Feb. 1, 2019) (to be codified at 7 C.F.R. pt. 273). 
 294 Id. at 981, 985. 
 295 See 7 C.F.R. § 273.24(c) (2019) (excepting individuals from time limits for able-bodied adults if 
certain conditions apply). As it happens, two-thirds of SNAP recipients are children, senior citizens, or 
people with disabilities. SNAP Supports Children and Families, ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUND. (Sept. 
2018), https://www.rwjf.org/en/library/research/2018/09/snap-supports-children-and-families.html [https:// 
perma.cc/ZYF2-WTHN]. 
 296 See 7 U.S.C. § 2015(o); see also 7 C.F.R. § 273.24(b) (“Individuals are not eligible to participate in 
SNAP . . . if the individual received [food stamps] for more than three countable months during any three-
year period . . . .”). See generally Andrew Hammond & MacKenzie Speer, SNAP’s Time Limit: Emerging 
Issues in Litigation and Implementation, CLEARINGHOUSE REV. (Apr. 2017) (summarizing SNAP’s 
statutory and regulatory scheme for ABAWDs). 
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rate is above a certain threshold.297 The Trump Administration’s final rule 
would require a higher unemployment rate from states to trigger waiver 
eligibility, thereby allowing fewer states to qualify for the waivers.298 The 
regulation would also require states to reapply for waivers every year—rather 
than every two years, thus adding administrative costs—and would prohibit 
states from carrying over unused exemptions into the following year.299 The 
Department of Agriculture estimates that 1,087,000 SNAP recipients will be 
subjected to the new time limit and that “approximately 688,000 will not meet 
the work requirement.”300 Researchers estimate that 755,000 Americans may 
lose their SNAP benefits under the proposed rule by living in an area that will 
lose its waiver.301 
As with the Medicaid work requirements, this agency action regarding 
SNAP was swiftly challenged in federal court. Before the rule could go into 
effect as planned on April 1, 2020, a federal court preliminarily enjoined the 
Department of Agriculture from implementing it nationwide. Nineteen states, 
the District of Columbia, and the City of New York sued the USDA alleging 
that the agency’s rule violated the Administrative Procedure Act for exceeding 
its statutory authority, failing to observe required procedures, and being 
 
 297 7 U.S.C. § 2015(o)(4)(A) (allowing states to seek a waiver to suspend the ABAWD time limit for 
“any group of individuals in the State” if the requested waiver area “has an unemployment rate of over 10 
percent” or “does not have a sufficient number of jobs to provide employment for the individuals”). 
 298 Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program: Requirements for Able-Bodied Adults Without 
Dependents, 84 Fed. Reg. 66,782, 66,790 (Dec. 5, 2019) (to be codified at 7 C.F.R. pt. 273). 
 299 Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program Requirements for Able-Bodied Adults Without 
Dependents, 84 Fed. Reg. 980, 987–88 (proposed Feb. 1, 2019) (to be codified at 7 C.F.R. pt. 273); Danielle 
Paquette & Jeff Stein, Trump Administration Aims to Toughen Work Requirements for Food Stamp 
Recipients, WASH. POST (Dec. 20, 2018, 5:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/ 
economy/trump-administration-aims-to-toughen-work-requirements-for-food-stamps-recipients/2018/12/ 
20/cf687136-03e6-11e9-b6a9-0aa5c2fcc9e4_story.html [https://perma.cc/PB8A-H96C]. The unused 
exemptions are the 15% rule. See Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program Requirements for Able-
Bodied Adults Without Dependents, 84 Fed. Reg. 980, 987 (proposed Feb. 1, 2019) (to be codified at 
7 C.F.R. pt. 273). 
 300 Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program: Requirements for Able-Bodied Adults Without 
Dependents, 84 Fed. Reg. 66,782, 66,809 (Dec. 5, 2019) (to be codified at 7 C.F.R. pt. 273); see also Jacob 
Bunge, White House to Tighten Work Requirements for Food-Stamp Aid, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 4, 2019), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/trump-administration-to-curb-states-control-of-food-aid-11575455401 
[https://perma.cc/W68M-TGVN] (discussing rollout of the Administration’s policy). 
 301 See, e.g., Paquette & Stein, supra note 299; Lauren Bauer, Workers Could Lose SNAP Benefits 
Under Trump’s Proposed Rule, BROOKINGS (Dec. 20, 2018), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-
front/2018/12/20/workers-could-lose-snap-benefits-under-trumps-proposed-rule/ [https://perma.cc/WTS8-
2U5B] (drawing on research to conclude that “strict enforcement of work requirements will sanction not 
only those who are able to work but are choosing not to, but those who are unable to work and those who 
are unable to find work or prove that they have met the requirement”). 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
420 
arbitrary and capricious.302 A social service organization and individual 
plaintiffs also filed suit.303 The lawsuits were consolidated as both made similar 
claims and requested that the district court preliminarily enjoin the final rule. 
In weighing the propriety of an injunction and a stay under § 705 of the 
Administrative Procedure Act, the district court determined that on all issues 
but one, the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits that the USDA’s 
rule was arbitrary and capricious. While the district court did not address the 
plaintiffs’ other claims about whether the USDA failed to observe procedural 
requirements, the district court pointed out that USDA received over 100,000 
comments, which were overwhelmingly opposed to the rule change, and that 
on some comments the “USDA did no more than state that that this evidence 
was rejected.”304 The district court, quoting the D.C. Circuit in Gresham, 
reminded USDA that “[n]odding to concerns raised by commenters only to 
dismiss them in a conclusory manner is not a hallmark of reasoned 
decisionmaking.”305 
Unlike with Medicaid, which has no statutory provisions or existing 
regulations regarding work requirements, the Trump Administration relied on 
statutory provisions and existing regulations that permit such requirements for 
some SNAP recipients. While the plaintiffs were not in as strong of a position 
as the Medicaid recipients were in the aforementioned litigation, the plaintiffs 
drew on similar arguments that the Administration had sought to achieve 
through regulation what it failed to secure through legislation, and that the 
proposed regulation ran afoul of SNAP’s federal statutory scheme. 
Furthermore, like in the Medicaid litigation, the government plaintiffs and 
SNAP recipients could point to the longstanding practices that have governed 
SNAP administration since the provision was enacted in 1996.306 
As for the other preliminary injunction factors discussed in Section I.C.2, 
they weighed in favor of stopping the SNAP rule.307 The district court credited 
the state plaintiffs’ representations that the increased procedural costs 
associated with implementing the new rule would be significant and 
irreparable.308 On the “balance of [the] equities” inquiry, the federal judge 
 
 302 Complaint ¶¶ 93–94, District of Columbia v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., No. 20-cv-119 (D.D.C. Jan. 16, 
2020) (contrary to law); id. ¶¶ 94–95 (procedural claim); id. ¶ 95 (arbitrary and capricious). 
 303 Complaint, Bread for the City v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., No. 20-cv-127 (D.D.C. Jan. 16, 2020). 
 304 District of Columbia v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., No. 20-cv-119, 2020 WL 1236657, at *1, *21 (D.D.C. 
Mar. 13, 2020). 
 305 Id. at *21 (quoting Gresham v. Azar, 950 F.3d 93, 103 (D.C. Cir. 2020), petitions for cert. filed, Nos. 
20-37 & 20-38 (July 13, 2020)). 
 306 See Complaint, supra note 302, ¶¶ 15–16.  
 307 District of Columbia, 2020 WL 1236657, at *22–31. 
 308 Id. at *22–24. 
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noted that “[t]he equities weigh sharply in favor of preliminary relief” since 
“USDA’s only harm is that it will be required to keep in place the existing 
regulation—which USDA has used for 19 years—while judicial review of its 
new regulation runs its course” whereas “absent preliminary relief, the state 
plaintiffs will suffer irreparable harm in the form of massive costs associated 
with implementing a sea change in a program that serves over forty million 
U.S. residents.”309 Here, the federal court identified the dynamics of fiscal 
federalism discussed earlier in this Article. Furthermore, the court, like many 
before it in welfare litigation, identified “the grave harm to the individual 
plaintiffs who will have to go without the $194 per month they need to buy 
food,” not to mention the “[n]early 700,000 people across the country [who] 
face the same hardship.”310 
In granting the relief sought, the district court pointed out that a 
nationwide injunction was appropriate since the affected individuals “reside in 
34 states, plus the Virgin Islands and the District, as those 36 jurisdictions 
currently have either statewide or partial ABAWD time limit waivers.”311 The 
Trump Administration signaled that it planned to appeal the nationwide 
injunction, but the COVID-19 pandemic changed its calculus and the 
governing law.312 In one of the initial stimulus packages enacted in the wake of 
the coronavirus outbreak, Congress lifted all SNAP work requirements 
beginning in April 2020 and lasting until a month after the COVID-19 public 
health emergency declaration is lifted.313 The Trump Administration appears 
committed to pursuing its appeal despite the pandemic,314 but given the 
duration of the COVID-19 crisis, the district court’s stay could be the only 
court decision on SNAP work requirements before the next presidential 
Administration. 
3. Public Charge Regulations 
While work requirements are the most prominent example of efforts to 
undo food and medical assistance through federal agency action, another 
example of this strategy of disaggregation is the Trump Administration’s 
 
 309 Id. at *31. 
 310 Id. 
 311 Id. at *36. 
 312 Ashraf Khalil, USDA to Appeal Ruling, Seeks Food Stamp Change amid Pandemic, ASSOC. PRESS 
(Mar. 18, 2020), https://apnews.com/e2a2e9be5950a98f4dabcc2649aef332 [https://perma.cc/9U96-8PRY]; 
Lola Fadulu, Trump Backs Off Tougher Food Stamp Work Rules for Now, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 10, 2020), 
https://nyti.ms/3e5m6we [https://perma.cc/N2QA-SMGF]; see also Families First Coronavirus Response 
Act of 2020 § 2301, Pub. L. 116-127, 134 Stat. 178, 187–88 (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 2011). 
 313 Families First Coronavirus Response Act § 2301(a). 
 314 Notice of Appeal, District of Columbia v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., No. 20-cv-119 (D.D.C. May 12, 
2020), ECF No. 61 (filed by Secretary Perdue). 
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efforts to discourage legal immigrants and their families from accessing public 
benefits.315 Here, the Trump Administration is not changing the eligibility rules 
for welfare programs. Instead, the Trump Administration has promulgated a 
final rule that creates dire consequences for noncitizens who try to access or 
who have accessed these benefits, allowing immigration officials to deny them 
entry, withhold permanent status, and deport them.316 In effect, consular 
officials could deny admission to any individual who they determined would 
be likely to apply for benefits like Medicaid or SNAP.317 For individuals 
seeking permanent status, immigration judges could deny a Permanent 
Resident Card, known as a “Green Card,” to a noncitizen who had used these 
programs or others. As a result, this regulation is expected to spur a decline in 
enrollment in immigrant communities, including citizens who are legally 
entitled to these benefits.318 
Here, too, public interest lawyers sued the Trump Administration in 
federal court. And yet, the Administration has better prospects for achieving 
its policy goals. The Trump Administration published its final rule on public 
charge on August 14, 2019.319 The same day the D.C. Circuit heard oral 
argument in the Medicaid work requirement cases discussed above, three 
federal district courts issued three preliminary injunctions staying the 
implementation of the final regulation.320 Each district court relied heavily on 
Congress’s actions (or lack thereof). Each judge relied on Congress’s refusal 
to deny eligibility for noncitizens for these programs. The opinions detailed 
how Congress considered but rejected such eliminations of eligibility in the 
Welfare Reform Act of 1996 (PRWORA) and in the Illegal Immigration 
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA). These abandoned 
 
 315 See Hammond, supra note 219, at 518–28 (2018) (detailing the Trump Administration’s efforts 
before the promulgation of the final rule). 
 316 Inadmissibility on Public Charge Grounds, 84 Fed. Reg. 41,292 (Aug. 14, 2019) (to be codified at 
8 C.F.R. pts. 103, 212, 213, 214, 245 & 248). 
 317 See id. at 41,462; see also Public Charge Update: What Advocates Need to Know Now, NAT’L 
IMMIGR. L. CTR. (Mar. 26, 2020), https://www.nilc.org/issues/economic-support/pubcharge/public-charge-
update-what-advocates-need-to-know-now/ [https://perma.cc/HU3A-KWR8]. 
 318 HAMUTAL BERNSTEIN, DULCE GONZALEZ, MICHAEL KARPMAN & STEPHEN ZUCKERMAN, URB. 
INST., ONE IN SEVEN ADULTS IN IMMIGRANT FAMILIES REPORTED AVOIDING PUBLIC BENEFIT PROGRAMS 
IN 2018, at 3 (2019), https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/100270/one_in_seven_adults_in
_immigrant_families_reported_avoiding_publi_8.pdf [https://perma.cc/CZP8-7PRC]. 
 319 See Inadmissibility on Public Charge Grounds, 84 Fed. Reg. 41,292. 
 320 See City of San Francisco v. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs, 408 F. Supp. 3d 1057, 1072, 1130–31 
(N.D. Cal. 2019) (including four states and D.C. as plaintiffs); New York v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 
408 F. Supp. 3d 334, 353 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (including three states as plaintiffs); Washington v. U.S. Dep’t 
of Homeland Sec., 408 F. Supp. 3d 1191, 1224 (E.D. Wash. 2019) (including fourteen states as plaintiffs). 
A few days later, another federal court issued a more limited preliminary injunction. See Cook County v. 
McAleenan, 417 F. Supp. 3d 1008, 1031 (N.D. Ill. 2019). 
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statutory changes, the district courts reasoned, were evidence in favor of 
stopping the Trump Administration from attaching immigration enforcement 
consequences to receiving these benefits.321 One federal district court pointed 
to the inaction on the part of Congress since the 1999 Field Guidance was 
published by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), the 
predecessor to U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), to revise 
the definition of public charge, including most recently in 2013.322 Summing 
up, one federal district court characterized the federal government’s position 
as “urg[ing] the Court to take two unsupported leaps of statutory 
construction.”323 The first is “a legal conclusion that the purpose of the public 
charge inadmissibility provision is to ‘ensur[e] the economic self-sufficiency 
of aliens,’” despite evidence of welfare provisions to the contrary.324 The 
second is that “Congress has delegated to DHS the role of determining what 
benefits programs, income levels, and household sizes or compositions[] 
promote or undermine self-sufficiency,” even though the government failed to 
“cite[] any statute, legislative history, or other resource that supports” such a 
delegation.325 
While the legal arguments echo those made in the Medicaid work 
requirements litigation, the plaintiffs differed. The public charge lawsuits 
included state, county, and city governments as plaintiffs, which each federal 
court concluded had standing to bring such a suit.326 And the district courts 
relied on the upheaval of the state governments’ operations as the basis for the 
likelihood of irreparable harm, a key element in the balancing test for deciding 
whether to grant a preliminary injunction, as discussed in Part I.327 
 
 321 See City of San Francisco, 408 F. Supp. 3d at 1097–99; New York, 408 F. Supp. 3d at 347; 
Washington, 408 F. Supp. 3d at 1215 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(4)). 
 322 Washington, 408 F. Supp. 3d at 1216. 
 323 Id. at 1217. 
 324 Id. (quoting the federal government’s brief). 
 325 Id. 
 326 See City of San Francisco, 408 F. Supp. 3d at 1126; New York, 408 F. Supp. 3d at 334; Washington, 
408 F. Supp. 3d at 1203. In the last few years, there has been a bumper crop of scholarship on state standing. 
See, e.g., Seth Davis, The New Public Standing, 71 STAN. L. REV. 1229 (2019); Tara Leigh Grove, When 
Can a State Sue the United States?, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 851 (2016); Jonathan Remy Nash, Sovereign 
Preemption State Standing, 112 NW. U. L. REV. 201 (2017); Shannon M. Roesler, State Standing to 
Challenge Federal Authority in the Modern Administrative State, 91 WASH. L. REV. 637 (2016). This 
scholarship tends to attribute this multistate litigation strategy to the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency that states are “entitled to special solicitude” when it 
comes to standing. 549 U.S. 497, 520 (2007); see also Tara Leigh Grove, Foreword: Some Puzzles of State 
Standing, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1883, 1883–84 (2019). 
 327 City of San Francisco, 408 F. Supp. 3d at 1126–27; New York, 408 F. Supp. 3d at 350. 
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The Trump Administration has enjoyed some recent, but not uniform, 
success in convincing the courts of appeals and the Supreme Court to, at least, 
stay the district court injunctions. The Trump Administration immediately 
appealed these injunctions to the Second and Ninth Circuits. The Second 
Circuit denied the Administration’s request, but the Ninth Circuit stayed both 
injunctions from the district judges in California and Washington State.328 
Then, the Supreme Court injected even more uncertainty into this controversy 
by staying the New York district court’s injunction.329 In a 5–4 ruling, the 
Court’s order did not discuss the merits of the underlying lawsuits. The only 
indication as to any Justices’ opinion on the merits was Justice Neil Gorsuch’s 
concurrence, joined by Justice Clarence Thomas, in which he questioned the 
legality of nationwide injunctions beyond the public charge context.330 
While the grant of an emergency stay in the New York case appeared to 
rely on the overly broad relief, as opposed to the public charge rule itself, a few 
weeks later the Supreme Court granted another request for an emergency stay 
by the Justice Department for the public charge injunction that only applied to 
the rule’s implementation in Illinois.331 Justice Sonia Sotomayor dissented 
from the grant of the stay, noting that the government “has recently sought 
stays in an unprecedented number of cases, demanding immediate attention 
and consuming limited Court resources in each.”332 Justice Sotomayor pointed 
out that, unlike the nationwide public charge injunctions, the injunction at issue 
here only applied to Illinois.333 Therefore, “the Government’s only claimed 
hardship is that it must enforce an existing interpretation of an immigration 
rule in one State—just as it has done for the past 20 years—while an updated 
version of the rule takes effect in the remaining 49.”334 Justice Sotomayor 
concluded that that was not the type of hardship that merits the extraordinary 
relief the Supreme Court granted.335 
 
 328 See New York v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Nos. 19-3591 & 19-3595, 2020 WL 95815 (2d Cir. 
Jan. 8, 2020) (order denying stay); City of San Francisco v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., 944 F.3d 
773 (9th Cir. 2019) (order granting stay). 
 329 Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. New York, 140 S. Ct. 599 (2020) (order granting stay). 
 330 Id. at 600–01 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in the grant of stay) (stating that the “real problem here is the 
increasingly common practice of trial courts ordering relief that transcends the cases before them”). 
 331 Wolf v. Cook County, 140 S. Ct. 681 (2020). 
 332 Id. at 683 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting from the grant of stay). 
 333 Id. at 681. 
 334 Id. at 683. 
 335 Id. at 681–82 (characterizing the new regulation as “expand[ing] the type of benefits that may render 
a noncitizen inadmissible, including non-cash benefits such as the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance 
Program (formerly food stamps), most forms of Medicaid, and various forms of housing assistance”). 
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Similarly to Justice Sotomayor’s dissent, each district court that 
considered a public charge challenge emphasized that the decades of 
precedent, coupled with the absence of explicit congressional authorization for 
the Administration’s proposal, counseled against the federal government’s 
position.336 However, with the backdrop of the Immigration and Nationality 
Act, the public charge litigation is beginning to diverge from the work 
requirements litigation. Federal courts are generally quite deferential to the 
federal government in the area of immigration enforcement and have routinely 
ruled in its favor in litigation against state and local governments.337 Given the 
Supreme Court’s grants of emergency stays, the Trump Administration is in a 
strong position to prevail on public charge. 
While the Trump Administration’s prospects to effectuate its public 
charge and work requirement policies appear to diverge in the federal courts, 
the thrust of the policies is identical, betraying how difficult it is to cut 
Medicaid and SNAP directly. Instead, agencies will be most successful where 
they can argue that Congress delegated more discretion to the agency in 
shaping the parameters of access. In both situations, the Trump 
Administration’s efforts are not directed at all SNAP and Medicaid recipients, 
but rather a specific group such as noncitizens and their families or childless 
adults. Nor does either policy take away benefits immediately; instead, they 
attach conditions to the targeted groups continuing to receive benefits that can 
reasonably be expected to deter use. Some of those subject to the public charge 
regulation will fail to enroll or disenroll in Medicaid and SNAP, lest they risk 
their legal status in the United States. Some of those subject to the work 
requirement waivers will fail to meet or fail to report their labor activity and 
will lose access to Medicaid and SNAP as well. In a sense, the Trump 
Administration’s actions in this sphere betray the state of poverty law today: it 
has become extremely difficult to reduce food and medical assistance in 
Congress, and the federal courts will thwart agency attempts to restrict welfare 
programs when it conflicts with the agency’s statutory mandate. Rather, the 
only avenue available to a presidential administration committed to 
retrenchment is to engage individual states through waivers, to disaggregate 
recipients by only changing rules as to recipients with specific statuses like 
noncitizens, and to attach other conditions to receiving SNAP or Medicaid. 
 
 336 See City of San Francisco v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., 408 F. Supp. 3d 1057, 1100–01 
(N.D. Cal. 2019); New York v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 408 F. Supp. 3d 334, 347 (S.D.N.Y. 2019); 
Washington v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 408 F. Supp. 3d 1191, 1215–18 (E.D. Wash. 2019); Cook 
County v. McAleenan, 417 F. Supp. 3d 1008, 1022, 1028 (N.D. Ill. 2019). 
 337 See, e.g., Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2400 (2018) (“By its terms, § 1182(f) exudes deference 
to the President in every clause.”); Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 395–96 (2012). 
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Each of these efforts will present different doctrinal challenges under 
administrative law, but all will follow this pattern. 
Inevitably, this is a messy story. The setting includes Congress, the 
federal courts, federal agencies, and state governments. The remainder of this 
Article takes a step back from the commotion to reflect on what these actions 
suggest about how the New Property has changed over time. 
III. UPDATING THE NEW PROPERTY 
As Part II shows, the Trump Administration and its allies in state 
government have run into various legal obstacles in their attempts to undo 
SNAP and Medicaid through agency action. The Supreme Court in King, 
Shapiro, and Goldberg identified a constitutional dimension of public-benefits 
administration and, in doing so, created a path for federal and state agencies 
and public interest lawyers to exploit the obstacles peculiar to welfare 
retrenchment.338 In effect, courts, agencies, and lawyers operate within a 
peculiar fiscal federalism that extends the federal statutory entitlements beyond 
what Congress set out to do some fifty years ago. Such an account has 
important implications for two scholarly debates: the relationship between 
procedure and substantive law and how public law matures absent 
constitutional and legislative revision. 
A. Procedure–Substance Trade-Off? 
Is there an inverse or even perverse relationship between procedural 
protections and substantive law when it comes to welfare? Professor Charles 
Reich, Justice Black, and the Supreme Court in Mathews v. Eldridge all saw 
procedure as a cost to government. Professor Reich thought that cost would 
protect the individual’s entitlement to her livelihood, whether that be a welfare 
benefit or an occupational license.339 Justice Black predicted that the additional 
cost of procedures would discourage the government from extending benefits 
in the first instance.340 In Mathews, the Supreme Court predicted that the New 
Property’s proceduralist bent would cause the political branches to reduce the 
substantive benefits to pay for court-mandated process.341 
 
 338 See, e.g., ROBERT A. KATZMANN, JUDGING STATUTES 23 (2014) (suggesting that “agencies are 
generally the first—often the primary—interpreters of statutes”); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS 
REVOLUTION 111 (1990) (“[L]egislative reform must overcome an enormous burden of inertia. It is through 
interpretation, in the courts and the executive branch, that regulatory improvements, interstitial to be sure, 
can be brought about most easily.”). 
 339 See supra notes 53–56 and accompanying text. 
 340 Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 278–79 (1970) (Black, J., dissenting). 
 341 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 348 (1976). 
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What Justice Black missed in his dissent in Goldberg and the Mathews 
Court misidentified is that there is not a single government body that responds 
to judicial decisions on social welfare programs. This unitary theory predicts 
the government would respond to judicial decisions imposing costs on the 
program by seeking savings elsewhere. Hence, a court order requiring a 
Medicaid program to provide in-person hearings for benefit terminations could 
lead to a reduction in the generosity of Medicaid benefits. But as this Article 
explains, the welfare administrator is responsible for overseeing the procedure, 
not the substance of the benefit—the latter being Congress’s remit. Layered on 
top of this horizontal division of welfare administration between the 
bureaucracy and Congress is the further vertical division between federal and 
state government. State government must pay for the procedures, but not the 
substantive benefits of federal programs. As a result, state bureaucrats will 
respond to court orders in exactly the opposite way the Supreme Court 
predicted. Rather than reduce the generosity of the benefits, states may simply 
become more lenient—refraining from denying, reducing, or terminating 
benefits lest they incur more costs following court-mandated procedures. 
In effect, the public law surrounding these programs engenders an unholy, 
but not unstable alliance of state government, federal courts, and public interest 
lawyers. State government sees SNAP and Medicaid as vital sources of federal 
funding.342 Federal courts see SNAP and Medicaid as creatures of federal law, 
requiring agencies to operate within the strictures of the APA and the relevant 
statutes. And legal aid lawyers see SNAP and Medicaid as crucial support for 
their low-income clients. Each of these actors have different reasons for their 
shared interest in maintaining the federal statutory regime. The New Property 
did not usher in the revolution of welfare as a constitutional right that Reich 
envisioned or for which the legal aid community worked.343 Yet Medicaid and 
SNAP recipients enjoy increased legal protections and more generous benefits 
than they did in 1964—the year Reich wrote The New Property and President 
Johnson declared a War on Poverty. This is not to say that Reich’s scholarship 
 
 342 Certainly, there is a dark side to this revenue maximization. Professor Daniel Hatcher documents 
how several states have used federal funding for Medicaid for various purposes. See DANIEL L. HATCHER, 
THE POVERTY INDUSTRY 111–42 (2016). SNAP funding is less likely to be used in such a substitutionary 
way because there is no cost-sharing in the substantive benefits and the benefits go directly to the individuals. 
Furthermore, while Professor Hatcher indicts this practice, his argument is functionally similar to the one 
advanced in this Article. Professor Hatcher emphasizes the structural dimensions of fiscal federalism, 
arguing that it transcends party or ideology, causing state officials to vehemently oppose any proposed cuts 
to Medicaid. See id. at 111–12. 
 343 See Charles A. Reich, Beyond the New Property: An Ecological View of Due Process, 56 BROOK. 
L. REV. 731, 731 (1990) (remarking that “[t]wenty years later, we must confront the fact that the road opened 
by Goldberg v. Kelly has not been taken”). 
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can claim credit for the forty million Americans who receive SNAP and the 
approximately seventy million Americans who receive Medicaid.344 But it is to 
say that the procedure–substance trade-off that spooked Justice Black in 
Goldberg v. Kelly and the Burger Court in Mathews v. Eldridge has not come 
to pass for two of the country’s largest anti-poverty programs. The relationship 
between procedure and substantive law in public-benefit programs is more 
complex than either Professor Reich’s or Justice Black’s visions. Unlike 
Reich’s New Property, which thought of procedure as protecting recipients by 
raising the cost of reducing the welfare rolls, this Article recognizes that 
procedure also raises the costs to participate in the program. Given the fiscal 
federalism written into these programs and the APA framework, the 
government agencies administering these programs do not see procedural 
dollars and substantive dollars as fungible. If the funding for substantive 
benefits and the procedures to administer these benefits are not 
interchangeable, there are asymmetries that multiple legal actors can exploit. 
This structural account has difficulty explaining why any state would seek 
a Medicaid work requirement waiver. According to this Article, no state would 
opt to increase procedural hurdles to stymie SNAP and Medicaid applicants 
and recipients. While it might be too much to expect a theory to predict each 
of the fifty state governments’ actions in this area, it could be that the anti-
government ideology of many in the Republican Party overwhelms the fiscal 
incentives inherent in this cooperative-federalism program. Indeed, the 
Medicaid litigation in Arkansas, Kentucky, and New Hampshire exposes this 
illogic. Judge Boasberg repeatedly pointed out that these states are spending 
state resources to kick people off a program that the states are not paying for.345 
Regardless of whether this Article can account for each and every government 
actor’s behavior in this field, this theory does crystallize the current state of 
welfare litigation.  
 The strategies of the New Property’s adherents and its opponents 
underscore this reality. If one canvasses reforms to SNAP and Medicaid 
championed by public interest lawyers and advocates, it has not been to 
increase process à la Reich’s theory, but rather to streamline it. Legal aid 
lawyers have fought for extended certification, telephonic rather than in-person 
 
 344 CTR. FOR BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES, THE SUPPLEMENTAL NUTRITION ASSISTANCE PROGRAM 
(SNAP) (2019), https://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/policybasics-foodstamps.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/UD4G-LPQE]; May 2020 Medicaid & CHIP Enrollment Data Highlights, 
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 345 See supra notes 263–275 and accompanying text. 
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interviews, adjunctive eligibility, and third-party assistance with enrollment.346 
These efforts are a far cry from the formalities of trial-like adjudication 
envisioned by the New Property or the Goldberg majority. That is because low-
income people and their advocates want to reduce the costs of accessing and 
maintaining government services. No legal aid lawyer wants to subject their 
client to more hearings and more documentation, particularly when their client 
is raising children and holding down multiple jobs. Further, what has made 
these procedural simplifications so attractive in this instance is that 
“government” is not singular, but plural. Congress legislates the substantive 
requirements of eligibility, but often leaves federal and state agencies to 
determine the procedures to enroll and recertify. The state agencies that must 
administer these determinations know that their governors and state 
legislatures have to pay for a portion of those procedures, but that the federal 
government pays for the bulk of the benefits themselves. Indeed, in the case of 
SNAP, states only pay for procedure. Therefore, a SNAP state administrator 
can either ratchet up the procedure required for an applicant, understanding 
that it will come out of the state budget, or the administrator can cooperate with 
anti-poverty advocates and create an eligibility system that keeps the benefits 
and the federal funding flowing, benefiting the applicant and the administrator 
alike. As a result, legal aid lawyers use procedure as much as a sword as a 
shield. Goldberg and the other welfare cases from the due process revolution 
expected individual recipients to use fair hearings to defend against arbitrary 
actions. But over the last half century, public interest lawyers have used these 
procedural requirements as a basis to enforce federal law and tie up federal and 
state agencies in the courts.347 Notably, the APA provides procedural 
protections that avoid the problem of case-based due process—which imposes 
time and resource costs on the welfare beneficiaries—and instead impose costs 
on agency rulemaking and action instead. Moreover, the mere threat of 
litigation yields significant leverage in lawyers’ legislative and administrative 
advocacy.348 
On the other side of this conflict, those who are ideologically opposed to 
welfare programs and the New Property’s legacy have also learned this lesson. 
Retrenchers now know that the relationship between procedure and substance 
 
 346 See CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES & CLASP, IMPROVING SNAP AND MEDICAID 
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is more complicated. And they understand that procedure can impose not only 
costs on the government, but also on the recipients themselves. The current 
retrenchment efforts of the Trump Administration offer a straightforward 
application of this theory. Falling short of legislating cuts to SNAP and 
Medicaid in Congress, the Administration’s strategy is to increase the 
procedures and intensify the process by which individuals prove and maintain 
eligibility. 
In particular, this updating of the New Property’s insights helps account 
for the fight over work requirements and public charge discussed in Part II. 
Work requirements in SNAP and Medicaid are best understood not just as a 
substantive legal change (i.e., adding work as a condition of eligibility for both 
programs), but as an imposition of additional procedures through reporting 
requirements. Indeed, these work requirements, like the public charge 
regulation, increase the burden of applying for and maintaining access to public 
benefits. The Trump Administration’s strategy is the converse of efforts by 
previous administrations to extend certification with the elderly and the 
disabled.349 Adjunctive eligibility in SNAP and Medicaid, in which receiving 
one benefit qualifies a recipient for the other, is another example of the legal 
aid strategy. Indeed, the Obama Administration’s HHS spent significant 
agency resources to bootstrap SNAP to the additional resources and 
streamlined processes that the Affordable Care Act envisioned for Medicaid.350 
And the ACA legislated simplified enrollment for its Medicaid expansion.351 
The Trump Administration understands that in order to change the 
substantive welfare law (i.e., who receives benefits and how much), it needs to 
impose additional procedures. By increasing the reporting requirements, the 
Administration and its allies in state government can eliminate people’s food 
and medical assistance without changing the statutory provisions of eligibility. 
From its perspective, it does not matter what the additional procedural 
requirement entails. As long as the requirement is an additional hurdle to prove 
 
 349 See STATE OPTIONS REPORT, supra note 182, at 27 (detailing how states can opt-in to extended 
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 350 See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., MEDICAID/CHIP AFFORDABLE CARE ACT 
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or maintain eligibility, it can deter access. For instance, drug testing is not just 
about signaling that welfare recipients are scroungers and assuring the public 
that they are not financing addiction through the government fisc; it also 
creates an obstacle that applicants must overcome.352 Work requirements, at a 
level of generality, serve the same function. Forcing a recipient to jump 
through some additional hoop to maintain benefits—whether that is a drug test 
or a work requirement—is a cost to an individual for whom time and resources 
are particularly scarce. With these hurdles, the Trump Administration can limit 
access to SNAP and Medicaid not with direct cuts, but through furtive actions. 
This Article’s account of welfare litigation does not line up neatly with 
previous accounts of the relationship between procedural and substantive law. 
Several commentators have expressed skepticism about the due process 
revolution’s salutary effects on agency action.353 In administrative law, some 
scholars have bemoaned how judges have beaten a hasty retreat to the 
protection of the administrative state.354 But the resilience of two of the largest 
government programs over the last half century suggests that judges have not 
been subservient to the administrative state, as some would suggest, but that 
judges have helped to protect this area of public law. Administrative law 
presumes some background allocation of constitutional authority, and in this 
area, judges have not been missing in action. Litigation has proven to be a 
useful mechanism for building the public law of public benefits. Of course, this 
is not the judicial role that critics of the administrative state envision. These 
scholars often exhort judges to construe statutes narrowly to minimally disrupt 
private rights best understood through principles of common law.355 But that 
 
 352 See 1115 Medicaid Waivers in Wisconsin, FAMS. USA (Oct. 31, 2018), https://web.archive.org/ 
web/20190707151724/https://familiesusa.org/waivers-wisconsin [https://perma.cc/EK89-YVVX] 
(requiring a “Health Risk Assessment” of Medicaid recipients in place of Wisconsin’s original proposal to 
include a mandatory drug test for all Medicaid applicants). 
 353 See generally JERRY L. MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE (1983) (arguing that the elements 
associated with due process in adjudicatory proceedings are inadequate in the social-welfare context); JERRY 
L. MASHAW, DUE PROCESS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE (1985) (proposing a more streamlined 
understanding of administrative due process that accounts for institutional competency and political goals); 
Jerry L. Mashaw, The Management Side of Due Process: Some Theoretical and Litigation Notes on the 
Assurance of Accuracy, Fairness and Timeliness in the Adjudication of Social Welfare Claims, 59 CORNELL 
L. REV. 772, 820–23 (1974) (proposing management solutions to due process adjudication issued in the 
administrative-state context). 
 354 See, e.g., ADRIAN VERMEULE, LAW’S ABNEGATION 6 (2016) (describing law’s “considered, 
deliberate, voluntary, and unilateral surrender” to the administrative state). 
 355 See PHILIP HAMBURGER, IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL? 493–512 (2014). But see Paul 
Craig, The Legitimacy of US Administrative Law and the Foundations of English Administrative Law: 
Setting the Historical Record Straight 58 (June 30, 2016) (Oxford Legal Stud., Research Paper No. 44/2016), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/a=2802784 [https://perma.cc/2U7K-HMRG] (characterizing Professor 
Hamburger’s work as “misconceiv[ing] the administrative state and the way in which it was perceived during 
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tradition of using private law as the source of background assumptions for 
interpreting public law fails to provide much guidance in areas where public 
law itself is the source of private rights. Indeed, that may have been Charles 
Reich’s point all along.356 If government is the source of the property right, the 
holder of that right must be afforded sufficient legal protections. Otherwise, 
Reich warned, the government would abuse its position over the property 
against the individual.357 
Beyond administrative law, in criminal procedure, Professor Bill Stuntz 
is credited with crafting a highly influential account of how the federal courts’ 
insistence on greater procedural protections engendered ever harsher criminal 
law.358 It is certainly possible that Stuntz’s perversity thesis is not inconsistent 
with this Article’s account of procedure and substantive law in a different 
context. Nor does this Article suggest that procedure builds substantive law. It 
does, however, advance the more modest claim that the relationship between 
financing procedure and substance in the welfare context is more complicated 
than the New Property predicted, or earlier legal scholarship suggests. And 
furthermore, the relationship between procedure and substance can only be 
understood by tracing which government institution funds and administers 
these programs, something Stuntz understood when it came to prosecutors and 
police, but which subsequent scholars may misapply to other corners of the 
administrative state. 
 
the seventeenth century and thereafter, the very time period on which he draws when using material from 
England”). 
 356 See Reich, supra note 12, at 739 (“As government largess has grown in importance, quite naturally 
there has been pressure for the protection of individual interests in it.”). 
 357 See id. at 786 (concluding that “[o]nly by making such benefits into rights can the welfare state 
achieve its goal of providing a secure minimum basis for individual well-being and dignity in a society 
where each man cannot be wholly the master of his own destiny”). 
 358 See, e.g., William J. Stuntz, The Political Constitution of Criminal Justice, 119 HARV. L. REV. 781, 
810 (2006) (“State legislators and members of Congress have spent where they could govern. Constitutional 
law made governing policing hard, governing litigation somewhat easier, and governing punishment very 
easy indeed. Legislators have spent accordingly.”); William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between 
Criminal Procedure and Criminal Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 32–34 (1997) (discussing how low funding and 
high costs of indigent defense impacts the severity of criminal case outcomes); see also Donald A. Dripps, 
Why Gideon Failed: Politics and Feedback Loops in the Reform of Criminal Justice, 70 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 883, 902–07 (2013) (discussing different academic critiques of the Warren Court’s criminal procedure 
decisions around right to counsel); David Alan Sklansky, Killer Seatbelts and Criminal Procedure, 
119 HARV. L. REV. F. 56, 56–57 (2006) (summarizing and contesting Professor Stuntz’s argument that the 
Warren Court’s “criminal justice revolution . . . has worsened the very ills it was intended to remedy”). But 
see Margo Schlanger, No Reason to Blame Liberals (Or, The Unbearable Lightness of Perversity 
Arguments), NEW RAMBLER (2015), https://newramblerreview.com/book-reviews/law/no-reason-to-blame-
liberals-or-the-unbearable-lightness-of-perversity-arguments [https://perma.cc/X7AZ-H39R] (reviewing 
NAOMI MURAKAWA, THE FIRST CIVIL RIGHT: HOW LIBERALS BUILT PRISON AMERICA (2014), and 
suggesting that perversity arguments might be particularly seductive to academics). 
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B. The New Property in the Age of Statutes 
The surprising durability of SNAP and Medicaid demonstrates the 
enduring strength of the New Property, but the path of both programs moves 
us away from a focus on constitutional due process and individual adjudication 
to the main events of the administrative state: appropriations and rulemaking. 
Recently, scholars have sought to explain how American public law is made 
in the absence of constitutional amendments and an increasingly unproductive 
Congress.359 One such effort is the notion that some statutory schemes become 
so entrenched by judicial interpretations, agency action, and congressional 
acquiescence that they are best understood as “super statutes.”360 This literature 
often identifies the Social Security Act as a prime example of a federal statute 
that, over time, has attained a status of higher law.361 Importantly, this scholarly 
literature does not discount the role of courts and litigation. However, instead 
of conceiving of courts as fora to resolve individual disputes, this literature 
attends to how litigation serves a regulatory function, pushing agencies to 
expound on statutory meaning through rulemaking.362 Furthermore, this 
litigation can discipline federal policymakers who seek to reverse the course 
 
 359 See David A. Strauss, The Irrelevance of Constitutional Amendments, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1457, 
1470–73 (2001) (discussing a deliberate strategy during the New Deal to rely on statutes rather than 
constitutional amendments); cf. Barbara Sinclair, Question: What’s Wrong with Congress? Answer: It’s a 
Democratic Legislature, 89 B.U. L. REV. 387, 387–89 (2009) (challenging the argument that Congress is 
“an increasingly dysfunctional and ineffective institution”). 
 360 See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR. & JOHN FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES: THE NEW AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTION 6–12 (2010); Ernest A. Young, The Constitution Outside the Constitution, 117 YALE L.J. 
408, 412 (2007) (arguing that “[m]any of our most important individual rights—rights against discrimination 
based on age or disability, rights to welfare, medical care, and social security—stem from statutes rather 
than the Constitution”). 
 361 See, e.g., Young, supra note 360, at 424–25 (arguing that “American constitutional culture has 
generally been reluctant to recognize positive rights to housing, food, health care, or economic security, but 
we have created elaborate statutory entitlements to such benefits under the Social Security, Medicare, 
Medicaid, Aid to Families with Dependent Children, and unemployment assistance regimes”). There is also 
the overlapping literature of “small ‘c’ constitutionalism” and “administrative constitutionalism.” See 
Sophia Z. Lee, Race, Sex, and Rulemaking: Administrative Constitutionalism and the Workplace, 1960 to 
the Present, 96 VA. L. REV. 799, 801 (2010) (defining administrative constitutionalism as “regulatory 
agencies’ interpretation and implementation of constitutional law”); see also Gillian E. Metzger, 
Administrative Constitutionalism, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1897 (2013); Bertrall L. Ross II, Embracing 
Administrative Constitutionalism, 95 B.U. L. REV. 519, 585 (2015); Tani, supra note 52, at 825 (applying 
the administrative constitutionalism framework to the Equal Protection Clause). For a dissenting view that 
posits that scholars are wrong to conflate administrative law’s stability with entrenchment or some higher 
law, see Emily S. Bremer, The Unwritten Administrative Constitution, 66 FLA. L. REV. 1215, 1233–34 
(2014). 
 362 See, e.g., David Freeman Engstrom, Agencies as Litigation Gatekeepers, 123 YALE L.J. 616, 624 
(2013) (describing “a growing scholarly literature that aims to re-think the contours and work of the 
administrative state by training attention on the increasingly blurred boundary between administration and 
litigation”). 
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of prior administrations’ regulations.363 And because much of federal agency 
action turns on the cooperation of state governments, judicial review of agency 
action sometimes begins at the behest of state lawmakers.364 
SNAP and Medicaid amplify the chorus of case studies in these 
overlapping literatures. Neither program has grown through formal 
constitutional change or Supreme Court doctrine, as Reich or his 
contemporaries would have predicted. Admittedly, Congress has played an 
active role in reauthorizing the appropriations for SNAP roughly every five 
years through the Farm Bill.365 And Congress has repeatedly expanded 
Medicaid by adding additional eligible populations and services.366 But the 
precise contours of the programs, like the procedures governing benefits 
applications and terminations, have been left to federal agencies.367 
Furthermore, Reich’s theory of the New Property and the due process 
revolution more generally conceived of an individual’s legal protections in 
light of administrative adjudication and constitutional doctrine.368 Yet, as Part 
II shows, the durability of SNAP and Medicaid stems not from fair hearings 
for individual recipients, but through aggregate litigation, and the strongest 
 
 363 See SEAN FARHANG, THE LITIGATION STATE: PUBLIC REGULATION AND PRIVATE LAWSUITS IN THE 
U.S. 20 (2010) (“Lawsuits provide a form of auto-pilot enforcement that will be difficult for bureaucrats or 
future legislative coalitions to subvert . . . .”). To be sure, scholars in the 1980s identified this “auto pilot” 
function. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Rescuing the Private Attorney General: Why the Model of the Lawyer 
as Bounty Hunter Is Not Working, 42 MD. L. REV. 215, 227 (1983) (admitting that private lawsuits 
“perform[] an important failsafe function by ensuring that legal norms are not wholly dependent on the 
current attitudes of public enforcers”); Richard B. Stewart, Crisis in Tort Law? The Institutional Perspective, 
54 U. CHI. L. REV. 184, 198 (1987) (discussing how private enforcement provides a “back-up guarantee of 
redress”). 
 364 See David S. Rubenstein, Administrative Federalism as Separation of Powers, 72 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 171, 174 (2015) (describing administrative federalism as a descriptive inquiry into “the role that 
agencies play in shaping the federal–state balance of power today” and a “visionary project designed to 
shape federalism’s future through adjustments to the existing administrative system”); Miriam Seifter, States 
as Interest Groups in the Administrative Process, 100 VA. L. REV. 953, 954–56 (2014); see also Katherine 
Shaw, State Administrative Constitutionalism, 69 ARK. L. REV. 527, 530–31 (2016) (arguing that 
scholarship on administrative federalism is still “focused on federal agencies as the relevant administrative 
bodies, even if the interests in question are state interests”). 
 365 See Jonathan H. Adler & Christopher J. Walker, Delegation and Time, 105 IOWA L. REV. 1931, 1967 
(2020) (describing the Farm Bill as “[p]erhaps the most-known reauthorization legislation”). 
 366 See Super, supra note 245, at 1592 (“Congress can override agencies’ interpretations of statutes, but 
scarce resources make that difficult, and it rarely does.”). 
 367 See supra Section I.B. 
 368 See Goodwin Liu, Rethinking Constitutional Welfare Rights, 61 STAN. L. REV. 203, 205 (2008) 
(discussing how “[d]uring the 1960s and 1970s, welfare rights held a prominent place on the public agenda 
not only in the legislative process but also in mainstream constitutional discourse” (citing, inter alia, Reich, 
supra note 12)). 
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challenges to government action are not based in the Constitution, but the Food 
Stamp Act, the Medicaid Act, and the Administrative Procedure Act.369 
These cases and their attendant political controversies are far from over, 
but the last four years have shown that executive action in the welfare arena is 
still subject to the rule of law. Ideological opponents of the welfare state, even 
when they enjoy near-total control of the presidency, Congress, and state 
government, cannot easily discard and dismantle anti-poverty programs. So 
long as the peculiar fiscal federalism of welfare administration persists, 
litigation in the federal courts will too. Welfare recipients can wield the law to 
ensure that agencies comport with constitutional due process and federal 
statutory commitments. And, as a result, law will remain an effective tool to 
protect access to food and medical assistance in the United States. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article does not seek to serve as an apologia for the ways in which 
food assistance and medical assistance have developed in the last fifty years. 
Rather, it works to show that the maturation of both SNAP and Medicaid have 
made these programs harder to dislodge and dismantle by even a unified 
federal government. In light of the ubiquity of committed welfare opponents 
at all levels of federal and state government, the absence of a constitutional 
commitment to basic assistance, and the comparative stinginess of the 
American welfare state, the durability of food and medical assistance in the 
United States is, in a word, surprising. 
Yet, the rights to food and medical assistance are not held equally across 
the American citizenry, let alone the broader society. Put short, public law in 
the United States condemns poor Americans to their fates in states. Despite the 
resilience of Medicaid and SNAP in American society, access to food and 
medical assistance is still not evenly distributed across the country. No 
procedural protections will prevent the federal or state governments from 
perpetuating these discriminatory practices unless we have a conception of 




 369 This contingent, iterative process echoes other discussions of private enforcement. See Sean 
Farhang, Regulation, Litigation, and Reform, in THE POLITICS OF MAJOR POLICY REFORM IN POSTWAR 
AMERICA 48, 69 (Jeffrey A. Jenkins & Sidney M. Milkis eds., 2014) (“As private enforcement regimes have 
diffused across the American regulatory state, the interests formed around them have become more widely 
spread and deeply rooted, increasing the political capacity of the coalition to defend the private enforcement 
infrastructure from retrenchment.”); Engstrom, supra note 362, at 641 (“Over time, private enforcement may 
thus drive legal mandates in very different directions than we might expect if enforcement authority 
remained in purely public hands.”). 
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